The Muslim Brotherhood in Western Literature

1. Introduction

The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood has become, ever since its reputation crossed the Egyptian borders in the early 1950s, the subject of increasing number of studies in the West. In this literature three main features dominate: first, a general tendency to stress (often to exaggerate) the transnational or global character of the movement; second, an emphasis on the predilection toward militancy and violence as central features of the movement; third, an understanding that these two features are closely juxtaposed and intertwined. In general, from this literature emerges a monolithic view, one that is always assumed but never examined, of the movement and its discourse as exclusively Islamic in content, global in scope, militant in outlook and historically unchanging. Of these aspects, it is the last two that are clearly problematic and it is these two that are the focus of this paper.

It should be noted that not all of these conclusions are mistaken. There is, for example, enough evidence for one to argue that the techniques as well as the precepts on which the movement of the Muslim Brothers was built have traveled well beyond the Egyptian borders, thereby inspiring the establishment of similar organizations in countries such as Jordan, Syria, Palestine and elsewhere. There is also enough evidence from the words and deeds of some members of the Muslim Brothers to suggest that they have encouraged, if not materially supported the transplantation of the movement model in other countries. In fact, the movement sent at a relatively early stage of its development delegations to neighboring countries and subsequently received some as well.[i] Additionally, there is, in the literature of Ikwan, an unmistakable pride in the appeal of the movement abroad, as it was sometime reflected in the warmth with which the movement’s delegations were received in several Muslim countries. Moreover, Banna himself exchanged correspondence with personalities outside Egyptian borders (correspondence with al-Hajj Amin in Palestine are a good example). 

Furthermore, the Islamic character of the movement is hardly a matter of dispute. Yet, it seems that the interest in these aspects of the movement has little to do with facts themselves and more to do with understanding their implications. This could not be otherwise for the spread of the movement’s ideas elsewhere in the Arab world, where similar cultural norms and socio-political conditions existed, should not surprise anyone. In fact, it should be expected. After all, ideas are too fluid to be contained by any geographical limits. 

It is apparent from the literature that many Western (and some Arab[ii]) scholars believed that the proliferation of the form of political Islam upon which the movement was modeled, was bound to create an environment on the local level conducive to ‘xenophobia,’ ‘fanaticism,’ and ‘rebellion” (and with presumed proclivity toward violence and militancy, one should expect a ‘world crusade’[iii]). This latter aspect is further exacerbated by the perception that “[Banna’s] teachings demonstrated,” to borrow Mitchell’s own words, “the non-rationalist and even non-intellectualist quality which has been observed to be an aspect of Muslim thought.”[iv]  This is where the literature on the Muslim Brothers especially during Banna’s life, is at its weakest. Here is where presuppositions tended to replace objective analysis, where simplicity supplanted circumspection, and where crucial facts were overlooked— a process that, in many of these works, reflected in confusion and contradictions.[v]

To be sure, works on Muslim Brothers are rife with quotes from Hasan al- Banna’s speeches and directives where he appears to express a desire to see Islam, if not his movement, in a position to call “Mankind to accept one of these three: Islam, tribute [Jizya], or combat.”[vi]  Nor there is a shortage in Banna’s speeches or in the literature on his movement of reference to words like ‘jihad,’ ‘conquest,’ ‘striving,’ ‘guarding right through force,’ or reference to his men as ‘Monks by night and Knights by day,’ and to the ‘call of duty’; elements that all have a strong militant reference. Based on such statements the movement became suspect of harboring violent tendencies, if not of being outright violent. Because of such quotes the movement became threatening in the eyes of those who looked at it from the outside.

It is indeed justified, based on a discourse of this nature, to draw such conclusions. One is justified; that is, if the discourse of the movement is monolithic as such. But that is hardly the case. As a reader of Banna’s directives and speeches encounters references to violence, he would also encounter myriad of references to love, tolerance and ‘universal kinship.’ In these speeches one can sense the fervor of the revolutionary, but one is also bound to meet the acquiescence of the pacifist, if not the compassion of the Sufi.   Banna spoke of “The brotherhood of all peoples, the mutual assistance of all human societies, and the extirpation of those greedy ambitions which are inspired by fanaticism, and whose fires sow dissention and mutual aversion among the nations.”[vii] When this side of the movement, and particularly of its founder, is presented, it seldom receives the attention or the analysis it merits. It gets often eclipsed in the shadow of the more accented aspect of the movement, rendering its presence a mere nuance for the scholars who were already convinced of the movement’s violent nature. 

More troubling is how the presumption of the movement’s inherent rigidity and violence (sometime presented as a corollary of Islam’s uncompromising stance vis-à-vis others) encouraged selective presentation of facts, thus precluding a meaningful synthesis. The impact of this presupposition of inherent violence had another deleterious effect on the clarity of the literature on the movement, namely, the failure to situate the words and deeds of Banna and his followers within their proper context; the failure to see how the movement discourse would have had at times shifted (as it did in the last decade of Banna’s life) to respond to, to accommodate or to measure up to the rhythm and fervor of the prevalent political and ideological discourse; the failure to see how the intense campaign launched by competing forces in Cairo in 1930s to win the hearts and minds of potential converts imposed a certain mood on all participants, including the Muslim Brothers. It is the failure to see how the traffic of converts from one ideological force to another, from one school of ideas to the next brought with it new energy, a synergy of ideas, a cacophony of voices that were bound to disturb, if not completely transform the intellectual harmony of any single group. Knowing that by the end of the 1930s, most of the traffic was in the direction of the Ikhwan, as many of these works readily acknowledge, it is interesting how the transformative effect of this aspect received little attention.

This paper argues that not taking into account all of the above elements led many Western scholars to overlook some significant shifts which the movement experienced during the latter part of 1930s as its membership swelled. These shifts impacted not only the orientations of the movement and the conception of the tactics needed to further its goals. They also created serious rifts that crippled the movement various organs.[viii] The energetic and politicized generation that joined the group in the latter part of 1930s and early 1940s created a gravitational force that pushed the movement to engage in politics and militancy. Thanks to a wave of memoirs and articles written by leading members of this group which continued to be published starting from the 1970s throughout the turn of the century, we now have a better understanding of the internal affairs of the movement.[ix]

These memoirs permit scholars to see that, unlike the monolithic view of the movement as a tightly controlled organization, one managed from the top, the leadership of Banna, particularly in the latter part of the 1930s and through most of the subsequent decade, was not always without a challenge. That Banna wasn’t always in control of every aspect of the movement and that his decisions did not always fall on receptive ears are evident when one traces the trail of ‘fitan,’ as ‘Abd al-Halim calls them. Of these, the crises precipitated by Rif‘at’s demands, Bann’s sister’s marriage to ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Abiddin, and the dismissal of Ahmad al-Sukari were particularly noteworthy.

This discord within the movement was noted by Jankowski in his discussion of why a proposed merger between Young Egypt and the Brothers failed in 1939. He believed the merger failed because “al-Banna of the Brotherhood was facing serious dissent and eventually secession from a segment of his following.”[x] But before discussing how these aspects led to the movement’s transformation from the small Sufi-like order of pre-1936, to the powerful and notorious political movement of late 1940s, it behooves us to provide: (1) a brief survey of the movement as featured in Western scholarship; (2) a short exposition of the tumultuous history that produced the atmosphere in which the movement emerged; and (3) a concise biography of the movement and its founder.

Muslim Brothers: the violent organization

Suggestions of proclivity toward violence and use of extra-legal means are abundant in the literature on the movement, so prevalent as to raise the need for an attestation or to make a thorough review of such negative portrayal of the movement necessary, or practical, for that matter. Hence, the examples listed below are not meant to be exhaustive. However, they put into perspective a shade of this current in Western scholarship.[xi]

Richard Mitchell, one of the early Western scholars to write an extensive study of the Muslim Brothers, noted the stringency that persisted from the time of Banna: “the same quality of rigidity and Puritanism, which the first leader had indelibly stamped on the organization.”[xii] He also refers to the movement’s “basic intolerance of dissent” and “the Society’s sense of exclusiveness,” which bread violence.[xiii] While in general Michelle acknowledges that violence perpetrated by the movement “was in many respects a response to the situation in Egypt and had much in common with the violence of other Egyptians,” he contended that “the Islamic dimension which the Brothers claim as their own …precipitated a variety of violence in both political and social life which was characterized primarily by rigid intolerance”.[xiv]

In reference to a string of events that took place between 1945 and 1949, which included the assassination of Ahmed Mahir, an attempt to kill Nahhas Pasha, the assassination of the judge Ahmad al-Khazindar in 1948, and  the assassination of the prime minister al-Naqrashi (acts which the movement denied that it planned or executed[xv]), Mitchell found it difficult to exonerate Hasan al-Banna, even as the latter condemned them in the strongest terms, denying that their perpetrators could be either “Brothers” or even “Muslims”. Mitchell believes that Banna is to blame because he “failed to practice restraint.”[xvi]

Mitchell’s views of the stern and violent movement were echoed a decade later by Charles Wendell in his book The Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna’. [xvii]  Wendell attributes part of the “ease to pass from threatening words to acts” (characteristic in his view of the movement) to the general atmosphere of the time, but mostly to the infatuation of Hasan al-Banna with the orderliness and tactics of the Nazis, the fascists and even the communists. Wendell states that “there can be little question that Hasan was deeply impressed by the organization of the Nazi, the Fascist, and Communist parties.” He further stresses that Banna and the movement he led had “by no means rejected the tactics employed [by the aforementioned groups] to gain and sustain their power.”[xviii]  Moreover, Wendell makes in his relatively short introduction much use of the presumed resemblance between the Muslim Brothers and the fascists, hinting that the former is far more dangerous than the latter because of its ability to tap into the religious discourse of Islam, hence capitalizing on its “ready-made program for a world crusade that required only actors and a leader.”[xix] According to Wendell, the feelings generated by the program the Muslim Brothers adopted “can turn into an unsavory blend of xenophobia, fanaticism, and aggressiveness coupled with a frantic “busyness” about acquiring the latest in weaponry and gadgets in order to achieve technological parity with the traditional adversary.”[xx] Finally, Wendell contends that the foreign policies of the Libyan regime are an enactment of Banna’s “domestic program.”[xxi]

            These views of Mitchell and Wendell are shared by many other scholars. Mitchell himself repeated the conclusions of previous scholars such as H. A. R. Gibb and J. Heyworth-Dunne.  In turn, Mitchell’s conclusions were echoed by scholars who subsequently studied the movement. One of these scholars was Christina Phelps Harris. Christina is the author of an early book on the movement entitled Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of Muslim Brotherhood. In her introduction, Christina called the movement “a militant [and] fundamentalist.”[xxii] She also asserted that “the Muslim Brotherhood in its motivation and religious objective was an ideological throwback to the 18^th and 19^th century—to militant Arabian Wahhabism.”[xxiii] In addition to the fundamental and reactionary nature of the movement, Harris also referred to the group’s obsession with military power: “They had a nostalgic yearning for one special aspect of the golden age of Islam, namely, the military strength of the Islamic empire.”[xxiv] Furthermore, for Harris the link between the group and terrorism is so solid and plain that she found it “morally crucial” to ask: “How long can a religious group hope to defend its faith by terrorism and assassination? How long can it justify war, not just on the foreign infidels, but against its own Muslim government and against its Muslim fellow countrymen?”[xxv]

Moreover, because of this image of violence and militancy there is a tendency in the English literature to compare Muslim Brothers to the most recent phenomenon of al-Qaeda, underlining the points in which these two groups converge. Examples of this comparison could be found in Barry Rubin’s book on the Muslim Brotherhood. Rubin states that “The Brotherhoods approve in principle of its [al-Qaeda’s] militancy, attacks on America, and ideology.”[xxvi] Rubin also seems to believe that regarding violence and terrorism, “there is no principled opposition to such tactics.”[xxvii] The movement only condemns violent tactics when the socio-political atmosphere doesn’t work to its advantage and when such acts are likely to yield negative outcome. Furthermore, the suspicion of the duplicitous nature of Muslim Brothers’ approach to politics voiced here by Rubin is a recurrent theme in English literature both in academic works and in the press and media as well.[xxviii]

 Some of the most recent works, such as Kramer’s work on Banna, reflect a more nuanced view of the Ikhwan, thanks to the breadth of the scholarship, mostly in Arabic, that became available in recent decades. Yet, because of the English sources that this scholarship relied mostly on, the traditional belief in the movement’s proclivity toward violence still gets recycled. Kramer notes, for example, that “the growing literature written by former members as well as critical observers has done little to modify Mitchell’s judgment  that although ‘before 1948 few members indeed knew about the secret apparatus, those who did—and after 1948 this number included most of the articulate members—found few, if any, reasons to resist it. Thus while the secret apparatus had relatively a few members, it had, as a concept, large if inarticulate support’.”[xxix]

What is at task here is not to deny that some acts of violence were committed by members of this group. Nor is it to exonerate Banna or his followers from secretly planning to subvert the political order in 1948.  The purpose of this paper is limited to discussing the projection of the movement as inherently violent. The existing literature on the movement and on the political atmosphere of the time suggests that such projection is not only unsubstantiated, but simplistic as well. The words and deeds of Banna indicate that he faced in late 1930s increasing pressure from the movement’s youth to take a more candid[xxx] (precisely militant) stance vis-à-vis the most pressing issues of the time.  The trajectory of the movement’s history and some of Banna’s proclamations reflect distrust, if not complete aversion, of revolutionary tactics.  The movement’s monumental growth, yet peaceful record, during the first decade shows a policy of gradualism and accommodation, not of militancy. In other words, it contradicts the allegation of proclivity toward violence (although it doesn’t entail a complete disavowal of its use to achieve political gains).

Additionally, this literature shows that the changes in the structure of the movement, particularly the creation, initially, of militia-like scouts and later of a military wing (on which the perception of the movement’s inherent violence centered) were both inspired and dictated by the general atmosphere. The two most prominent political groups at the time, the Wafd and Young Egypt had their different militias with military-style uniforms (blue and green respectively). These militias paraded in Cairo’s streets on a regular basis. The heightened nature of the political struggle of the time, and the emphasis in the culture of these ‘Shirt Squadrons’ on ‘obedience and struggle,’[xxxi] led them to resort to escalatory tactics which ranged from “mutual invective and clashes” to “physical assaults on opposition leaders.”[xxxii] The most notorious of these acts was the attempt to assassinate then Prime Minister, Nahhas, in 1937 by a member of the Green Shirts of Young Egypt.[xxxiii] Moreover, the time line of these organizations’ development reveals that the Muslim Brothers were aping, not inspiring, this model. Both the blue and green militias of the Wafd and Young Egypt were operational by 1934,[xxxiv]at least three years before the rovers of the Brotherhood appeared.[xxxv] Even after their appearance, the rovers of the Brotherhood remained civilian and non-confrontational until the organization of the secret apparatus sometime in 1941. To be sure, Young Egypt was the first organization to create the paramilitary model that other groups subsequently emulated—as Jankowski rightly notes: “It [Young Egypt] was the first paramilitary organization organized for young Egyptians, with many of its symbols and techniques influencing later Egyptian paramilitary groups such as the ‘the Blue Shirts’ of the Wafd or the ‘Rovers’ of the Muslim Brotherhood.”[xxxvi]

The same is true of the accusations of xenophobia, at least beyond the general atmosphere of hostility toward Jews which didn’t seem to be unique to the Brothers, and of which the Brother appear to have espoused only a diluted form.[xxxvii]  Allegations of widespread xenophobia cannot be substantiated. While aspects of the movement discourse could be interpreted to show a xenophobic tinge, other aspects of it attest to the opposite.[xxxviii] The movement has consistently denied hostility toward non-Muslims. Moreover, while there are allegations of intolerance, one finds testimonies to the contrary.  Kramer refers to an incident in which a Coptic leader “refuted the charge [that al-Banna was instigating violence against Copts], lending credibility to Banna’s claim that the Muslim Brothers made every efforts not to alienate the Copts and even actively to seek an understanding with them.”[xxxix] Finally, the Brothers’ memoirs cite several such incidents and refer to other occasions when the Brothers included Coptic members in their list of parliamentary candidates.[xl] 

1-    Historical Background

It is important before further discussion of the rise and growth of the movement to highlight the tumultuous history that created the atmosphere in which the movement emerged. Like most political movements that appeared in the first half of the 20^th century, the movement of the Muslim Brothers owes much of it attraction, if not its orientation, to the complex history of Egyptian traditional society’s encounter with the West, whose various episodes—often violent and asymmetrical—culminated in the chaotic atmospheric of 1930s. Although there were pre-modern cultural and commercial contacts between Egypt and the Occident, it is the contacts beginning from the 19^th century onward that were consequential for Egyptian political environment during and after the interwar period.

The Napoleonic campaign (1798–1801) was often considered to be Egypt’s first deterministic contact with Western civilization and the catalyst that set Egypt on its course to modernization. In a much broader context, this campaign marked the “beginning of a more tangible European military and cultural presence in the entire Middle East,”[xli] a legacy that had long term effects on the formation of national consciousness in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.  The French occupation was followed by a brief period of agitations as the Ottomans battled the Mamluks for control. Within a few years of French withdrawal, the Ottoman military commander, Muhammad ‘Ali, managed to fill the power vacuum, defusing the power of the Mamluk (through bribery, cajoling and treachery),[xlii] and putting matters in order. During his reign (1805-1849), ‘Ali sought to secure Egypt’s de facto independence from the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, he embarked on a campaign to create an industrial base and to fashion Egyptian institutions after their European counterparts. To achieve these goals, he came to rely on European advisors, especially in reforming the Egyptian army and economy.[xliii] He also sent distinguished Egyptian students in delegations to study in Europe.  These delegations would later become the nucleus of the secular Egyptian national movement which advocated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and candor, the westernization of Egyptian society.

Muhammad ‘Ali was succeeded by his gradson ‘Abbas, who ruled for a short and uneventful six years. ‘Abbas was succeeded in 1854 by his uncle Sa‘id. Sa‘id’s reign saw the rise of Egyptian debt as he began to borrow from foreign bankers to fund his projects. This trend would continue during the reign of his nephew, Ismail, who assumed power in 1863. Upon his investiture, Ismail embarked on a more ambitious attempt to modernize the country along European lines, spending generously on education and on the country’s infrastructure. During his reign, the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. But the costs of Ismail’s various projects (including the protracted war in Ethiopia) were far beyond what Egypt could afford. This led to Ismail’s “increasing dependence on European financiers to back his projectors and military ventures.”[xliv] The country’s failure to meet financial obligations in the subsequent years alarmed European investors who pressured their governments to intervene.[xlv]

The bankruptcy of the khedive’s treasury and the increase of European meddling in the country’s financial matters, especially in the period after Britain and France took over the control of the financial institutions in 1876, provoked popular discontentment and led to a period of disorder which culminated in Ahmad ‘Urabi’s revolt in 1879. The final years of Ismail rule saw Egypt lose its share of the Suez Canal and other important assets.[xlvi] Although Ismail was dismissed, (with little remorse on the part of his subjects) and a new viceroy, Tawfiq, was appointed, Egypt will remain unstable. Violent clashes erupted first in Cairo and spread to the coastal city of Alexandria.  The turmoil in which the country was embroiled served as a pretext for the British invasion, which was solidified after the defeat of Ahmad ‘Urabi in 1882 at Tal al-Kabir. The British occupation—initially presented as a temporary measure to put matters in order—continued until 1954.[xlvii]

The British intervention put a halt, albeit a temporary one, on the rise of the Egyptian national movement which started with ‘Urabi’s revolt. The significance of ‘Urabi’s revolt lies in its Egyptian national character as it reflected in the grievances it claimed to seek redress for and in its leadership.[xlviii] The central goal of ‘Urabi’s revolt was to stop the policy of discrimination against the Egyptians serving in the army who received poor wages and were constantly denied promotion. However, the revolt was a sign of the rise of national sentiment and the discontent with the foreign leadership. The defeat of ‘Urabi had the temporary effect of quashing Egyptian feelings of embitterment and of subduing the Egyptian drive for national self-determination (perhaps because many believed the British would leave as soon as order is maintained and financial issues are resolved). But the rise of the number of educated Egyptians in the subsequent decades would ensure the dissemination and refinement of these national feelings which were articulated, first and for most, in response to the encroachment of Western civilization.

Lord Cromer’s mandate (1883-1907) saw a swell in education and cultural activities, especially the translation into Arabic of European works, thereby rendering modern concepts of nation and nationality accessible to a larger segment of the Egyptian population. There was in parallel a surge, especially in the first decade of the 20^th century, in publications that brought to sharper focus the state of general backwardness that Egypt and the Islamic world had relapsed to.[xlix] These works helped generate the feelings of discontent and restlessness that would shape the first half of the 20^th century. Moreover, Cromer made a concerted effort to free Egypt from all foreign influences (except that of the British, of course), thereby consolidating (albeit inadvertently) the perception of Egyptian independent character. The first generation of the national movement leaders such as ‘Abduh, Zaghlul and Mustafa Kamil were reared during this period. These men came to rely on the periodicals, which mushroomed during this period, to publicize their views.[l] Of these men, Kamil was the youngest and, by far, the most sensational. Kamil would earn recognition for his ardent opposition of the British and his participation and leadership of violent demonstrations between 1907 and 1908.[li]  

Toward the end of World War I Egypt was seething with apprehension as the country’s leading intellectuals pondered their country’s future after the war.  Tense feelings turned into violent outbursts after Britain refused to allow a delegation of Egyptian nationals to speak to the Paris Peace Conference. The colonial authority also arrested and exiled a number of activists including Zaghlul. So important were these events for the Egyptian national identity that most Egyptian political leaders who rose to prominence in the first half of the century (including Banna) would later claim to have witnessed or taken part in these agitations. The popular discontent was in part exacerbated by the recognition that Britain’s promises of leaving the country were disingenuous. Many would have also come to term with the fact that foreign opposition to the British presence in Egypt (mainly from France and the Ottomans) was not precipitating a British withdrawal.  In light of widespread agitations, Britain declared the end of the protectorate in 1922 and took certain measures to reform the country political system along Western liberal lines in what was later termed “the liberal experiment.” As a result of these measures, Egypt would see a drafting of a new constitution followed by the election of the first Egyptian prime minister, Zaghlul, in 1924.[lii]

In the subsequent years, Zaghlul party of al-Wafd would win whenever a free and transparent election was held, but its authority was severely restricted by the prerogatives of the king and the blatant intrusion of the High Commissioner, whose meddling in the government affairs had the effect of nullifying any meaning of the election.  Most governments elected to office between 1924 and 1928 kept power only for matter of months and most were unable to affect any change. Because of the High Commissioners’ interference and that of the palace, most politicians (the majority of whom were liberals) became enmeshed in the struggle for political interests and became less driven by nationalist ideals than by furthering personal interests. Ultimately the constitution was abolished in 1930.[liii] The futility of the political struggle through electoral means and the frustration over the long yet fruitless Anglo-Egyptian negotiations led to a general environment of distrust of the political system and of the old generation of politicians. This situation made the atmosphere ripe for the rise of a new generation of actors with different approach to politics and understanding of power.

In parallel with the failed parliamentary experiment, Egypt was going through “a period of social and cultural dislocation.”[liv] There was a visible movement toward a rapid westernization of the country and analogous retreat of the influence of Islamic traditions. Although the roots of this process date to the effect of the policies adopted by Muhammad ‘Ali and the subsequent leaders, it had nonetheless gained momentum during this period. “The 1920’s were [indeed] the heyday of Westernization,” as Jankowski accurately noted.[lv]  Some of the Western educated elites such as Taha Husayn, Qasim Amin[lvi], Salam Musa and others sought a rapid conversion to Western ideals. They made ‘radical’ proclamations calling for the unveiling of women, curbing the authority of religious institutions such as al-Azhar and the ultimate separation between the state and religion—calls that provoked a virulent response from the administration of al-Azhar and its students. Moreover, Western styles of living and entertainment became readily visible and widely pursued by men from elite classes. This generated a counter push. In short, these aspects “created a suitable environment for the return to Islamic sentiments and concepts to the center of Egyptian thought.”[lvii]

While the majority of prominent Egyptian politicians and intellectuals during the period in question were secular and westernized, espousing a European vision for their nascent state, a number of thinkers came to embrace an Islamic alternative and championed the counter push.  Of the earliest and most prominent were ‘Abduh and al-Afghani. Both believed the remedy of the Egyptian backwardness and, by extension, that of other Muslims to reside in the reformation of Islamic thoughts, particularly of its jurisprudence. They saw a need for the invigoration of Islamic thought by reliance on the Quran (and abandonment of irrelevant opinions of different schools) and by opening the door for ijtihad (independent legal reasoning). Both ‘Abduh and al-Afghani were alarmed by the danger facing the traditional Muslim society by the advancement of Western culture, but neither of them was traditionalist in the traditional sense.   They were reformers. However, ‘Abduh and al-Afghani had disagreements on where should the reformer begin, with ‘Abduh stressing the role of education and al-Afghani eyeing the political system.  Regardless, their thoughts would influence all Islamic reformers who came after them. Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers, was no exception. Like ‘Abduh and al-Afghani, Banna was neither traditionalist like the men of al-Azhar nor was he fond of Western culture as was Zaghlul and al-Tahtawi. In many respects, Banna brought into synthesis and translated into actions, what al-Afghani and ‘Abduh theorized.

Because of the developments discussed above the decades of the 1930s would witness the resurgence of Islamic thoughts. In this atmosphere emerged the movement of the Muslim Brothers as one of many movements, representing the counter current. These organizations shared as a common concern the desire to preserve the society’s Islamic identity on one hand, while seeking to modernize it on the other. Some of these movements focused on spiritual and physical education such as Jam‘iyat Shabab al-Muslimin. This was in many respects true of all Islamic youth movements appearing before 1930. This was also true of the Ikwan in the early days in al-Isma‘iliyya’. Other movements would concentrate chiefly on politics, and in this decade, on a more assertive form. This would be the primary characteristic of any movement appearing in the decade of 1930 such as Young Egypt. Non-affiliated Islamists and individuals living in the period were no exception to this trend. This politically charged atmosphere was contagious and all movements that surfaced and lived beyond this period in Cairo would come to embrace politics, especially of the most militant form.

The accumulative impact of the historical processes discussed here coupled with the effects of the economic crisis of 1929, namely, unemployment, all contributed to making the 1930s “a politically and economically depressing decade.”[lviii] The impact of this period further exacerbated the resentment and cynicism of the disenchanted youth.  Convinced of the futility of the political struggle within the existing legal parameters and cynical of nationalist credentials of old politicians, the youth resorted to a form of political activism centered on militancy, with mass demonstrations as its main feature. The attitude of the youth in this period was summed in Young Egypt’s common slogan “la budda min inqilab, la budda min quwa.”[lix] Young Egypt’s stormy rhetoric and militant tactics left their imprints on the minds of this generation of students.[lx] The belief in the use of force became the hallmark of the period.

The closure of political and economic horizons had enormous impact on the social and psychological well-being of the rising student population, generating in their ranks “a life of despair and despair with life.”[lxi] This had the immediate effect of throwing this segment into the heart of contentious politics, where they found themselves recognizable arbiters. By mid 1930s, youth mass movements became the most visible and effective political force in the country.   This fact alarmed traditional players who saw the rise of youth as a threat to their power. This was particularly true after massive demonstrations were staged by students between 1935 and 1936. As a result, all leaders of recognizable organizations and institutions sought to control these forces and use them for their own gains. But rather then controlling the youth, more often politicians found themselves swept over by their zeal. Smith observes that “although the palace, al-Azhar, and politicians used these forces against each other, none controlled any one segment completely and often followed their initiatives rather than direct them.”[lxii] Banna competed with others to convert and control segments of these forces. Like many, he succeeded in the former and failed at the later. Although his movement arrived somewhat late on the political scene and sought to convert on its terms, its pragmatism prevailed over its idealism. The tone of the movement’s discourse as well as its conduct shifted to give the movement a competitive edge in attracting these new forces. Most of the movement’s militant declarations and politicized discourse emerged in this period.

In changing the tone and the orientation of his movement’s discourse, Banna was not entering uncharted waters. Most respectable thinkers of this period, even among the most Westernized elements, altered—in attempt to remain relevant—their discourse to cater to the tastes and needs of the new consumers of literary productions.[lxiii]  However, this maneuvering and the charisma of Banna had both the intended effect of mass conversion, but also the accidental effect of further radicalization of a contingent of his followers.   In the end, instead of riding the wave of the youth’s energy, Banna—like others—was swept by it.

A brief history of the movement and its leader:

The founder of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna, was born in 1906 in the town of Muhamadiyya, a hundred mile north of Cairo.[lxiv] Banna was born to a middle class family, in which he was the first of five siblings. His father was a recognized scholar in his community, a graduate from al-Azhar and an author of several works in hadith.[lxv] Because of the respect he commanded, Banna’s father became the man to whom his community turned for guidance on clerical and secular matters. Additionally, Bann’s father spent the remainder of his time in family shop in which he repaired watches, where Banna himself trained as an apprentice.[lxvi] It has been noted that this aspect— the careful attention to details, the love of order and exactitude that such line of work requires—left their imprint on the young Banna as he strove in his adulthood to plan and organize the operation of the Muslim Brothers.[lxvii]

Banna’s education started first at the kuttab (a traditional Quranic School) where he studied Quran and some basic Islamic teachings. At the age of twelve, he enrolled in elementary school, where he joined the Society for Moral Behavior.[lxviii]  Eventually, Bann assumed the leadership of this society, but left it shortly thereafter to establish the Society for the Prevention of Vice.[lxix] Within a year Banna took part in the organization of another association, the Hasafiyya Society for Charity. The new organization was a part of the larger Hasafiyya Sufi movement, which Banna came to love and admire.[lxx] The coming years saw Banna regularly attending the dhikr circles of this Sufi order.

Ultimately Banna left his home town of al-Muhamadiyya to attend a primary teachers’ training school in Damanhur, a city located 13 miles west of Muhamadiayya.[lxxi] In Damanhur, Banna’s interest in Sufism became more intense. He was especially drawn to the Sufi teachings of the medieval Sufi pioneer Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, particularly to his work Ihya ‘ulum al-Din. His attachment to Sufi concepts led him to reconsider the utility of education he received at the Teacher Training School and almost quit.

At the age of sixteen, Banna left Damanhur for Cairo, where studied at  Dar al-‘ulum, a school that was founded in 1873, with a mandate to provide a modern training in sciences and Islamic teachings, but which ultimately became a high level teacher-training school.[lxxii] The contradiction between Banna’s religious training, particularly his Sufi upbringing and the relatively Western and secular atmosphere of Cairo in the 1920s, left in Banna’s mind a sharp feeling of cultural alienation and alarmed him to the encroachment of Western civilization. Banna would later recount how disturbed he and some of his close associates were by these facts: “No one knows how many nights we spent reviewing the state of the nation…analyzing the sickness, and thinking of possible remedies. So disturbed we were that we reached the point of tears. ”[lxxiii]

To Banna the remedy for the ills of westernization of the society resides in the revival of Islamic teachings among the masses. But how to achieve this goal was the question that preoccupied him and his cohorts. Becoming increasingly aware of the degree to which the society had abandoned the Islamic ideals which it once cherished, Banna started to devise a way to face this threat. Banna joined a number of religious groups while at Dar al-‘ulum, apparently hoping to find a person or entity that has found resolution for this predicament. Along with students from al-Azhar, he organized small teams of volunteers who devoted their time to teach and preach at schools, mosques and eventually coffee shops. Banna also made some important contacts among leading Muslim intellectuals in Cairo.

In the summer of 1927, Banna graduated from Dar al-‘ulum and left Cairo to Isma‘iliyya on his new assignment as a teacher. The organizational skills he gained from working with various organizations in Cairo proved useful in his new environment. Within a year of his arrival in al-Isma‘iliyya, Banna laid along with six other close friends the foundations for the Society of Muslim Brothers. The new organization took first the form of a Sufi order, focusing mostly on religious subjects. At this time the movement showed little interest in mundane affairs.[lxxiv]  The movement would later expand the range of its services to include providing material and educational assistance to low-income families. It also championed the cause of Egyptian workers of foreign companies.[lxxv]

During the period between its founding in 1928 and the transfer of Banna to Cairo in 1932, the movement made significant inroads among several segments of the population in the town, particularly among men from lower classes. The movement was also able to negotiate and successfully reach agreements with local Western companies as a consequence of which some Egyptian workers gained significant rights (such as the right to have breaks for daily prayers and appointed imams to lead them). These imams were often members of the Muslim Brothers assigned by Banna himself to their various posts.[lxxvi] Despite some minor challenges, such as the accusation that Banna had preached against the regime, which was investigated and subsequently found to be false, the movement continued to thrive. The transfer of Banna to Cairo in 1932 marked the end of a chapter of the movement’s life and the dawn of a new one.

The first four years in al-Isma‘illiya saw a remarkable growth of the movement’s membership and with it the influence of Banna. Yet, there was no indication that Banna or any of his followers in al-Isma‘iliyya engaged in extra-legal activities. To the contrary, Banna and his movement played a constructive role, assisting local authorities in settlement of disputes.[lxxvii] This cooperative role earned Banna and his movement respect and support.

The new life in Cairo was different. Banna left behind him a thriving and expanding community in Isma‘iliyya. However, in Cairo he had to start to from the beginning. Evidently, Banna was no stranger to Cairo, as he kept contacts with old friends and colleagues from Dar al-‘ulum. Yet, a few of these were in position to help him. They were busy working to strengthen their own organizations. Banna dedicated an upper level room of a modest house which he and his family rented to be the head quarter of the movement. He had to labor intensely during the subsequent years to achieve part of the fame the movement had gained in Isma‘iliyya. From 1932 until 1935, a few in Cairo would have heard of the movement. Even a year later, the number of converts was so inconsequential that this small office continued to provide adequate space to hold meetings and discussions (as ‘Abd al-Halim’s account of his first and second visits to this HQ in 1935 and 1936 indicates).[lxxviii] Most of the followers were comprised at this time of young students and employees in the lower rank of the civil service.[lxxix]  Part of the failure to convert en mass had to do with the fact that, unlike before, the movement had competitors in the market of ideas. Unlike in al-Isma‘iliyya were the movement was the only ideological force and where most of its followers were uneducated, Cairo was awash with political and social organizations which competed for a more sophisticated audience. Part of it, no boubt, was Banna’s instinctive preference for quality of converts over their quantity.

However with the passage of time, Banna grew desperate at the movement’s inability to attract new members and its failure to retain them, once they joined. Banna who instinctively preferred to work with little fanfare abandoned his policy of caution. Banna’s desperation led him to embark on an indiscriminate campaign of mass publicity, resorting at times to curious tactics. ‘Abd al-Halim recounts[lxxx] how Banna, frustrated by the obscurity of his group, sought to make their presence known in Cairo:

The Ikhwan were, before the move to Maydan al-‘Ataba al-Khadra[lxxxi], few in numbers, obscure in place…[and] no one sensed their presence. They were absorbed in the society…the ustadh tried to make Cairo notice the presence of Ikhwan through series of lectures that he publicized in leaflets. He reached a level [of desperation] where he seized the opportunity of the month of Rabi‘ al-Awal[lxxxii] of that year to announce that he would be delivering  lectures every night at the headquarter in al-Nasiriyya. He distributed thousands of leaflets to publicize this lecture series. We used to go all to the mosque of al-Sayyida Zeinab to perform ‘Isha prayer. Afterward, we would organize in lines led by the guide (al-ustadh al-Murshid) who would chant a song commemorating the birth of the prophet and we would repeat it after him in chorus in a loud voice to attract attention…Indeed, people would gather around us and follow us. Some of us would then distribute flyers [regarding these lectures] to people and onto stores on both sides of the street. But when we would reach the headquarter only a miniscule number[lxxxiii] of these crowds would enter it.

Although the movement was not able to expand its membership as rapidly as it had done in Isma‘iliyyaa, the few dedicated converts who joined provided much needed aid to the General Guide. They were able to publish the movement’s first newspaper and to shoulder the burden of distributing it and other publications in mosques, in cafes, on university campus and in other public spaces as well.[lxxxiv] By late 1936, and with trickles of young and energetic converts, mostly university students, the movement intensified its proselytizing campaign, especially on campuses. During this period, the movement gained and lost scores of converts. [lxxxv]

However, by the end of 1930s, it became apparent that the movement was gaining far more converts than it was losing. The new converts had four characteristics in common which distinguished them from those converted at earlier periods; (1) they were largly young and mostly college students; (2) most of them converted at the hand of other students; (3) and most of them, it appears, had previously belonged to other groups which were active in the political sphere at the time; and (4) most of them were highly politicized. The impact of this process will become more evident in latter periods when movements such as Young Egypt and the Wafd lost the sympathy of the masses in general and the politically active youth in particular.

The influx of members joining the group in the latter part of 1930s and early 1940s, most of which came from the disenchanted youth, brought with them intense pressure on the movement to resort to militant tactics. Banna would resist these pressures until almost the end of the century, but he would ultimately cave in.[lxxxvi] Banna speeches on several of the movement conferences starting from 1936 onward bore witness to this pressure and to his attempt to resist them.  Rather than rejecting the legality of such tactics, which would have been tantamount to operational suicide—given the prevalence of militancy as accepted means of political expression— Banna sought to appease the movement’s youth by declaring that the movement wasn’t in position to use force. By doing so, he insinuated that the movement could use force if it came to garner enough support. Still, Banna would contend—whenever the movement was criticized in the latter of the 1930s for its rejection of revolutionary ideas, which seems to have been other parties’ main complaint against the Brothers at this time[lxxxvii]— that: “A country like Egypt has experienced its share of revolutions, and gained from it nothing except [the negative outcome] that you see;” as a result, “the revolution is not something the Muslim Brothers think about, depend on, nor believe in its utility.”[lxxxviii]

However, with a rapidly growing membership, one made of restless urbanites most of whom came to know the Guide through an intermediary (thus lacking a sense of intimacy and proper training),[lxxxix] internal feuds and personal initiatives were to be expected.[xc] It would appear that with the passage of time and the growth of the movement that Banna started to sense that his control of the operational levels of the movement was contested, [xci] even as he continued to serve as the unchallenged spiritual leader.  The most important shift during this period was the movement’s entrance to an area that it had hitherto shunned; politics. Banna, perhaps in attempt to appease the penchant appetite of new members for politics, sought to forge political alliances and encouraged members of his group to run for political posts.  Banna himself ran twice for political posts, first in 1942 and a second time in 1944. In 1942, he rescinded his candidacy apparently under intense pressure (and according to Ikhwan a threat to his life) from the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas.[xcii] Banna lost in the second time, with allegations of massive fraud in the election.[xciii]

As the membership of the movement increased so did the pressure on the leadership to adopt the tactics of other movements active in the public domain at the time. Sometime in the latter part of 1936, Banna dedicated a small room of the movement’s headquarter to house the activities of the movement first unity of rovers. The rovers were modeled over the regiments established by Young Egypt and Wafd party. But unlike these, the movement’s rovers were a legal body registered with the Egyptian Boy Scout Movement (Jam‘iyyat al-Kashafa al-Ahliyya). The initial activities of the rovers were similar to those of other organized scouts throughout the country. The characteristic that set it apart from most other organizations was the central role religion came to play in its training. In the early stage, the movement didn’t have a military wing.  

Ironically, the desire of the movement to keep its operation within the legal boundaries and its rejection of militancy made it a subject of scorn and ridicule from other groups, especially from the blue and green regiments of Wafd and Young Egypt. ‘Abd al-Halim recounts[xciv] the impact of this peer pressure on the young members of the Ikhwan: “During the period when the political organizations created squadrons from their youths, the rovers of the Muslim Brothers were subject of scorn from these organizations…. Young Egypt in particular used to boast (in front of us) about their green battalions and accuse us of weakness and of submitting in the organization of our rovers to a legal structure. We used to complain to al-ustadh (Banna) about their campaigns (hamalat) against us in this regard. We hoped that al-ustadh would accept our plea and rid us of the rovers system and create a battalion of our own, with a [uniform] of distinctive color of our choosing.”[xcv]   This pressure would escalate in the coming years as Young Egypt, the closest ideological kin to the Brothers, decided to “devote its energies to militant campaigns of agitation on selected political and social issues.”[xcvi]

The role of Young Egypt in the radicalization of the youth and the spread of violent tactics is well documented.  Indeed, the most notorious instances of violence during the decade of 1930s were carried out by members or sympathizers of Young Egypt. The movement was in particular responsible for a relentless campaign on Jewish businesses in Egypt. This campaign started with the organization of a committee devoted to boycotting Jews.  Initially, the committee published reports outlining the nature and locations of Jewish commercial activities in most Egyptian towns. Jankowski mentioned that “By 1939, this boycott committee had published three lists of Jewish merchants in Cairo,” a tactic that the Muslim Brothers would later adopt. But this campaign went far beyond the publication of statistical data on Jewish commercial activity and the simple call for embargo. Soon words were followed by actions. Jankowski sums this aspect:

The agitation surrounding the boycott soon had effects beyond mere boycott: in Asyut, a cache of bombs was found by the police a long with pamphlets advocating the boycott; two members of young Egypt were arrested for distributing anti-Jewish literature in Tanta, two more in Kafr al-Shaykk, and six in al-Mahallah al-Kubra; in the last city, two others were arrested on charge of placing a bomb in the Jewish district.[xcvii]

Moreover, the movement was involved during the early part of 1939 in a wave of attacks on liquor stores, nightclubs and brothels.  According to Jankowski, in January and February alone “there were more than a dozen attacks on bars in Cairo and Alexandria and provincial cities.”[xcviii] Meanwhile, bars’ owners who were spared such attack received threats that they would face similar fate if they did not give up selling alcohol.[xcix]   Other aspects of the campaign against ‘prohibited entertainment’ included demonstrations in the streets and the petitioning of government to ban the selling of alcohol and prostitution. 

The Fitan

Another consequence of the rapid expansion of the movement, especially its absorption of a politicized membership, beyond entering the realm of politics, reflected in episodes of internal dispute. In addition to apparent political opportunism both on part of the membership and the leader, these disputes revealed the presence of radical contingents. It is noteworthy that although Banna succeeded in seeing his movement through these episodes, by appeasing members and dismembering others, he failed to dissuade the radical contingent—an ominous signs that his uncontested mastery of the movement intellectual leadership was receding. Of these disputes, the following were the most significant.

a.     Ahmad Rif‘at

An example of the internal struggle, one that illustrates the seriousness of this aspect and its impact on the movement operational capacity, was the challenge to the leadership of Hasan al-Banna by a leading member of the group in 1937. According to ‘Abd al-Halim, Ahmad Rif‘at, who was a devout member of the organization started during the meetings to express his objection to aspects of the movement’s policy, calling on “the brothers to adopt different ones.” As Rif‘at became vocal about his position to the movement’s orientation, it seemed that a significant constituent of the brothers were on his side.

Rif‘at and his sympathizers presented a list of demands for the movement to consider (with an ultimatum that if they were not implemented they would quit). In his demands, Rif‘at accused al-Banna of adopting a policy of appeasement toward the government and called for a stronger stance. He contended that the movement should demand and accept nothing short of a full implementation of Shari‘a from the regime. The movement should otherwise declare it an apostate regime. Second, Rif‘at and his group reprimanded the movement for not taking a robust stance in regard to the imposition of proper Islamic code of dress, suggesting that the “brothers” should patrol the streets of Cairo and stain with paint the cloth of ‘uncovered’ women. Rif‘at ‘s last demand was the call for a more significant and meaningful support for the Palestinians, expressing his displeasure at the nature of the movement’s contribution to the struggle.

It appears from ‘Abd al-Halim’s account, that after a few attempts to solve the problem had failed, that Rif‘at became increasingly ‘hostile’ and ‘disrespectful’ towards Banna. At the same time Rif‘at and his followers, began to use the general HQ for their meetings and to aggressively try to convince others of the legitimacy of their complaints. According to ‘Abd al-Halim, Banna didn’t want matters to escalate and ordered that his loyal followers to eschew any altercation with either Rif‘at or with his followers. With more members taking the side of Rif‘at, the activities in the general HQ came to a complete halt. Acting on an advice from ‘Abd al-Halim, al-Banna disappeared for a few weeks, while the latter devised a plan to put matters back in order.  ‘Abd al-Halim plan consisted of identifying members who were still loyal to Banna and those who were likely to join Rif‘at. The loyal members were asked to boycott anyone who sympathized with Rif‘at. Within a few weeks, the plan seemed to work.  Feeling isolated and despised, Rif‘at sympathizers started to abandon him in scores and was left only with a few associates. At the end, Rif‘at disappeared—allowing for the closure of this episode. 

b.     The Marriage of ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Abidin

Sometime in 1941, the General Guide announced his intention to wed his sister to ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Abidin, a medical doctor and a senior member of the movement. Apparently, this decision was not welcomed by some of the members who, it would appear, thought that they were more deserving of this ‘honor’. Yet, despite intense pressure and opposition from members of the group, Banna went ahead with the plan. This incident created divisions within the ranks of the Brothers.

It would seem that in the wake of this episode a new one developed. Shortly after ‘Abidin married the sister of the General Guide, some members of the ikhwan accused the former of using his friendship and influence within the group to have access to and seek illicit relationships with some of their sisters and wives. This serious accusation against this trusted member of Banna’s inner circle and brother-in-law caused severe damage to Banna’s trust of some of his followers, even as the immediate repercussions of this particular episode were slowly mitigated.

c.     Dismissal of Ahmad al-Sukari 

The above episodes did not mark the end of the internal cleavages. Another serious internal fission occurred when Banna’s own assistant Ahmad al-Sukari accused him of favoritism toward his brother-in-law, ‘Abidin. Al-Sukari’s main complaint centered on the representation of movement to outside organizations, a role he traditionally played. Al-Sukari believed Banna was taking measures to give these responsibilities to ‘Abidin.  He threatened to withdraw from the movement unless Banna reverse his decision. Al-Sukari was not alone. Appatently, a segment within the movement supported him. Rounds of talks were held at the GH to narrow differences between al-Sukari and the General Guide, but all attempts failed. Subsequently, al-Sukari resigned, or was dismissed.[c] The resignation of al-Sukari was by far the most serious blow to the cohesion of the movement’s internal structure because of the sensitive position he occupied and because of the gravity of the allegations he came to charge Banna with. The two would fight for the coming months on the pages of Egyptian local press. Al-Sukari accused Banna, inter alia, of inclination to secrecy, dictatorship and collaboration with foreign powers.

Conclusion

Placing the movement’s development within the larger context of the evolution of Egyptian national movement indicates that the claim the movement is inherently violent is, at least contentious, if not completely baseless. Instead, it shows that violence was a by-product of a complex web of factors in which the movement was embroiled in certain periods of its evolution, and which changed its course. Indeed, the violent tactics the movement adopted in the second half of 1940s were more a product of the time than the movement’s own ideology. Above all, they were not an aberration in their context. In pursuing these tactics, the movement was aping others, not inventing new approaches. The use of violence as a form of political activism was common among Egyptian political groups at this time.

Furthermore, the time line indicates that it took almost a decade, after these tactics became popular, for the movement to adopt them. During this decade the movement was going through a major transformation thanks to the influx of young members that joined it during the latter part of 1930s. The most articulate of these elements had previously belonged to other organizations and had employed these contentious tactics. Even those who were not members of a particular group would become accustomed to them.  It is to the new membership that one can attribute the transformation of the movement to a political organization and its espousal of violent tactics. As have been discussed above, the leadership would resist this trend before it ultimately surrendered to it—perhaps in order to remain relevant. The closure of political and economic horizons only made matters worse.  

It would help illustrate the nature of this transformation to compare the movement’s membership and its behaviors in post 1936 to the period prior to that. On close examination, it is apparent that Muslim Brothers had at least three distinct periods of development. The first began from its founding in 1928 in Isma‘iliyya and continued until 1932. At this time, the movement was an orderly provincial religious organization modeled after some of the Sufi orders that Banna had previously joined. The movement members were comprised mostly of uneducated and apolitical workers. The range of its activities was limited to religious and general education and some advocacy on behalf of Egyptian workers in foreign companies. The second period, which started from1932 until 1936 in Cairo, shared some of the general characteristics of the first period. The movement remained a purely religious movement with little or no interest in politics except in as far as it impacted its ability to continue to operate.[ci]  In both periods, Banna remained the uncontested leader and the group eschewed violence.

Not unlike the first period, the period after 1936 witnessed the conversion of massive membership. But unlike any of the two previous periods, these new converts were members of other partisan groups who joined the Ikhwan when their parties lost or were on the verge of losing popular support, especially students. These new converts remained faithful to their goals and tactics and continued to pursue them under the umbrella of Ikhwan. Most of these came from the movement of Young Egypt, which was known for its inflammatory rhetoric and militant tactics. Young Egypt— which had at the early part of 1930s a strong presence on Egyptian campuses[cii] and among workers—became a marginal group by the mid 1940s.[ciii] Supporters of this movement did not simply dislodge from politics. As Jankowki and others noted, they joined the Muslim Brothers.  To these enthusiasts, Muslim Brothers provided a platform through which they pursued their goals—employing, of course, the same tactics they had hitherto used.

Considering that Young Egypt leader had proposed a merger in 1939 with the Muslim Brothers, it is not unwise to think that this proposal came as a result of its leadership recognition that significant segment of the group had already joined Muslim Brothers. The ideological proximity between these two groups and the fact that the latter saw a swell in its membership during this period suggests that many of Young Egypt’s supporters joined the Ikhwan—as some scholars have suggested. Jankowski contented that “the Brotherhood seems to have been successful in attracting to itself some of the youth who had previously followed Young Egypt by this time, as well as making serious inroads into those segments of the population which Young Egypt regarded as its natural clientele.”[civ] Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that most of what the Ikhwan did or were accused of doing between 1944 and 1949, such as intimidation campaigns, the organization of a military wing, the planning and execution of assassination attempts, and the possession and concealment of arms, were all aspects that had been the central trait of Young Egypt.[cv]

Another important factor that distinguished this period from previous ones was the medium of conversion. Unlike earlier periods when converts came through Banna, new converts were rather ushered in by other members. As such, they lacked the proper training and indoctrination. It is to such groups that one can attribute, not only the inflammatory rhetoric of the movement during this period, its involvement in politics, but also some of the violence. The meticulousness of Banna[cvi] and— one should add— his aversion to revolutionary thoughts and acts cannot be reconciled with the poor planning and negligence that characterized some of these acts (not to mention that Banna himself denied involvement ordering them and criticized their perpetrators).  The few examples of fitan (tribulations) listed above should serve to demonstrate the degree to which Banna’s control of the movement was contested and which was—one can assume— the by-product of having an influx of converts who arrived at a time when the Guide was too busy or too distant to closely usher them in.

We also learn from the expose above that the movement was able to co-exist with, even as it openly condemned, the secular and non-secular parties that made up the Egyptian political fabric. The movement also supported and received support from several levels of Egyptian government at different periods of its growth, indicating its pragmatic inclination.[cvii] There is, for example, a report that the movement had accepted support from the colonial authority to build its first mosque and center.[cviii] A movement with this profile seems to be driven by pragmatic and rational considerations, not by rigid and unyielding religious ideology. Later instances of violence attributed to the group against the regime have often happened at a time when the latter closed all venues of social mobilization and freedom of speech, and when Banna had little influence or control over them. 

In general, when the movement was removed from the contentious and politicized atmosphere of Cairo in the later part of 1930s and throughout 1940s, the movement remained peaceful. As it is clear from the record of the movement in its early days in al-Isma‘iliyya and in Cairo, the expansion of the movement’s membership and the dissemination of its ideals were negotiated, not imposed outcomes. This illustrates that it was rather flexibility and adaptation that characterized the movement, not violence and rigidity, which were products of a specific set of circumstances rather than purposeful indoctrination. And it is indeed these two aspects that allowed the movement to weather ferocious campaigns of persecution by different regimes and to continue to operate as a significant political force in Egypt. However, this ability of the movement to survive against the odds made it a target for governments and radical organizations alike. The movement became the recipient of the former’s wrath and the umbrella under which the latter sought protection.     

---

[i] - Banna, Memoirs; ‘Abd al-Halim, Memoirs.

[ii] - ‘Abd al-Halim

[iii]  Wedell, Tracts, p.8.

[iv] - Mitchell, Society, p. 326.

[v] - Examples of this contradiction are provided elsewhere in this paper.

[vi] -  Wendell, Tracts, p. 82.

[vii]  As cited in Wendell, p. 78.

[viii] - There is no need to go into details here about the nature of these rifts as they will be discussed elsewhere in this paper.  Yet, it should suffice here to illustrate the nature of these rifts to refer to the matalib of Ahmad Rif‘at’, or the demands of Ahmad Rifat, as Mahmoud ‘Abd al-Halim calls them in his memoirs, which according to him led to “the cessation of everything  at the General headquarter” (vol. I p. 208).  

[ix] - The most important of these, in terms of its breadth, are the memoirs of ‘Abd al-Halim, an influential member of the movement, a close associate of Banna and one of five founders of the notorious al-Nizam al-Khas, the secret military wing of the organization in 1941.  No less important, but by no means exhaustive, are Banna’s memoirs. As the founder and the leader of the movement until his death in 1949, Banna’s memoirs derive their importance from their author’s intimate knowledge of the movement’s history and internal affairs. But this point of strength (the intimate knowledge of the subject), is this memoirs’ Achilles’s heel as well, for it has the potential of compromising their objectivity. Abd al-Halim and Banna’s memoirs open for scholar an important window into the struggle for leadership and influence within the movement.

[x] - Jankowski, p. 40.

[xi] -  Examples of this current are extant in works on the movement as have been demonstrated elsewhere in this paper. But this current is also echoed by those who reviewed such works as well. As it is sometime the case, the tone with which this side of the movement’s life is approached is one that reflects open hostility to the movement; expressing a sense of relief that it had failed: “In the East and West the combination of mob oratory, religious zeal, and superb organization has perpetual menace to society. The only solace in the story is the reflection that Hasan al-Banna’ in Egypt, Husni al-Za‘im in Syria, and the Mufti in Palestine all failed” Esmond Wright, a book review of “Religious and political Trends in Modern Egypt” Middle East Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall, 1951), pp. 515-516. Moreover, Muslim Brothers have often been compared in both Arabic and English literature to the Kharijites and Isma‘iliyya movement, particularly the movement of Assassins.  The emphasis on the violent nature of the group is frequent in English and Arabic literature alike. See Mitchell, p. 320 “The mood of the mysterious and the esoteric and the spirit of the exclusiveness which engendered violence are particularly noteworthy.” Michell also notes that similar comparisons were drawn in Husayni, Ikhwan and Tabi‘i, Ha’ula’I hum al-Ikhwan. Charles Wendell notes this similarity as well in his work The Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), stating in his introduction that the “excessive reading of Islamic history must have familiarized him [Banna] with the organization and methods of the esoteric “Sevener” Shi‘I group” p. 5. See also Jeffery T. Kenney’s work on extremism in Egypt, where the legacy of another violent group Kharijites was invoked even in the title: Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremist in Egypt.

[xii] - Mitchell, p. 325.

[xiii] - Ibid, p. 320.

[xiv] - Mitchell, Society, p. 320.  Mitchell’s work has been praised for being moderate and he himself as ‘circumspect’ (see Kenney 2006). And he is indeed so, compared of course to some other scholars who wrote on the movement. Yet, he seems to have strongly believed that it was not only the Muslim Brothers who had a natural predilection toward violence and lawlessness, the entire Egyptian society had: “The political violence for which the Society is most widely known was, in its fundamental expression, not unique to it. In our analysis of the history of the movement we have suggested the theme, which will be considered further here, that the Muslim Brothers shared with fellow Egyptians a common disdain for law and order and accepted, in more or less degree, a rationale for violence” (p. 313).

[xv] - In a lengthy essay entitled Qadiyatuna (Our Case), Banna sought to share with the national and international audiences the movement’s response to the government accusations that Muslim Brothers planned and executed several terrorist attacks and attempted to subvert the political order.  Banna denied the four major accusations levied against the group. First, regarding the bombings of Jewish stores, he mentioned that there is no evidence linking any member of the Ikhwan. And even if it is approved that a member committed such acts that there is certainly no evidence that an order was given by the Leadership Council. He further contended that such events should be understood within their context: events orchestrated by zealous youth in a time of war.  Banna added that because some of the local Jews aided the Zionists in Palestine, this was to be expected. Second, regarding the assassination of Khazindar, Banna proclaimed that no one regretted this event than did the Muslim Brothers.  He asserted that the Muslim Brothers would not have committed this crime. Nor did any implicit or explicit order was issued by their leadership. He said, the movement would not have condoned such acts under any circumstances. Banna still stressed that the sentences this Judge entered against members of his movement were extremely harsh and might have precipitated his assassination. Third, regarding the assassination of Naqrashi, Banna had the following to say: “This matter is still with the Court. This matter happened when the Council was in no position to hold people to account. Nor was the leader (i.e. Banna) in position to run [his own organization]. All the leaders of Ikhwan were either in prison at the time or under close surveillance. This is the kind of reaction that we tried to avoid, and hoped would not occur. But not everything that one wishes, one gets. In the end, Matters are in God’s hand.”  Fourth, regarding the bombing of the court, Banna stated, “the general Guide has condemned this matter in the strongest words, and issued a statement to be published in the press. Local newspapers have subsequently refused to publish it, a decision that gravely saddened us and we believe it was a conspiracy against the Ikhwan.” Banna continued to assert that no one in the movement leadership ordered, or approved of this incident, noting that the person in custody denied that he was guilty and that no incriminating evidence has as of yet been produced by the court. Moreover, Banna rejected in this lengthy essay other allegations as well.   He rejected the accusation that his movement had derailed from its natural course  as religious and social movement to the realm of politics, arguing that the nature of religion itself does not make such distinction and that the brothers were coerced by events to enter the realm of politics. He cites the imposition of martial law and the narrowing of the margin of freedom along with the deliberate persecution of the Ikhwan. Entering the realm of parliamentary politics represented, according to Banna, the only viable option at the time for them to protect their rights as citizens. He went on to discredit any desire on the part of his organization to topple the regime or to subvert the political order, pointing out that the regime in Egypt is either entirely Islamic at which point the Muslim Brothers would be the first to protect it. If it is not based on an Islamic vision, it must be based on parliamentarian and democratic principles, where the rights of citizens are protected. In whichever case, the Muslim Brothers would not have sought to destroy it (saying in Arabic; la wa alf la, no and thousand no), for such regime would have provided the kind of protection the organization needed to prosper.

[xvi] - Ibid, p. 62.

[xvii] - It behooves us to point out that Mitchell’s account is relatively old, although it is still an important source on the movement, one that is widely quoted. Yet, Mitchell’s work, like those of many Western scholars on the movement, contains some interesting contradictions. While on one hand he decries the rigidity of Banna and the impact of such rigidity on the movement in general, Mitchell describes Banna as being ‘shrew’ ‘cunning’ and ‘cautious,’ pointing to ‘ambivalence’ and ‘political duplicity’ as characteristics of the movement political discourse. See pages 307-309. Elsewhere, Mitchell speaks of Banna’s vision of Islamic law, noting that its central characteristic is flexibility; reflected in the respect of diversity in legal opinions regarding any particularly issue, depending on location, time and circumstances. Mitchell even believed that Banna may have in fact been of the view that he and his contemporaries should make their own ijtihad, one that fits their own time and circumstances (p. 237). Regardless of whether Banna truly believed such matter, this approach could hardly be described as rigid.  Amazingly enough, this very idea of flexibility goes against Mitchell’s own belief that “Banna [demonstrated in his thoughts an] unrelenting insistence on being bound by the classical legists on the important question of change” (p. 325).

[xviii] - Wendell, Five Tracts, p. 5. It is interesting to see that just after accusing the movement of the infatuation with Nazis and other modern counterparts, insinuating that they adopted their tactics, Wendell asserts in the same page that “the significant economic, social, and health programs advocated and pursued by the Muslim Brotherhood are probably its only thorough modern features!”

[xix] - Wendell, Five Tracts, p. 8.

[xx] -Ibid, p. 8.

[xxi] - This absurd comparison between an Islamist thinker such as Banna and a secular Arab dictator such as Mu‘ammar al-Qadhaffi is reminiscent of allegations (which have now been debunked) in the buildup to the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 to a link between the secular president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda leader Osama B. Laden. Any observer with any credible knowledge of the region would readily concede that a link between the Muslim Brothers and the Libyan regime is very improbable. 

[xxii] -Harris, p. 2.

[xxiii] - Ibid., p.15

[xxiv] - Ibid., p. 234.

[xxv] -Ibid. p. 233.

[xxvi] - Rubin, M. Brotherhood, p. 6.

[xxvii] - Ibid., p. 1.

[xxviii] - For example, an Economist article on October of 2010, reads: “The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Wolves or sheep?”  Economist no. 8706, (October 30, 2010): p. 102.

[xxix] -  Kramer, Hasan al-Banna, p. 73.

[xxx] - Banna’s detractors have often accused him of obfuscation on issues of national importance in order to avoid confronting either the government or the British. See Tariq al-Bishri, al-Haraka al-Siyyasisiyya fi Misr: 1945-1952. 

[xxxi] -Haggai Erlich, Students and University in 20^th Century Egyptian Politics­, 1989, p. 126.

[xxxii] - Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, p. 147.

[xxxiii] - Jankowski.

[xxxiv] - James p. Jankowski, Egypt’s Young Rebels, 1975.

[xxxv] - Abd al-Halim, Memoirs.

[xxxvi] - Jankowski, p. 14. This veritable note contradicts Jankowski’s assertion elsewhere that Young Egypt was inspired by the militancy of the Muslim Brothers.

[xxxvii] - Banna even denies that his movement harbors hatred toward the West. Under the headline “Islam does not blemish the relationship between us and the West,” Banna states: “Some people may think that [implementing] the laws of Islam in our new life distances us from them [the West], after it [our relationship with them] has almost been normalized. This is indeed nothing but mere conjecture. If these [European] countries suspect ill intension on our part, then they will not be happy with us regardless of whether we followed Islam or something else. However, if their friendship is sincere, and if there is a mutual trust between us and them, then their speakers and politicians have proclaimed that every country is free to choose the governing system that it desires to implement in the interior of its country, as long as it doesn’t violate others’ rights. The politicians in these countries should all know that the international honor of Islam is the most sacred honor ever known to history, and that the foundations [ground-rules] put forth by International Islam to preserve and maintain such honor is the strongest and the most stable of foundations. (pages 32 & 33; Banna, The Letters of Muslim Brothers)

[xxxviii] - In fact, the accusation of racial or religious bias has been categorically denied by the organization. Banna says: “He is indeed deluded [the one] who thinks that the Muslim Brothers calls for racial disunity between the different classes of the nation, as we recognize that Islam paid at most care to the respect of the general kinship between all mankind: [God] the Exalted says: ‘O People We have created you from a male and female and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another.’  Banna adds that “Islam has also come for the good of all humanity. Therefore, a religion of this character is least likely of all religions to dispense disunity and rancor into the hearts [of nations]. Quran came to reinforce and encourage this unity: ‘We make no distinction between his messengers [apostles]’ Islam has also made aggression unlawful even in cases of anger and dispute. God states ‘Let not the enmity of a nation leads you to commit injustice. [Rather] be fair that is close to piety.’ Islam has also recommended [showing] kindness and benevolence toward citizens even if their dogmas and religions differed.”  Banna p. 10 ‘ila al-shabab.

[xxxix] - Kramer, p. 34.

[xl] - See ‘Abd al-Halim Memoirs and Banna Memoirs. ‘Abd al-Halim also adds that beside Banna’s father, the only man who walked in Banna’s funeral was a Christian Copt who managed to penetrate the security wall that prevented other men from attending.

[xli] - Smith, p. 10.

[xlii] -  Marsot, A short History of Modern Egypt.

[xliii][xliii] - Ibid.

[xliv] - Smith, p. 11.

[xlv] -Ibid.

[xlvi] - Marsot.

[xlvii] - Smith

[xlviii] - Despite the fact that some have argued that ‘Urabi’s revolt was national only in appearance. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt. Second Edition 1969.

[xlix] -Vatikiotis

[l] - Vatikiotis

[li] - Demonstrations would continue after Kamil’s death in 1908.

[lii] -Marsot

[liii] -Vatikiotis

[liv] - Ibid. 296.

[lv] - Jankowski, p. 5.

[lvi] - Died in the previous decade, but echoes of his ideas, particularly his views on women, continued to reverberate well beyond this period—with women, such as Huda al-Sha‘rawi, taking a more leading role in this matter .

[lvii] - Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining Egyptian Nationalism, 1930-1945, p. 54.

[lviii] - Jankowski, p.119.

[lix] - (A coup d’état is inevitable, the acquisition of force is a necessity).

[lx] - P.J. Watikiotis notes regarding the wide ranging effect of this movement that: “They [meaning high school students] were influenced by many ideas propagated by Young Egypt regarding independence, agrarian reform, the prutification of national life, military power, the extension of Egyptian influence into the Arab Middle East and Africa.” P. 330.

[lxi] - To use ‘Abd al-Nasir own words as cited in Gershoni and Jankowski, p.3.

[lxii] - Smith, p. 131.

[lxiii] - For examples see Smith’s seminal work on Haykal

[lxiv] - Mitchell. p. 1.

[lxv] - Ibid,

[lxvi] - Husaini, Ikhwan

[lxvii] - Ibid.

[lxviii] - Mitchel, Society

[lxix] -Ibid.

[lxx] - Ibid.

[lxxi] -Ibid.

[lxxii] -Ibid.

[lxxiii] - As cited in Michell, Society, p. 5.

[lxxiv] - Husaini, The Muslim Brothers.

[lxxv]  Banna, Memoirs

[lxxvi] - ‘Abd al-Halim

[lxxvii] - See these accounts in Both Banna’s memoirs, ‘Abd al-Halim memoirs, and some comments in Sayyid Yusif’s book: al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun:hal hiya sahwa Islamiyya [The Muslim Brothers: Is this an Islamic Awakening?]

[lxxviii] - Mahmud ‘Abdl al-Halim

[lxxix] -Ibid

[lxxx] - As cited in Al-Sayyid Yusuf, p. 174.

[lxxxi] - The centrally located position to which the movement moved its headquarter in late 1935 or early 1936.

[lxxxii] -The third month of Muslim lunar calendar.

[lxxxiii] - ‘Abd al-Halim uses the Quranic verse 88:7: la yusminu wala yugni min ju‘ [Which neither nourishes nor avails against hunger] to describe the number of those who would stay.

[lxxxiv] - Ibid.

[lxxxv] - Ibid.

[lxxxvi] - The question of whether this is a principled opposition is not only hard to determine as is any form of mind reading, but it also has little bearing on the general argument of this paper.

[lxxxvii] - It is interesting to note that while a great deal of Western literature accuses the movement of embracing a political ideology whose main goal is the seizure of power and of adopting strategy of violence to arrive at that end, much of the literature in Arabic written from the perspective of its contemporaries accuses the movement of distracting the youth from the ‘national cause; i.e. an open challenge to the colonial authority and that of the palace. See Tariq al-Bishri (al-Haraka al-Siyyasiyya fi Misr: 1945-1952, published in 1972); see also Sayyid Yusuf (al-Ikwan al-Muslimun: hal hiyya sahwa islamiya?).

[lxxxviii] - As cited in Sayyid Yusuf, p. 196.

[lxxxix] - Some of these were also members of their rivals who infiltrated the movement (especially its special militia [al-Jihaz al-Khas]) with the purpose of sowing dissension. See Dr. Salah ‘Issa introduction to the translated version of Mitchell’s work (published in 1977), especially pages 26 and 27.

[xc] - That Banna had more trust in the early converts to the movement, particularly from the town of al-Isma‘iliyya than he had in the followers of the movement in Cairo, is evident in some of his moves. When Banna decided (mostly likely under pressure from the young, passionate cosmopolitan members of the movement in Cairo) to run for office, he chose always to run for the seat of al-Isma‘liyya, even as the membership in Cairo swell beyond his wildest imaginations.

[xci] - Even though no evidence, at least no one amounting to a confession on the part of the leadership of the group exists to prove such matter, the internal tension and the administrative moves (such as the reorganization of the movement various branches and organs, and the dismissal of several members) seem to indicate that Banna made several attempts to impose order on a rather increasingly fragmented and disorderly organization. More importantly, Banna’s distrust of many of his followers is evident in some of his writings. In one of his essays entitled the ‘The Weakness of the Trustworthy and the Wickedness of the Strong,’ he writes:  “In regard to the organization of the administrative council, it is clear that these people have not understood yet the mission of the Muslim Brothers. Indeed, they are a few those who have the capacity to shoulder the burdens of its administration and the execution of its exhaustive platform. I, indeed, wish I have around me men who understand and are capable of [handling] administrative matters, so that I can surrender this work to them and have some reprieve myself. But where are such men? The majority understands from the administrative council only the [importance of] membership. They vey and compete for it, [a fact] that leads them to enmity and antagonism.” As cited in al-Sayyid Yusuf, p. 170.

[xcii] - ‘Abd al-Halim, Memoirs.

[xciii] - Ibid.

[xciv] - ‘Abd al-Halim account is more likely credible because he was not disputing the legality of the actions taken by Young Egypt, which would raise the suspicion that his account is apologetic. He was simply disputing the wisdom of them. He also referred to an article that he allegedly published in the local press apparently denouncing these acts and defending the non-escalatory approach adopted by the Ikhwan. While I was not able to verify that this article was indeed published, it would be unwise to make an allegation of this character that his Egyptian and Arab audience could easily ascertain its veracity or the lack thereof.

[xcv]-‘Abd al-Halim, vol. 1. p. 165.

[xcvi] -Jankowsky, p. 39.

[xcvii] - Jankowski, p. 39.

[xcviii] - Ibid., p. 38.

[xcix] -Ibid.

[c] - Depending on whose narrative one believes.

[ci] - In his speeches, Banna spoke of his dislike of politics. Regarding the movement’s views of politics, Banna states in a section of one of his letters under the title ‘We and Politics’: “Others will say that the Muslim Brothers are men of politics and that there mission is a political mission—and from behind that [religious veil] they have ulterior motives. We are not quite sure until when would our nation (umma) continues to hurl accusations [at each other], gives in to false suspicions, and [resorts into] name calling, leaving aside a truth based on reality and adapting suspicious matters that rest on doubts.”  He continues to add “we call you with the Quran in our right hands and the Sunna in our left hands, setting as an example the deeds of the righteous predecessors (salaf) of this umma. We call you to Islam, its teachings, its laws and its guidance. If you consider this politics, then [sure] this is our politics.”

[cii] - ‘Abd al-Halim mentioned in his memoirs that as early as 1936, members of Young Egypt have resorted to questionable and violent tactics such as the bombing of liquor stores and night clubs and used these acts as a recruitment tool. They also used these events to pressure young members of the Muslim Brothers, accusing their organization of weakness and acquiescence.  ‘Abd al-Halim claimed that he, after obtaining permission from Banna, wrote to decry their acts. This account shows two important facts:  (1) the Muslim Brother were at this time against such form of violence as they deemed it counterproductive; (2) there was an enormous amount of peer pressure on the young members of the group to adopt militant tactics, to prove their seriousness about their mission. As noted above, this pressure made its way up to the leadership.

[ciii] -  See Selam Bottman’s treatment of “the Economic and Social Setting,” especially the discussion on the political agitations during late 1930s and early 1940s and the role of movements such as Young Egypt, the Wafd, and the Muslim Brothers. Jankowski also notes that “Young Egypt’s suggestions of merger with the Brotherhood, would seem to indicate that the party [Young Egypt] was being eclipsed by the Brotherhood by 1939.” p. 40.

[civ] - Jankowski, p. 40.

[cv] - It should be noted that Jankowski believed that the Young Egypt increasing militancy was perhaps an attempt to compete with the Muslim Brothers on their own terms. He also refers to Young Egypt attempt to ‘Out-Brotherhood the Broherhood.’ But all indications, especially the timeline of events, suggest that it were the Brothers who strove to outperform young Egypt. Jankowski’s mistake in this regard stems from the wrong assumption that the Muslim Brothers became a more potent force before the rise of Young Egypt—an assessment that we now know was wrong. When Young Egypt was in its heydays in mid-1930s, the Muslim Brothers were indeed on the rise, but still inconsequential force. Finally, and in regard to the question of militancy, we know from the accounts in Muslim Brothers’ memoirs that when Young Egypt and Wafd’ paraded their Greens and Blues in a show of force in Cairo’s streets, the Muslim Brothers had little to display beside a small corps of untrained—and comparatively pacifist—Rovers.

[cvi] - A point that even his critics made note of and even at time used against him.

[cvii] - Banna, memoirs.

[cviii] - Ibid. He pointed out and so did ‘Abd al-Halim that the Suez Canal Company contributed 500 Egyptian pounds to build the Society’s first mosque and center in al-Isma‘iliyya. 

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