The Muslim Brothers in the 1948 war: a march to glory or to prison?
1
“I heard… that Jews would always look for the positions of the Brothers in
order to avoid them in their attack…I started to rely on them in many instances,
especially where valor was required. For example, I sent them to Dir al-Balah, around
100 kilometers to the south, to face an Israeli attack on al-‘Arish. They
showed gallantry and accomplished their goal…I assigned to them many dangerous
missions and every time they did the job with utmost courage. For this I wrote
to the Egyptian presidency requesting that they be given medals.”[1]
2
‘Asluj is a village located on the eastern road. It was captured by the Jews on
the first day of the [first] truce…I delegated to the late Ahmad ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
the responsibility of sending a force to attack it from the east. It was a
small contingent under the leadership of a lieutenant. I sent [also] a bigger
force to attack the village from the West, with support of heavy weapons of
different calibers. But the small army was the one that was able to conquer the
village…the matter is not about officers. It is about morale.”[2]
3 “O Muslim Brothers do not be
concerned with that which takes place in Egypt. Your responsibility is to fight
the Jews!”[3]
For the Arabs, the year 1948 will always
be remembered as the year in which Palestine was lost despite, or as a result
of, the Arabs’ attempt to ‘rescue’ it. With many parties and interests at
stake, a unified effort to grab victory eluded the Arabs, but so did the chance
to candidly assess the causes of their defeat. Once the extent of the loss
became clear and the noise of the official rhetoric of glamour and bravado died
down, a conspiracy narrative was quickly taking shape in most Arabic
capitals. The main lines of this
narrative in every capital were clear: our army fought bravely, but the scale
of betrayal by sister nations and the all-evident Western support for the Jews
were too enormous, too great for one country to overcome. In Jordan, it was the
Egyptians’ delays of arm shipments they promised and their failure to advance
toward Tel Aviv per the Arab League’s plan.[4]
In Egypt, the Jordanians reluctance to lend support to their army and their
policy of wait and see left the Egyptian alone in the battlefield to face the
brunt of the Jewish assault.[5]
Other Arab countries found one another guilty of lethargy, timidity or
ineffectiveness. What was true for nations
was also true for militiamen. Qawuqji, for example, found a few parties to
blame including his long time enemy and rival Al-Haj Amin al-Husayni and the Jordanians
who helped both appoint him at the beginning as a leader of the Jaysh al-Inqadh and later protect him as
he continued to enact his circus-like venture in Palestine.[6]
In the background of these official narratives,
a popular one was slowly forming. The popular narrative is one in which the web
of intrigue and deception is far more complex. In this narrative, the Arab
official endeavor came to a devastating end, not because they betrayed each
other (which they did), but because their goal was never to aid the Palestine
resistance. To the contrary, their intervention was meant to provide a cover to
quickly end it. To this end, the official soldiers who went to Palestine were
assured that this would be an uneventful march.[7]
Consequently, when the initial push inside Palestine encountered a stiff
resistance from the Zionists, the marching Arab armies were bogged down, took
stationary defensive positions and their morale started to plummet.
This is a part of a narrative that the volunteers,
who fought along side Arab regular armies, and who eventually clashed with them
because of divergent goals and strategies, told. Some of the most prominent
units of these volunteers came from the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood,
whose role is the focus of this paper. The paper seeks to examine how the
contribution of the Muslim Brothers to the war (as it was corroborated by the
testimonies of non-Brothers) and the Brothers’ own narrative of their
contribution, further our understanding what was at stake and what took place
in 1948.
What follows should therefore be
understood as a discussion of a narrative. But this is a narrative that claims
as much lineage to facts as it is to the perspective of those who narrate it.
It is, therefore, indispensable to understanding some of the mysteries of the
1948 war. It is indispensable because it sheds light on an angle of what went
on in the Arab front, an angle that was accidentally or deliberately overlooked
by Arab official historiography, Western sources and Israeli revisionist
historians. This is a narrative whose various threads point to a level of
fracturing in the Arab camp that went far beyond those acknowledged and valued
in the existing historiography. By doing so, it challenges the common wisdom
that the Arab defeat in 1948 was per se a product of the Arab inter-state
rivalry, the Israelis’ clever exploitation of them and the latters increasing
stock of weapons.
As other aspects of the Arab popular historiography
points to the role which Glubb Pash and Qawuqji played in demilitarizing the
Palestinian resistance (a process which received only a cursory reference in
some of the English literature)[8]
and the devastating impact of such a step, this narrative illustrates a
parallel campaign, equally deleterious if not more so, on the Egyptian front.
At a time when the impact of the shift in the military balance between the
Arabs and the Zionists started to be felt, when the Arabs needed the energy and
skills of the already too few soldiers they had on the battlefield, the
decision-makers in the Arab world were deeply invested in other battles whose
goals and management seemed to compromise the presumably central effort at
hand.
The discussion below shows that— although
the Muslim Brothers’ contribution was not as grand as the Brothers would like
it to be perceived— the Brothers’ effort in 1948 was significant. Not only did
the Muslim Brothers send a well-trained corps of volunteers, which was capable
of sabotaging enemy supply lines, defending its positions, and mounting
effective assaults on enemy sites. They also constituted an efficient force
that (when it wasn’t constrained) protected the right flank of the Egyptian
regular army, and provided it with light and rapidly deployable units, giving its
stationary battalions the kind of maneuverability they lacked. In other words,
it is evident from the corroborated aspects of the Brothers’ narrative that
their deeply motivated and religiously driven body of volunteers was an asset
to the Arab side. They were an energy whose presence provided momentum to the
Egyptian initial push, and helped them keep their positions when their drive
wore down. Although by constraining this force and pushing it out of the
military equation the Egyptians may not have precipitated their defeat, they
certainly contributed to it.
The Pre-War effort of the
Brothers
The early interest of the society of the Muslim
Brothers in the Palestinian issue was mentioned by a number of historians. Lia,
for example, noted “the prompt establishment of its Palestinian campaign in May
of 1936.”[9]
Along with several other Muslim youth organizations in Egypt, the Muslim
Brothers undertook a concerted propaganda campaign to alarm the Egyptian public
to the plight of the Palestinians and the importance of this matter to the
Egyptian national interest. The Brothers were the first to heed the
impassionate call made by the Grand Mufti of Palestine on May 7th,
1936 to the Muslims and Arabs to help the Palestinians. Their leadership
quickly gathered in Cairo and took several actions to help the Palestinians. These
included fundraising campaigns throughout Egypt to which all the movement branches
were dedicated. But where the Muslim
Brothers impact was felt was on the media front. The movement foot soldiers as
well as its leading figures flooded mosques, cafes, and schools to raise awareness
of the Palestinian issue and urge the population to do something for Palestine.
They drew a list of Egyptian Jewish merchants who were thought to provide
support to the Zionist activities and urged people to boycott them. The
Brothers also published articles and issued protest letters to government
representatives, embassies (such as that of Britain), and notables in Cairo.[10]
This propaganda campaign would become a
feature of the Muslim Brothers’ response to the Palestinian issue in the coming
years both during and after the Revolt.
In the winter and spring of 1948, as the war between the Palestinian
resistance movement and the Hagana intensified, the Muslim Brothers embarked on
a similar campaign. Like its predecessors, this was a multi-tracks effort that
included massive publications and distribution of stories and images that
highlighted the plight of the Palestinians, collecting, procuring and
transferring fund and arms to the Palestinians.[11]
The vitality of the Muslim Brothers media effort, especially the wide scale
printing of the booklet, al-Nar w
al-Damar fi Filistin, led the British to pressure the Egyptian government
to close down the Muslim Brothers printing houses and confiscate thousands of copies
of this publication.[12]
The
campaigns which the Brothers launched on behalf of the Palestinians from mid
1930s onward are well known and hardly a subject of dispute.[13]
Hasan al-Banna sought in particular to enlist, not only the help of Muslim notables
for the Palestinian cause, but also those of Egyptian Jewish and Christian
background. Al-Banna, for example, wrote to the Coptic Patriarch urging him to
lend his moral and financial support to the Palestinian cause, stressing that
this is not a Muslim cause, but an Arab one. But like many other Egyptian personalities,
“The Coptic Patriarch did not even
bother to reply.”[14]
However, Arab leftist historiography and some Western sources that
relied on it charged the Muslim Brothers with duplicity.[15]
They accused the Muslim Brothers of using the Palestinian issue to raise the
profile of the movement and to finance its branches. This view became prominent
in the English literature with the Israeli scholar, Israel Gershoni, who wrote
on the Brothers’ reaction to the Arab Revolt in Palestine between 1936 and
1939. Gershoni asserts that:
The Arab Revolt, the growing interest in the
fate of Palestine, and the determination to 'rescue' the Palestinian Arabs
which found expression in massive campaigns allover Egypt- all transformed the
Palestine issue into the principal springboard to prominence of the Muslim
Brothers. More than any other organization in Egypt, the Society was successful
in riding the first waves of solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs then
beginning to spread throughout the Egyptian public. By arousing, stimulating
and organizing expressions of sympathy and solidarity, the Society exploited
them, through its special 'Palestinian' bodies, often in a clearly instrumental
way, to strengthen its own ranks and expand its activities.[16]
But Brynjar Lia, who examined the various
arguments about the exploitation of the Palestinian issue and its relationship
to the rapid expansion of the movement, rightly concluded that “the
exploitation theory rests heavily on the assumption that the Muslim Brothers
misappropriated the fund which they raised for the Palestinian Arabs…[but] this
claim is at best an exaggeration, at worst completely unfounded.”[17]
The Muslim Brothers went even further in
their effort to consolidate the Palestinian effort. Hasan al-Banna, who enjoyed
a special relationship with al-Haj Amin al-Husayni and the Higher Arab
Committee he headed, sent several delegations to Palestine between 1936 and
1947. The earlier delegations had the aim of spreading the teachings of the
Muslim Brothers.[18]
However, the focus would later shift to supporting the Palestinian effort to
create a local force after the British had brutally crashed the Revolt,
creating a shortage of weapons and trained men amongst the Palestinians. This
came at a time when there was a rise in weapons and trained soldiers on the
Zionist side. The Brothers helped train and later unify the Palestinian two
main factions, Najada and Futuwa.[19]
For this latter goal, al-Banna dispatched the head of their infant military
wing, al-Sagh Mahmud Labib. Labib, an Egyptian officer with a history of
insurgency against the British and the Italians, joined the Muslim Brothers in
1938. Ever since, Labib became instrumental in the creation of the (in)famous Muslim
Brothers’ military wing, al-Nidham
al-Khas. He also served as their liaison to the movement of the Free
Officers.
In Palestine, which he visited twice (one
in late 1930s and again in 1947) with a mandate from al-Banna to help the
Palestinians organize their militias, Labib brought the two factions under his
command forming a new group called Munadhamat
al-Shabab al-‘Arabi al-Filistini. His activities inside Palestine soon alarmed
the British who arrested and deported him.[20]
Thomas Myer speculated that Labib’s work “was the most important attempt to
unify all the Palestinian Arab youth organizations,” adding that such prospect
would have created “the nucleus of an organized Palestinian Arab Army.”[21]
Although this initiative “collapsed with the deportation of Labib,” some of the
Brothers’ volunteers, whom Labib had brought, remained in Palestine and a few
more joined them between February and March of 1948 to participate in the
fighting between the Hagana and Jaysh
al-Jihad al-Muqadas.[22]
The Brothers’ War: rhetoric
and reality
As the situation deteriorated in
Palestine in late 1947 and early 1948, the Muslim Brothers intensified their
local campaign pressuring the Egyptian government and the Arab League to take
actions. The movement, which then claimed a million members, organized several demonstrations
to decry the indolence of the Arab neighbors of Palestine. The Brothers
criticized in particular “the inaction of the Egyptian government and its
dependence on the British.”[23]
Although this campaign and the highly
charged atmosphere it generated was one of several factors that led to the
Egyptian involvement in the war, the Muslim Brothers had subsequently
maintained that was the opposite of their intended goal. They contend that al-Banna
opposed the intervention of regular Arab armies, warning that they were ill
trained and ill equipped to enter what was essentially asymmetric warfare. Instead, he preferred that Egypt and other
Arab countries help the Palestinians arm themselves and allow volunteers to
enter Palestine.[24]
Indeed, enabling the Palestinians to take
charge of their fate is a central theme in the Muslim Brothers historiography
and the premise of their critique of official Arab military intervention and
the historiography it generated. To prove their commitment to this strategy the
braches of the movement, especially in Cairo, but also in other Egyptian towns,
started to welcome volunteers desiring to join the fight in Palestine. And a process
of screening to determine those physically fit to join the combat was
subsequently carried out.[25]
The Muslim Brothers historiography
purports that thousands of their members showed their desire to die for the
Palestinian cause by registering to volunteer. Some Arab and Western historians
argue that these numbers were in the hundreds, not in the thousands. They point
out not only to contradictions between the figures that the Muslim Brothers
gave (al-Banna for example spoke of 10,000 whereas Labib of 2,000 trained
volunteers[26]),
but also to the small number of volunteers that eventually found their way to
Palestine. The critics of the movement believe that it engaged in a massive
propaganda campaign to cover the fact that the outcome of its recruitment drive
was very unimpressive. Because it was unable to secure the necessary number to
fight in Palestine, these critics contend, the movement drugged Egypt to the
war.[27]
It is almost impossible, like in many
other aspects of the war, for an independent observer to arrive based on the
existing literature at any conclusive assessment. There are, however, a few
evident facts that reveal both the scale of the movement’s contribution to
volunteers and the underlying factors that dictated such scale irrespective of
the movement’s clear commitment to the cause. Indeed, the critics of the
movement are correct in pointing to the relatively small number of the Brothers
that joined the fight in Palestine. A summative reading of all the conflicting
and confusion reports in the Muslim Brothers memoirs and the nature of the
combats in which they were involved, show that the volunteers of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers remained under 3000. The Syrians and Jordanian Brothers
contributed far smaller numbers. Although there were hundreds of very religious
Libyans, Sudanese and dozens of Tunisians and Moroccans, there is no evidence
to indicate that these were Muslim Brothers. Of course, this raises the
important question of why would a movement, which championed the call for
liberating Palestine and built much of its credentials on its unwavering
commitment to that cause, fail to dispatch except such minuscule numbers? Or to borrow the words of Haim Levenberg, why
wasn’t “an extremist religious society, which became so famous in the Arab
world for its superior organization...able to dispatch…[except] a few hundred
volunteers”?[28]
For Levenberg, and other critics of the
movement, the answer is plain and simple: the movement was unwilling, not
unable to dispatch volunteers. The movement chose to keep the bulk of its
soldiers for its ‘main’ war against the Egyptian regime. This view is rather
simplistic and the true answer seems to rest elsewhere. There are at least three
factors that are helpful to consider. The first is the social environment in
which the Brothers operated. The memoirs
of the Muslim Brothers speak to a disparity between the enthusiasm of the
members to join the combat and their families’ opposition to it. ‘Ali Mustafa
Nu‘man, one of the early volunteers to go to Palestine in March of 1948, speaks
in his memoir of how his family, and his father in particular, was against his
departure to Palestine:
After I received the order to get ready
to travel, I informed my father and my mother. But my father objected to that,
stating that he needs me to help him care for my siblings. My mother showed at
first some understanding, but she did not agree with me. When she saw me in a
uniform as I came to see them off, she fell [motionless] on the ground.
Although Nu‘man went despite his parents’
opposition, and even though situations of this kind are expected from most
parents, they seem recurrent in these memoirs. Of course, there are fewer
references to feelings of pride and joy that some parents demonstrated when
they saw their youth marching to the battlefield. These stories, however,
reveal an important fact about the rapid growth of the movement at the time,
namely that many of those who joined the movement at this time came from
families where most members either didn’t convert, or weren’t thoroughly
immersed in the movement’s teachings. This aspect would be remedied later when
the movement started to focus on the family as a unit of organization. In
general, it is safe to assume that the opposition of parents (regardless of how
limited or wide spread was this phenomenon), would have dissuaded some of the
Brothers from volunteering. After all, the Brothers speak in their memoirs of a
general state of lethargy and indifference amongst the Arabs both inside and
outside Egypt—a state to which they attributed the lack of resolve amongst many
regular soldiers and volunteers from other factions.
The second factor, which is far more
important in this context, is logistical. Before the beginning of the war the
Brothers were under a very close scrutiny from both the British and the
Egyptian government, and their access to arms and training camps was severely
circumscribed. Except in the brief period when the Arab League took the
initiative of opening training camps, the few Brothers who managed to train and
cross the border did so with great difficulty. It suffices to mention that at
one point the movement had to pretend that it volunteers were going on a
scientific exploration journey to Sinai. “Once the mission had arrived in
Sinai, they threw off their scientific cover and infiltrated into Palestine.”[29]
Once the war began, there were two stages that bear on the question of training
and logistics. Like most other participants, the Brothers were optimistic
during the early stages of the war that the combination of Arab regular armies
and the few other factions would defeat the Zionists.
Starting from the second truce in July,
the Brothers had already seen the progress of the war and were restless as some
of these memoirs indicate. But the old restrictions on their ability to train
or dispatch volunteers had only been compounded. The arms embargo that Western
powers placed on the Arabs made it difficult for Arab governments, not just for
a 20-years old popular movement of largely poor and minimally educated
constituency, to obtain arms.
The third factor, which is connected to
the second, is political. By this time, the Brothers and the government of Nuqrashi
were already on a collision course and the movement was deeply enmeshed in the
political struggle in Egypt. Al-Banna and a few of his close associates had
already been arrested at least once and the tension between the movement and
the government was on the rise. As a clear sign of this tension, an attempt in
mid October by Shaykh Muhammad al-Farghaly, the supreme leader of the Brothers’
regiments in Palestine, to collect arms and smuggle volunteers to improve the
deteriorating situation in Palestine led to his arrest under the charge that
these weapons were intended for domestic use.[30]
This would lead to further raids on the premises of the Muslim Brothers and
more arrests, a series of events that culminated in the prime minister’s
(in)famous decree to dissolve the movement on December 8, 1948.[31]
In general, it is clear that not all
those who registered were able to find suitable training. Nor were all those
who received training had the chance to cross the border into Palestine.
Moreover, the general atmosphere, especially the political turmoil that
accompanied the campaign of incarceration against the movement distracted it
from doing the little that it could have done to aid its members in
Palestine. Of course, with the decree
and the subsequent debacle, the movement had more pressing concern than
supplying its volunteers in Palestine or trying to train and dispatch new ones.
Yet, Banna was clear in a letter (cited above) to his men in the battlefield
that they should stay on task and the existing historiography shows that they
did.
The Brothers and the Hero
Although the argument that Banna was
against the involvement of regular Arab armies is not found outside the Muslim
Brothers’ historiography, it seems quite credible in light of subsequent
developments. After the United Nations voted for the Partition of Palestine in
November of 1947, the Arab League announced, with a tacit approval— it would
seem— from the Egyptian government, that it would enlist and train volunteers.
In parallel with this move, several Egyptian officers petitioned for a leave
from the army, and soon started to oversee the training of volunteers at a few
training camps set up across Egypt.[32]
Ikhwani literature has it that Banna quickly sent 1,000 of his volunteers to be
trained.[33]
Although not all of the volunteers
trained by these officers were from the Muslim Brothers, and the majority of
the officers may not have been affiliated or influenced by them, one officer
would stand out. Colonel Ahmed ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, a man with some revolutionary
credential (participated in the 1919 anti-British riots in which one of his
brothers was killed by a British officer, promoting Ahmed to stab another
officer—an offense for which he was arrested and imprisoned), and a bright
history in the Egyptian Cavalry, would lead the first group of these volunteers
to enter Palestine, crossing the Egyptian Palestinian border near Rafah in the
latter part of April of 1948. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was a companied by 804 volunteers
from different countries (Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) and several Egyptian
organizations. His group came to be known as the battalion of the Ikhwan.[34]
The question of how many of these volunteers
were, indeed, of ikhwani persuasion
is subject to some debate in the historiography between those who belittle the
contribution of the Ikhwan and those
who exaggerate it. Thomas Mayer, for
example, contended that the volunteers of the
Muslim Brothers constituted only a small portion of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz battalion. He argued that “ the
Society’s active participation in the military activities in Palestine was
extremely small,” indicating that “the valor of the relatively few ikhwan who took part in the fighting
could not make for their small number.”[35] Thomas claimed that ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz mentioned only 344 Egyptian volunteers and 118 regular Egyptian
soldiers in his battalion. The rest of the battalion came from Libya and
Tunisia. These seemingly contradictory views could be reconciled in one of two
ways. The first is a relative majority argument, which means that the Muslim
Brothers volunteers were the single largest group inside this army, although
they constituted only around one third of the total volunteers. The second
explanation, which is somewhat speculative, would be to assume that some of the
regular soldiers were already members of the movement at the time of their
arrival or converted during the course of the war. In general, the Bothers
accounts, which are corroborated by later developments, suggest that most of
the leadership in this battalion were members of or sympathizers with the ikhwan. This explains the excellent
rapport between ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and the Brothers, which earned him the
displeasure of the regime in Cairo and perhaps led to his mysterious death by a
‘friendly’ fire in September 22 of 1948.
It should be noted, however, that ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz’s ideological affiliation remains an enigma. Although he is portrayed
in some of the Ikhwani literature as a member of the movement, the evidence is
inconclusive at best. In fact, most of the literature of the Ikhwan— although praise ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
commitment, his religious leanings and his sympathy with the movement— mentions
no specific date in which he joined the group.[36]
There are, however, vague references to meetings with Banna.[37]
Husayn Hijazi in his memoirs gives an account of a meeting with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
at their camp in Sur Bahir (southern
outskirts of Jerusalem) on June 6. The latter who just came back from Cairo
told Hijazi: “Hasan al-Banna sends you his greetings and I will grant you a
leave because he wants to meet you.”[38]
However, Hijazi contradicts himself a few pages later in his account when he
asserts that “Ahmad ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was
not a member of any organization inside or outside the army,” adding that “His
first contact with the Brothers was in April of 1948, and got to know their
spiritual and political leadership only in July of 1948.”[39]
A few pages earlier Hijazi brings yet another account that further complicates
the question of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s affiliation. Back in Cairo in late September
1948, Hijazi was in a meeting with al-Banna at the Brothers headquarter. Banna
opened the meeting addressing Hijazi “Of course you are upset on account of
this news [referring to the killing of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz]?” Banna added, “They used
to think that he is one of the Brothers.”[40]
This latter sentence coming from the General Guide almost amounts to a denial
of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s membership in the movement, but one cannot take this
statement at its face value. There would remain the question of whether Hasan
al-Banna sensing the impending confrontation between the Muslim Brothers and
the government, and fearing the disclosure of other ties with some Egyptian
officers inside Egypt or in Palestine, made the statement to camouflage the
extent of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s relation with the movement. In that sense, the
statement could very well be an affirmation, not a denial.
Regardless of whether he was or he wasn’t
a member, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz led a group of volunteers, where the most dedicated and
the best trained were Muslim Brothers. This was true of those came with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
from Egypt, those who preceded him and had now to work under his command, as
well as those who joined in the later stages of the war. (Trickles of Ikhwan
continued to arrive until the arrest of al-Shaykh
Farghali in late October of 1948).
A few weeks before ‘Abd al’Aziz’ entry
into Palestine, a contingent of the Muslim Brothers led by Sagh Labib had
already crossed the border and started to harass Zionist settlements around
Gaza. The group, which conflicting reports put anywhere between 100 and 260 of
lightly armed and trained men, had tried to capture the settlement of Kfar
Darum in mid April. The attempt broke in disarray before the fortifications of
the settlement and several of the assailants died and some sustained injuries.
The battle gave the Muslim Brothers their first bitter taste of war and led
them to adapt a more cautious strategy of besieging and harassing settlements in
lieu of directly assaulting them.[41]
A second attempt to capture Kfar Darum took place in early May. The attack was
made under the command of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz who insisted, against the advice of
those who participated in the first attempt, that he must capture the strongly
fortified settlement. The plan was that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz soldiers would soften the
defenses of the settlements with heavy artillery throughout the night, opening
the way for a contingent of the Brothers to enter the settlement in the early
hours of dawn. Poor coordination between ‘Abd al-‘Aziz artillerymen (who didn’t
started to fire until dawn when the Brothers’ positions became exposed), and
the stiff resistance that the defenders of the settlement shown, led to
confusion and forced ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to call off the attack as causalities
amongst his men rose. The Muslim Brothers claimed that seventy of their men
died and dozen were injured—many of whom died or wounded as a result of the
tardy and inordinate use of the artillery by their comrades.[42]
The second attack on Kfar Darum was an
important lesson for ‘Aziz and a real test for the combination of conventional maneuvers
he learned in the Egyptian army and the asymmetric tactics that the shape and
weapons of al-Quwat al-Khafifa (the
Light Force) he commanded warranted. It was also a test to the ability to
synchronize the work of the regular soldiers in his battalion, who preferred to
fire from a distance, and the Brothers who would plunge into enemy lines
irrespective of dangers. The lessons learned from the Kfar Darum would be
implemented in the subsequent attacks on other Zionist positions including the
tight siege on Kfar Darum itself before its capture on May 16th, the
successful assault on Bi’r al-Sabu‘ on
May 19th and the clearing of the settlements on the road to al-Khalil.
Before charging east toward Bi’r al-Sabu‘ and then north to
al-Khalil and Ramat Rahil, closing in on the Zionist settlements (in Tel Biot, Sur Bahir and around Jabal al-Mukabir) on the southern
outskirts of al-Quds, ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz
and his volunteers provided coverage for the Egyptian army as it entered Palestine
on May 15th. The Egyptian
command wanted ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz to assume the task of securing Egyptian supply
lines, as the regular army marched northward along the coast. But ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz rejected this task on the ground that it was far less ambitious than what
he and his men had hoped their training would be used for. A comprised was
reached whereby ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz was given some freedom of action. In exchange of
that leeway, he was expected to advance in parallel with the main Egyptian
army, protecting their right flank and lending support whenever he was called
on. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was to receive his commands from the Egyptian commanders on
the ground and his material support from the Arab League.[43]
Some of the operations that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
and the Brothers carried out took place before the Arrival of the Egyptian
army. In his seminal work on the Arab Israeli conflict, the renowned Arab historians,
Muhammad Hasanin Haykal, mentioned a number of operations that the volunteers
carried out before and after the arrival of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. These included an
attack on the settlement of Dir al-Balah
by the Muslim Brothers on April 14 1948. Haykal attributed this attack to 123 volunteers
of the Muslim Brothers who were working with a group of Palestinians loyal to
al-Haj Amin al-Husayni. The Brothers also attacked another settlement around Khan Yunis on the 5th of May.
On the 10th of May, the Brothers—now working under ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
command—captured al-‘Awja. On May 15th another attack was launched
against Danjor settlement. In the meanwhile, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz captured a few hills
to the east of Gaza city. On May 23rd, Aziz and the Brothers,
working in close coordination with Palestinian fighters, launched one of their
deadliest assaults on the settlement of Ramat Rahil. An estimated 300 of the
defenders were killed. [44]
Prior to the first truce, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz had
made a speedy northward march. Although
he was able to neutralize a number of Jewish settlements on the way between
Gaza, ‘Asluj, Bir al-Sabu‘ and Bayt Lahim, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bypassed many
of the settlements.[45]
He was worried that his soldiers, whose numbers continued to dwindle, as many
were stationed to secure the newly captured sites, would face a scenario
similar to that of Kfar Darum. He adopted with great success, the Brothers’
earlier tactics of intercepting settlers’ supply convoys and subjecting
settlements to continuous bursts of heavy fire, thereby exhausting settlers and
forcing them to either surrender or to fight in the open. The success of ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz’s tactic and his rapid move toward the north, the respect he
commandeered amongst his men, and the rapport he built with the Palestinians
(in contrast to the state of distrust and tension that typified their
relationship with regular Arab armies who often suspected them of espionage for
the enemy) made ‘Abd al-A’ziz a popular hero both inside Palestine and back at home
in Egypt.[46]
The Brothers amongst soldiers
But ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s popularity must have
made him a subject of some jealousy and envy from other military commanders who
weren’t as successful as he was. Ibrahim Shabik speaks— in a comment about the
mysterious death of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz— of an apparent disagreement between him and
al-Mawawi, the general commander of the Egyptian forces in Palestine. According
to Shakib, the latter thought that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz— because of the fame he
gained—started to bypass him and speak directly to the senior officers in
Cairo. Although Shakib was keen on pointing out that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz cleared the
matter with al-Mawawi, the information itself raises suspicion about ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz’ death on September 22nd at the hand of an Egyptian
sentinel on his way to report to al-Mawawi.[47]
But al-Mawawi was not the only party that
‘Abd al-‘Aziz might have displeased. In addition to the British officers who
were weary of the growing cooperation between him and ‘Abdullah al-Tal, ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz was increasingly opening up to those under his command about his views
of the Arab governments—views that wouldn’t have been taken lightly by those in
power in most Arab capitals. Husayn Hijazi cites one speech in which ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz passionately proclaimed:
You are the best of Egyptian youth…you
are the elite, la crème de la crème. You will only come to Egypt as conquerors
(fatihin). We have Palestine before
us; we shall liberate it from the Jews. We will then proceed to the Arab
countries to liberate them from colonialism and its cronies. Ahead of us lies
Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and then we move to Libya, Tunis, Algeria and
Marrakesh, afterward we will enter Egypt as conquerors. This is our mission.[48]
Whether these words reached the
decision-makers in Cairo and whether they decided to take or not to take action
against ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the latter was shot as he approached an Egyptian base on
the 22nd of September. The official story has it that a sentinel
asked ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and the officers accompanying him about the night code.
When they failed to remember it, he got suspicious and fired at them. ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz was the only person killed in the incident. With his death, the
Egyptian front and the volunteers in particular lost a successful commander at
a time when good military leaders seemed in short supply. His death was similar
in magnitude to the loss of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and its impact on the
overall direction of the war had some parallels. The relationship between the
volunteers whether Brothers or foreigners (Libyans, Sudanese or Yemenis) and
the regular Egyptian army deteriorated, and reports of skirmishes, riots and
even imprisonment of volunteers by the army officers are extant in the
historiography of Egyptians and others.[49]
This coincided with a ruthless campaign undertaken by Glubb Pasha to disband
and disarm another component of the volunteers’ corps: members of the Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqadas.
Moreover, the government of Egypt seemed
eager to quickly bury the images of heroism that were painted in the Egyptian
press for ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and his volunteers. Soon after ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s death,
the Brothers noted the disappearance of the correspondents who were embedded
with their units. In their historiography, the Brothers saw first the killing
of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, then the disappearance of the journalists from the field, and
later the banning of the movement as a part of a global plan to liquidate the
Palestinian issue.[50]
Although it is far-fetched to imagine that the Egyptian regime had deliberately
intended to lose the war for the Israelis and to dispense with Palestine, it
was clear that the government wanted to curb the growing influence of the
Muslim Brothers. Since a good deal of the Brothers’ influence came from the perception
of their heroic effort in Palestine, it is reasonable to think that distressing
their volunteers and denying them a media platform constituted preparatory
steps toward an overall dismantling of its structure. The weakening of the
Egyptian front and its impact on the progress of the war was just a consequence
of this policy.
Without leader and without clear
directions, the Brothers continued to fight bravely—although some lost faith and
contemplated going back to Cairo.[51]
Things only got worse as time proceeded. Soon the government in Cairo decided
that the Brothers were a danger to its security and an order was issued for the
commanders on the ground to arrest them. The army implemented some, not all of the
orders. The Brothers were asked to withdraw from their positions and gather in
one guarded camp around Gaza and to keep but not use their arms. Of course, the
Israelis quickly filled the vacuum that the Brothers left and the settlements
they had suffocated started now to breathe.
Despite their new status, the Brothers
were still needed. The Egyptian army, which in a hasty retreat left a few of
its garrisons and battalion stranded, had from time to time to call on the
Brothers for help. Although embittered, the Brother rose to every occasion and
fought with reputed gallantry.[52]
With camels, donkeys and other medieval means of transportations, the Brothers
circumvented or at times penetrated the Zionist lines encircling Faluja to
smuggle in the most needed provision to the besieged Egyptian army,
strengthening their resolve and preventing a disaster. As the Egyptian army’s
position was further compromised, the Brothers were also called on to slow dawn
the Israeli march toward the Egyptian main land. Their intrepid assault to recapture
the Hill 86 gave the feeling that that the war was not all lost.[53]
Being invited for matters that the Egyptian army found too dangerous to handle
was nothing new to the Brothers. Earlier when the Egyptian army was in a better
condition, a small contingent of the Brothers (still then under ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s
command) were called upon to recapture the village of al-‘Asluj from the
Zionist hands after the regular army failed to retake it. A few hours fighting
were enough for the Brothers to secure the village and hand it back to the
Egyptian army, losing only one of their men in the combat.[54]
Yet despite their courage, their small numbers and the political atmosphere
that confined them meant that they couldn’t have changed the outcome of the
war. But that is a projection the Brothers never made.
Conclusion
The war of 1948 in Palestine is a complex
war. Its complexity does not stem from the sophistication of the weapons used;
these were rather primitive by modern standards. Nor is its complexity stems
from the difficulty of determining the victors and the vanquished. These were
clear: the Israelis triumphed and the Arabs defeated. The complexity rather
lies in the challenge of exhausting the factors that made one party emerge so victorious
and the other so defeated. The existing historiography, particularly the
Israeli revisionist history, has significantly contributed to our understanding
of how the Israelis won, debunking the central myths of the traditional Israeli
narrative of a Jewish David and an Arab Goliath. It showed the importance of the
role the arm shipments, which the Israelis brought in during the different
truces, played in turning the tide in their favor. It also points to the
disorganized nature of the Arab effort and the inter-state rivalry that allowed
the Israelis to ‘pick them one a t time.’
The popular Arab historiography, of which
the narrative of the Muslim Brothers’ jihad in Palestine constitutes a key element,
sheds further light on the disarray in the Arab camp. Not only were the efforts
of each Arab state in Palestine primarily conceived in opposition to the
efforts of another Arab state. Within each state, there were deep political and
social ruptures, which the involvement in the war could neither completely
bridge, nor partially attenuate. Deeply invested in domestic campaigns of score
settling, the Arab policy-makers saw the war only as a background to
efficiently carry these campaigns or to properly camouflage them. In the same
way, the Jordanians placed a higher importance on curbing the Palestinian
national aspiration and used the war to further that goal, the Muslim Brothers
memoirs illustrates that the Egyptians had a similar scheme. In the Egyptian
scheme, Palestinians were not the targets; the Muslim Brothers were. The
official Arab world was at war with Israel only in a secondary sense. It takes
a miracle for one to win a war s/he did not fight.
Consulted Sources:
'Abd al-Halim, Mahmud. Al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimun: ah-Dathun Sana'at al-Tarikh. Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa, 1979.
‘Abd al-Mun‘im,
Muhammad Faysal. Asrar 1948. Cairo:
Maktabat al-Qahira al-Jadida, 1968.
Al-Banna, Hasan . Min rasa'il al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimin. Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi bi-Misr, 1954.
Al-Banna, Hasan . Mudhakirat al-da‘wa
w-al-da‘i. Cairo: al-Maktab al-Islamiya li-al-tiba'a wal-nashir, 1948.
Al-Banna, Hasan. Qadiyatuna bayna yaday
al-Ra'y al-'amm al-Misri wal-'Arabi wal-Islami wa al-Dammir al-'Alami.
Unknown: Unknown, 1978.
Al-Jamal, Hasan. Jihad al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Qanat wa
Filistin. Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi‘ wa al-Nashir al-Islamiyya, 2000.
Al-Mut'iny, 'Abd al-'Azim, I.. Tis'ata
'ashara (19) risalatan min Hasan al-Banna ila qiyyadat al-Da'wa.
Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1979.
Al-Sharif, Kamil. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filistin.
Al-Zarqa: Maktabit al-Manar, 1984.
Inwayshi, Mursi. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: al-Tawqu wal Iswaratu.
Cairo: Al-Markaz al-‘Arabi lil I‘lam wa al-Nashir, unknown.
Kamil, Rashad. Harb Filistin 48: Al-Khayba wa al-Khadi‘a,
Hadith al-Watha’iq. Cairo: Dar Nasir li al-Nashir wa al-Tawzi‘, 1998.
Nu‘man, ‘Ali. M. Shahid ‘Ala Jihad al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi
Harb Filistin 1948. Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi‘ wa al-Nashir al-Islamiyya, 2002.
Sayid Jad. Al-Haras al-Hadidi: kayfa kana al-Malik
Faruq yatakhalasu min khusumihi. Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyya al-Lubnaniyya,
1993.
Shakib, Ibrahim. Harbu filistin 1948: Ru’ya Misriyya.
Cairo: Al-Zahra’ Lil I‘lam al-‘Arabi, 1986.
Sidi Ahmad, Rif‘at. Watha’iq Harb Filistin: al-Milafat al-Siriyya
lil Janiralat al-‘Arab. Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, unknown.
Secondary Sources:
Botman, Selma . Egypt from Independence to
Revolution, 1919-1952. Contemporary Issues in the Middle East. New
York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fatah M. The Muslim Brothers and the Palestinian
Question: 1928-1947. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998.
El-Awaisi, ‘Abd Al-Fattah M. "Jihadia
Education and the Society of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers: 1928–49." Journal
of Beliefs & Values 21, no. 2 (2000).
Erlich, Haggai. Students and
University in 20th Century Egyptian Politics. London: Frank Cass, 1989.
Gershoni, Israel and Jankowski, J. P.. Redefining
Egyptian Nation 1930-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Gershoni, Israel. “The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt
in Palestine, 1936-39,”Middle Eastern
Studies, 22, no. 3 (1986): 367-39
Harris, Christina P. . Nationalism and
Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Hague: Mouton
& Co., 1964.
Husaini, Ishak M.. The Moslem Brethren: The
Greatest of Islamic Modern Movements. Beirut: Khayat's College Book
Cooperative, 1956.
Kenney, Jeffery . Muslim Rebels: Kharijites
and the Politics of Extremism In Egypt . Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006.
Kramer, Gurdrun . Hasan al-Banna.
Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2010.
Lia, Brynjar . The Society of the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942. Beirut :
Ithaca Press , 1998.
Marsot ,Agfaf, L. S.. A short
History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Mitchell, Richard P. . The Society of the
Muslim Brothers. . Oxford University Press, 1969.
Myer,
Thomas “The Military Force of Islam: The Soceity of the Muslim Brethen and the
Palestinian Question, 1945-1948,” in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel
(London: Frank Cass, 1982),p. 109.
Rubin, Barry (ed.). The Muslim Brotherhood:
The organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement. New York:
PalGrave Macmillan, 2010.
Vatikiotis,P. J.. The history
of Egypt. 2nd ed. London : Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1969.
Wendell, Charles. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna
(1906-1949). Near Eastern Studies. 20, Berkely: University of
California Press, 1978.
Wright, Esmond. "A bookreview of
"Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt."." Middle
East Journal 5, no. 4 (1951): 515-516.
Yusuf ,al-Sayyid. al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: hal
hiyya sahwatun islamiyya?. Cairo?: Markaz al-mahrusa li eddirasat
wal-nashir, 1994.
.
Notes:
[1]
Testimony of Ahmad Fu’ad Sadiq Pasha, Major general and the commander general
of the Palestine Campaign. See,
Tawfiq
al-Wa‘i, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Shubuhat
wa rudud (al-Mansura: Shuruq li- al-Nashir, 2005), 237.
[2]
Testimony of the Major general Lieutenant Ahmad ‘Ali al-Mawawi, the commander
general of the Palestine Campaign. See;
Tawfiq
al-Wa‘i, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Shubuhat
wa rudud (al-Mansura: Shuruq li- al-Nashir, 2005), 240.
[3] Hasan
al-Banna in a letter to his followers in Palestine after the government of
Egypt dissolved their movement. See ;
‘Ali
Mustafa Nu‘man, Shahid ‘ala jihad
al-Ikhwan fi harb Filistin 48 (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi‘ wa al-Nashr
al-’Islamiyya, 2002), 126.
[4] John
Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (New York: Harper, 1957).
[5]
Muhammad Hasanin Kaykal, al-Juyush wa
al-‘Urush: Qira’a fi yawmiyat al-harb (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1999).
[6] Fawzi
al-Qawuqji, Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji,
1890-1977 (Damascus: Dar al-Numayr, 1995).
It
should be noted in this context that of all the mysteries of the 1948 war,
Qawuqji’s reputation amongst some Arabs as a war-hardened mujahid is by far the strangest. Qawugji was from a very early stage in his military career capable of
working simultaneously for various warring factions. In Syria, Qawuqji fought
along side the Arab mujahidin against
the French, always finding the most opportune terrain and time for his men to
be exterminated and for him to escape unscathed. Once the revolt was defeated,
Qawugji was already the French favored man. During world war II, Qawuqji came
to German as a fervent anti-British revolutionary, but had to escape as
evidence of his espionage on behalf of the British was uncovered. Qawuqji’s
defense was that he was a victim of a setup by Al-Haj Amin al-Husayni. Whether
he was or was not a British spy, Qawuqji’s Salvation Army was the only Arab
faction to cross in broad day light into Palestine with thousands of soldiers
and heavy weapons before the end of the British mandate. Other groups, including the Muslim Brothers,
local Palestinians factions were subjected to more scrutiny and had to smuggle
their volunteers and light arms under cover of darkness.
[7] This is Nuqrash’s
famous statement that is noted throughout the historiography. Egyptian radio
spoke of an effort to discipline the Zionist gangs.
[8] See
for example a short reference to a campaign undertaken ruthlessly by Glubb
Pasha to disarm ‘unruly ’ Palestinians elements in:
Avi
Shlaim, The Collusion Across The Jordan:
King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (New
York: University of Columbia Press, 1988).
[9]
Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt: the rise of an Islamic mass movement 1928-1942. (England: Ithaca Press, 1998), 238.
[10] Mahmud 'Abd al-Halim, Al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimun: ah-Dathun Sana'at al-Tarikh (Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa, 1979).
[11] The
campaign also included a day of rage—a part of a Palestinian Week— in which
British newspapers and magazines were collected and burned to express dismay
with the British press and it coverage of the war in Palestine.
[12] This
was a small, but complex work that featured images, documenting the extent of
the British and Israeli brutalization of the Palestinians.
[13] See Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt:
the rise of an Islamic mass movement 1928-1942.
(England: Ithaca Press, 1998); Israel Gershoni, “The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine,
1936-39,” Middle Eastern Studies, 22,
no. 3 (1986): pp. 367-397, Rashad Kamil, Harb Filistin 48: Al-Khayba wa al-Khadi‘a,
Hadith al-Watha’iq. (Cairo:
Dar Nasir li al-Nashir wa al-Tawzi‘, 1998). Richard
P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969)
[14] Israel
Gershoni, “The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine.”
[15] The
same line of critique was also repeated by the Israeli scholar, Haim Levenberg,
who exhausted every line of argument to stress the contradiction between the movement’s rhetoric
and ‘the marginal’ role it played in Palestine. Levenberg dismissively
concluded that “Al-Banna was using the Jihad
in Palestine as a mask, which enabled him to organize his forces for the
decisive battle inside Egypt.”
Haim Levenberg, Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945-1948 (London: Frank Press, 1993),
178.
As we have seen, Levenberg was not
alone in suspecting that al-Banna was using the Palestinian issue as a cover
for the local strategies of his movement.
[16]
Gershoni, p. 390.
[17] Lia,
p. 241
[18] During
this stage Amin al-Husayni used his clout in Palestine to facilitate the
Brothers’ mission. The Brothers would later pay Husayni back by insisting that
Egyptian should extend military and political support to him, not to his rivals
inside or outside Palestine.
[19] ‘Awni Jadu‘ al-‘Ubaydi, Safahat min hayat al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni: mufti Filistin al-Akbar we
Qa’id Harakatiha al-Wataniyya, (Al-Zarqa: Maktabat al-Manar,1985).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Thomas
Mayer, p. 105.
[22] In
addition to several works by the Muslim Brothers, the presence of the Muslim
Brothers volunteers in Palestinian in the pre 1948 war was mentioned in some
Israeli accounts of the war, such as Uri Milstein who speaks of ‘volunteers
from Saudi Arabia and Muslim Brothers’ in April of 1948.: , History of Israeli War of Independence,
III (University Press of America, 1998) . It was also mentioned in the memoirs
of foreign fighters such as in Mickey Marcus, Cast a Giant Shadow: The Story of Mickey Marcus Who Died to Save
Jerusalem (Manifest Publication, 1999).
[23] Lia,
p. 243.
[24]
Nu‘man, Shahid ‘Ala Jihad al-Ikhwan.
[26] These
may not be a contradiction. Al-Banna was speaking optimistically of a plan, of
the number they would be able to send, whereas Labib spoke of the actual number
of trainees who joined the fight.
[27] Levenberg, Military Preparations.
[28]
Levenberg, p. 178.
[29] Ibid,
175
[30]
Nu‘man, Shahid ‘Ala Jihad al-Ikhwan.
[31]
Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers.
[32] The most famous of these was the Hakstap camp
near the Sues Canal.
[33]
Hijazi, Jama‘atun iftadat ’umma.
[34]
Al-Sanusi Shaluf, Suwar min jihadi
al-Libiyyin bi filistin 1948-1949 (Tripoli: Dar al-Jamahiriyya li al-Nashr
wa al-tawzi‘ wa al-I‘lan, 1982).
[35] Thomas Myer, “The
Military Force of Islam: The Soceity of the Muslim Brethen and the Palestinian
Question, 1945-1948,” in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel
(London: Frank Cass, 1982),p. 109.
[36] This
is quite unusual for a movement with a reasonably good organizational
structure. It is very unlikely that the conversion of an important personality
such as Ahmad ‘Abd al-‘Aziz would go unnoticed or undocumented.
[37] Beyond
their praise of his bravery and his good leadership, the Muslim Brothers only
speak of one meeting between him and Hasan al-Banna.
[38] Husayn
Hijazi, Jama‘a iftadat umma, p. 152
[39] Ibid, p. 169.
[40] Ibid.,
p. 165.
[41]
Hijazi, Jama‘a iftadat umma.
[42]
Partial lists of the names of these martyrs are extant in some of these
memoirs.
[43]
Hijazi, Jama‘a iftadat umma.
[44]
Haykal, p. 167.
[45] The
regular Egyptian army had a similar approach, preferring to leave settlements
behind. Unlike ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and the Muslim Brothers under his command, the
Egyptian regular army did not put much effort into besieging these settlements
and many of them continued to be supplied as the war went on. The inability to
clear these settlements would later facilitate the Israeli counter attack on
the Egyptian stationary posts. The settlements were used as bases to launch
attacks that first distressed and eventually cut off Egyptian supply
lines.
[46] The
Brothers’ memoirs document stories of Arab regular armies arresting local men
and accusing them of cooperation with the Zionists. The Brothers would often
vouch for these men’s integrity and push to set them free. In the
historiography of the Brothers, this was as one of many instances in which the
Arab regular armies were duped by Zionists deception. They would dress in
traditional Arabic attires and assault regular army posts. This led the army to
thin that local men work for the Zionists. These memoirs allude to reports in
the Egyptian press (which I was not able to authenticate) were the betrayal of
the Palestinians was cited as a reason behind their country’s defeat. It should
be noted that the Brothers have always looked with suspicion at the Egyptian
press, and the past 60 years or so have only heightened that feeling.
[47] ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz was coming from a UN sponsored meeting with Moshe Dayan to extricate a contingent of Jewish forces under Dayan’s
command which was besieged by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s army after it occupied a UN
neutral zone to the south of Jerusalem and to redraw the demarcation lines
between the two armies. ‘Abdullah al-Tal, whose increasing cooperation with
‘Abd al-‘Aziz has enraged Glubb Pasha, was also at the meeting. According
Al-Jazeera’s documentary entitled the Road to Jerusalem, which cites the
Memoirs of Kamal al-Din Hussayn (a member of the Free Officers and one of whose
who worked closely with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz), ‘Abd al-‘Aziz survived an attempt on
his life on his way to the meeting with Dayan on September 20th by a
Jewish group and returned to his base.
The meeting was rescheduled and took place on the following day and ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz represented the Egyptian side. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was shot the following
night on his way to report to al-Mawami the outcome of the meeting.
[48]
Hijazi, p. 146
[49] These
reports of the Brothers about disputes with the Egyptian army are corroborated
by similar reports in the memoirs and collection of essays written by some of
the Libyans who participated in the war. The Libyans report harsh and
repressive measures taken their Egyptian superiors. These reports were told in
contrast to the leadership style of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz who were liked by all his
men. It should be noted that these reports are more likely credible at least in
this angle since their authors are not members of the Muslim Brothers. In fact,
some of them critique the Brothers in their narratives. See,
Al-Sanusi
Shaluf, Suwar min jihadi al-Libiyyin bi
filistin 1948-1949 (Tripoli: Dar al-Jamahiriyya li al-Nashr wa al-tawzi‘ wa
al-I‘lan,1982)
[50]
Hijazi, Jama‘a iftadat ’umma.
[51]
Nu‘man, Shahid ‘Ala jihad al-ikhwan
[53] Kamil
al-Sharif, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi harb
filistin.
[54] See
the testimony of Major General Lieutenant Ahmad ‘Ali Al-Mawawi cited at the
very top of this paper. The story of ‘Asluj is corroborated in most of these
accounts by the Brothers and also by other Arab historians such as Haykal.
تعليقات
إرسال تعليق