Has Aljazeera been taken over by the Muslim Brothers?



Has Aljazeera been taken over by the Muslim Brothers?

It has now become a cliché to say that recent uprisings in the Arab World surprised the region’s most revered experts not just in terms of the rapid procession with which they spread but also because of the tangible results that some of them achieved: toppling powerful dictators such Qadhafi and Mubarak. Overcoming the initial shock, many of the region’s experts as well as ordinary Westerners turned to the channel that has become the unrivaled news source on the region: Aljazeera. But it was not only Westerners that tuned in to Aljazeera. TV viewers across the region tuned in as well. For Arab viewers, Aljazeera has established itself as truly “the most trusted name in news.” Its coverage of their various wars, from Iraq to Palestine has placed it in an elevated status. Of course, this time Aljazeera was there to report as usual.
But as the waves of unrest swept the region and more fissures within Arab streets surfaced, Aljazeera’s neutrality (once taken for granted) came to be questioned. For some, its coverage seemed to favor certain players. Aljazeera, which was once cherished for its policy of representing the opinion and the counter opinion, appeared now, for a growing number of articulate Arabs, to stress certain opinions and overlook others. It has been critiqued, particularly since the early days of the Libyan uprising, of being a mouthpiece for the Qatari state, which is thought to side with the Islamists. Many more accusations of this kind continued to pour in as the Islamists in Egypt seemed poised to win the first election in that country and as the Syrian uprising seemed to drift to a bloody civil war.  The central theme of these accusations was that the channel has ceased to be a neutral source of news and has become instead a propaganda tool at the disposal of the Muslim Brothers. Some even go further to say that the channel has always been so. It simply happened that this bias, which was carefully camouflaged, did not surface until now.
This is no simple proposition. It certainly deserves some inquiry. Thus I attempt to consider these allegations below on the basis of the available information. I ask: To what extent is Aljazeera serving the overall political goals of the Muslim Brothers? And if so, how? Is the bias in favor of the Muslim Brothers, if such bias exists, a by-product of intrinsic (a takeover of the channel’s editorial process) or rather extrinsic (the brothers’ alignment with the state of Qatar) factors?
 Of course, there are no simple answers. The questions themselves were born out of the contentious and divisive nature of the Arab Spring—or more properly the Arab Fall. For example, supporters of the Syrian regime, even those amongst whom who are privy to the level of brutality of the Assad cult, believe that Aljazeera stands completely on the side of the “revolutionaries.” They contend that its coverage of the Syrian crisis is born out of political and ideological stance, not out of earnest attempt to report events.  They further question the argument— often made by supporters of Aljazeera— that such close reportage of the Syrian (and before that the Libyan) uprising was motivated by a moral commitment to side with the weak against the powerful. They maintain that had such considerations been the guiding principles behind the channel’s reportage, then the channel would not have toned down it coverage of the uprising in Bahrain.  
I shall attempt below to demonstrate that some bias is evident, although it is not as pervasive or deliberate as some of Aljazeera’s distractors suggest. It certainly does not amount to a takeover of Aljazeera by the Islamists, or Muslim Brothers in particular. Evidently, the channel employs and hosts individuals who are not Islamists, but also people with known hostility to the Islamists. Furthermore, Islamists and pious Muslim alike have accused the channel of providing a platform for Islamophobes to attack Islam on its airwaves. The appearance of Wafa Sultan on al-itijah al-mu‘akis debating a Muslim cleric is frequently cited. It is helpful therefore to think not of how the Islamists took over Aljazeera (since this is too big of a proposition to substantiate), but rather to examine the socio-political and historical factors that make Aljazeera more disposed to project the views of the Islamists. This includes the channel’s perception of the preferences of its viewership, the clout of the Islamists within the Qatari society (Aljazeera’s host) and the special alignment between the Islamists and the foreign policy of the state of Qatar (Aljazeera’s patron).
It should be remembered that the name Aljazeera today stands for a collection of TV channels in both Arabic and English (another channel in French will be launched soon). Some of its channels are specialized in documentary programs and others in sports. Moreover, Aljazeera has a special channel for children.  Depending on which channel one examines, one’s impression of Aljazeera could be different. Watching Aljazeera English is not necessarily helpful in evaluating its Arabic sister. The programs of Aljazeera English are not mere rendition of the programs on the Arabic channel. Both channels are geared toward their respective audiences, and hence each reflects the dominant values and cultural frames of its particular audience.
It is no that surprising that Aram Bakshian, who served as an aid to three US presidents (Nixon, Ford and Reagan), found Aljazeera (in this case English) to be “moderate, Westernized,” and to find no evidence that it is “an "Islamist" stalking horse.” To the contrary, Bakshian saw a channel that was “a not-for-Prophet as well as a not-for-profit news operation,” a trait that he extolled.[1] However, a viewer of the Arabic channel could come to a different conclusion. With this aspect in mind, I should make clear that what follows is a discussion of the orientation of the Arabic channel and has little to do with the nature or the tone of the programs on Aljazeera English.


The Channel:
Since it shyly invaded Arab skies in 1996, Aljazeera’s reputation as a trustworthy source of news has been on the rise.  The emancipatory possibilities that Aljazeera represented as a free platform were all voices inside the Arab world could engage in uncensored debate was new in its context, and like all things new, it had its lure. Venturing to airwaves filled with media busied with the solitary theme of glorifying the autocrats in power, Aljazeera rapidly drew the viewers of local states-sponsored media outlets. It also drew, albeit slowly, the viewers of Arabic media outlets broadcasted from outside the region. These included both privately sponsored radios and TV channels and those subsidized by foreign governments. Aljazeera’s attraction stemmed from its ability to market itself as an all-Arab channel, reporting and analyzing news of concern to the Arabic public, looking at them with Arabs’ eyes while, of course, proclaiming objectivity.[2]


Accustomed to listing to their news reported from the viewpoint of others (from media platforms such as BBC, CNN, RFI) or to the propaganda machine of the state, consumers of news in the Arab world found Aljazeera captivating. Aljazeera was seen as a revolution, a channel capable of doing of what all Arab leaders preached but failed to do: creating a unified free Arab public sphere. Only Arab autocrats and their patrons abroad were unhappy, but their complaints seemed only to increase Aljazeera’s popularity in the Arab World.[3]


Aljazeera’s reputation, as the most credible source of news for the Arabic viewership, was significantly boosted by its performance during certain critical moments in Arab history. Aljazeera’s ability to provide a close and often live coverage of the region’s most momentous events, such as the war in Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the 2008-09 bloody onslaught on Gaza (dubbed Cast Lead), did certainly take Aljazeera’s fame well beyond the borders of the region. But its more profound effects were in the region itself. Aljazeera which was once a trusted source of news and news analysis had become by the end of the first decade of the 21st century—at least in the eyes of its Arab viewers—a celebrated phenomenon, the last castle guarding Arabic culture, at a time of a great defeat. Most, if not all Arabs, felt that Aljazeera is truthful when it proclaims itself to be the voice of the voiceless.   Living under repressive regimes and constant threats of foreign invasions, the Arab—in his collective imaginary—was the persona most deserving of the descriptor, “the voiceless.” In some ways, Aljazeera ceased to be a channel in the collective memory to becoming something of a shadow government. It was to Aljazeera that people turned, not just to passively listen to news but rather to create them as well.
Evidently not all Arabs venerated Aljazeera to such extent, but outside the circles of governing elites, those who did not venerate the channels held it in a great esteem. It did not matter whether one was a leftist, Islamist of salafist or ikhwani bent, or ideologically unaffiliated. Aljazeera was everyone’s channel. If the Arab masses and many of their intellectuals agreed on any one subject, and they seldom did, it was that Aljazeera was doing a good job.[4]


This was possible in part because Aljazeera made it one of its unspoken priorities to scrutinize the behavior of the Arab regimes, at a time when their own citizens held them in extreme contempt. It was also in part because Aljazeera did not bow-down (at least not completely[1]) to the enormous pressures from the Americans and others to tone down its reportage on key topics such the war in Iraq, the occupation in Palestine and the war on terror. But above all, Aljazeera was successful in unifying the Arab masses in their trust in its programming because Aljazeera made a conscious decision to cater to the diversity of the Arab world by speaking to all the ideological trends present in the region. Whether through the selection of its staff or the ideological background of its guest speakers, Aljazeera made sure that every Arab viewer would feel that her viewpoint was made and heard, whether she was of Arab nationalist persuasion, a secular individual, a traditional religion scholar or an Islamist. This was a successful formula, one that did not veer away from its claim to represent the opinion and the counter opinion. In fact, it perfectly went with it.[5]


Aljazeera’s reputation peaked at the onset of the Arab Spring as it expectedly made use of the expertise it had amassed, the credibility it had gained and the connections it had forged to provide extensive coverage of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolts as they took place. But the intricacies of the ongoing unrest in the region brought some reversal of fortune to Aljazeera. The cleavages within the Arab street and among the intelligentsia as a result of the waves of agitation sweeping the Arab world brought to the fore what Aljazeera had all along been able to hide by sending its cameramen and correspondents elsewhere: the Channel’s relationship with its host and sponsor, the state of Qatar. And within that frame, the clout of a specific ideological group in the channel, namely the Muslim Brothers, has been put to question. These two points were brought up in the wake of perceived imbalance of Aljazeera’s coverage of the bloody civil war in Libya, the current repression campaign in Syrian, and demonstrations in Bahrain.
Challenges:
But before examining these aspects, the following should be born in mind. There are many difficulties that the researcher face in evaluating the extent to which the range of opinion in regard to Aljazeera, especially the critical portrayal of it, indicates a genuine consternation among a considerable segment of its viewers. Part of this lies in the difficulty of separating the deliberate official campaigns (undertaken by certain governments because of their dislike of how Aljazeera reports on their conducts or by the managers and sponsors of other news channels that compete with Aljazeera for Arab viewership) from the sentiments on the streets.
It should also be remembered that although some bias could be shown, a blatant bias couldn’t. The very premise of Aljazeera as a channel for the opinion and counter opinion, the sophistication that has only increased as the channel evolved, makes its difficult for Aljazeera to be overwhelmingly and unashamedly biased toward one player. Aljazeera’s support for a given party is not, and unlikely to be at the same level of clarity as, for example, the Syrian TV’s support for the Syrian president. Although state-sponsored, Aljazeera continues to maintain a level of diversity in its staff and in its coverage of events as to keep it in the rank of private or free channels. This diversity also gives Aljazeera a chance of deniability.
Despite these credible challenges, however, some of the accusations against Aljazeera seem to come from different parts of the region and from known intellectuals with no known links to the existing regimes. In fact, some of these sentiments are expressed by many of those who have once defended or, as was often the case, worked for Aljazeera. And some, not all, of these continue to oppose the dictatorial regimes in the regions. Therefore, their words cannot be dismissed simply as a part of a given regime’s propaganda.[6]


Evidence of the bias:
Aljazeera’s critics cite numerous examples of cases where Aljazeera’s bias was very evident, even and especially in areas where the uprisings have led to the fall of former regimes. Internet chat rooms, debate forums, facebook groups, and even newspapers’ columns are awash with examples of Aljazeera’s clear bias in favor of the Muslim Brother across the region. The most frequently cited examples are:
1-                   Aljazeera employs many members with known links to the Muslim Brothers. These include Aljazeera’s former director Wadah Khanfar, Ahmad Mansur, and the director of Aljazeera’s Bureau in Cairo, ‘Abd al-Fattah Fayid.  Aljazeera also has Skaykh Al-Qaradawi as a permanent guest-speaker for its weekly Shari‘a and Life program.
2-                   After the revolution in Egypt, Aljazeera’s correspondent, Ahmad Mansur, made a series of interviews with members of the Muslim Brothers as a part of his program Shahid ‘Ala al-Thawra—a Witness to the revolution. In short period, Ahmad Mansur interviewed, Dr. Safwat Hijazi and Khirat al-Shatir.  Even though Mansur later interviewed non-Islamist activists, some critics contend that the disproportionately longer time given to the Muslim Brothers indicates a clear bias, even as the Islamists only joined the revolution in its latter stages.
3-                   The channel’s report on the fall of Mubarak, which was aired for several times in the same day bore an unmistakable Islamist tone, with heavy allusions to Quranic references.
4-                   In its coverage of the Syrian uprising, Aljazeera sides completely with demonstrators, and especially with the Islamists amongst them. It has supplanted its absence from the scene inside Syria with a dubious use of eyewitnesses, many of whom turned to be liars, located far away from where actions took place. Aljazeera’s critics say that this unfiltered use of the testimonies of eyewitnesses is no random act.
Analysis:
The alignment between the objectives of the channel and those of the Muslim Brothers can be discussed at two levels. One is the close relationship between the Qatari state and the movement, or at the least, key players in the local movement. The second has to do with the orientation of the channel, its desire to be the channel most viewed in the Arab world.  On the first level, one has to see not just the evident camaraderie between key figures in the Muslim Brothers such as Qaradawi and the most influential members in the government of the small emirate, especially with the emir and his family. However, not all the influence of the Muslim Brothers in Qatar stems from this important connection, the Muslim Brothers benefit, not doubt, from it. In fact, it seems that this unique connection, between Qaradawi and the state, is in part reinforced by the vast network of connections that local Muslim Brothers have forged inside various state institutions.  Although it is difficult, given the centrality of Qaradawi and his long lasting ties to the emirate, to isolate the cause from effect (i.e whether the movement’s connections are simply an extension of Qaradawi’s clout or whether the latter is a by product of those connections), the tactics of local Brothers are worth examining.
The movement:
Since its founding in 1928 at the hands of a high school teacher (Hasan al-Banna) in the town of al-Isma‘iliyya, the movement of the Muslim Brothers has sought to expand its influence outside its country of origin, Egypt. This was often done in one of two ways. One of these was to approach visiting students or scholars from other Arab countries to convince them to be part of the movement. Once recruited, the goal of these new converts was to establish cells inside their respective countries. The second method (functions either as a substitute or reinforcement to the first one) was to send delegations to certain countries to propagate the mission of the movement and recruit followers. Once sufficient members are converted, an organizational structure would be set up. The leaders as well as the members would pledge allegiance to the General Guide in Egypt. The local leader of the movement would have to carry a title suggesting allegiance but also subordination to the General Guide. For example, the title of the local leader in countries such as Syria, Jordan and Palestine (countries were the Muslim Brothers created early branches) is known as al-Muraqib al-‘Am, the General Observer—a man who runs the local branch on the behest of the General Guide in Egypt.
While this is the general paradigm of the expansion of the Muslim Brothers in some parts of the Arab World, the literature of the movement have led in other parts to the rise of local movements inspired by the Egyptian model, without a direct involvement of the main movement in Egypt. But even when a local movement grew independently, an attempt would always be made, either by a local initiative or by the main movement in Egypt, to integrate the newborn to the global network. Whether the movement sprang naturally or through a prompt from Cairo, the main vehicle of integrating a new movement is the oath of allegiance, bay‘a. The oath not only symbolizes a commitment to the ideals of the movement but also acts as an acknowledgment of the leadership of the General Guide. 
The centrality of the concept of bay‘a for the Muslim Brothers made it also a litmus test for governments’ fearing the spread of the organization in their countries. In the gulf where various manifestations of political Islam appeared somewhat late on the scene and where most of its strands were tolerated, the question of subservience of local branches to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt became a contentious topic in 1990s when the influence of the Muslim Brothers was perceived to pose a threat to local regime or social norms. It was often the ability of the local branch of the Muslim Brothers in a given country to convince the government under whose jurisdiction they operate of the absence of ties with the mother organization that determined its ability to continue to function unobstructed. The movements, which failed in this regard, clashed with the local regimes and their activities were severely circumscribed, if their structures were not completely dismantled. 
The gulf, an area of great interest to the Muslim Brothers because of its vitality as a funding source, saw the rise of various braches of the Muslim Brothers between early and late 1970s in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Early attempts (in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s) to create a branch in Saudi Arabia received unequivocal opposition from the monarchy, even when the relationship between the general movement and the kingdom was at its best. The arrival of the Muslim Brothers in large numbers in 1970s as quest workers, asylum seekers or guest scholars did not change this fact— although they were able to disseminate their message and attract some sympathy.  The Saudis held to the polite but firm rejection of establishing a Muslim Brothers’ branch, insisting that the Saudis are already ‘brothers’ and hence the creation of a new brotherhood is unnecessary superfluity. [7]
Like other branches in the region, the Muslim Brothers in Qatar trace their origins to the waves of Egyptian migrants, mostly asylum seekers fleeing the persecution of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt under Nasser. Many of these new migrants (some but not all of whom were scholars) found societies that were mostly untouched by modernity and countries that were in their infancy. These societies were also both Muslim and conservative.[8]
These factors placed the relatively well-trained, politically motivated and organizationally savvy Brothers at a great advantage vis-à-vis both the state and the public. They soon became the group that dominated vital professions in these countries. They were the lawyers, the jurists, the teachers and the mosque leaders. Beyond this qualitative imbalance, the Muslim Brothers found the conservative environment receptive to their ideology, although it seemed at times too conservative for their taste.  All of this meant that the brothers were able to shape the youths of these countries through the mold of Islamic education.
But the Qatari case was unique in at least three ways. First, Qatar was demographically smaller than any other state in the region. At the time of the arrival of early migrants of the Muslim Brothers, the country had a population of only 10,000 inhabitants. Second, the Muslim Brothers arrived a few years before Qatar became an independent state. Last, and most important, it would seem now in hindsight that no one person among the Brothers who migrated to the region commandeered a level of respect among fellow brothers, dedication to the cause, personal charisma, independence, erudition and an inexhaustible energy all at once as did Qaradawi.
The centrality of Qaradawi, which will receive further treatment below, cannot be overstated. But before highlighting the role of Qaradawi and the trajectory of events that led to his enormous influence inside and outside Qatar (all of which contributed to the intersection between the Muslim Brothers’ rhetoric and Aljazeera’s editorial policy), it would be useful to look at how the Muslim Brothers in Qatar managed to circumvent the fate of other movements in the region.
As noted above, the question of the level of ties to the mother organization in Egypt has always been a bone of contention between the various regimes in the Gulf and the different branches of the Muslim Brothers under their jurisdictions. In mid 1990s, when fears of political Islam reached considerable heights (fears that were triggered in no small part by the bloody civil war in Algeria) and at a time when ikhwani networks in countries like Kuwait and the UAE have dominated such important sectors as education, culture and religious affairs, many of these governments, which had hitherto tolerated or supported the activities of the Brothers, sought to curb their power.  Suspicions of the Muslim Brothers were also in part exacerbated by the position of the mother organization in Egypt during the Gulf war (II), which was interpreted as sympathetic to the regime in Bagdad.
Unlike in other countries, where attempts to curb the Muslim Brothers often entailed a direct assault on the organizational structure of the movement, in the Gulf (Kuwait and UAE are good examples) the governments took a more measured approach. They often sought to negotiate with the local members and leaders of the movement.  In the UAE, for example, the state attempted to reach a resolution whereby the local branch could maintain much of its structure and privileges if they were willing to severe all ties with the mother organization in Egypt and officially abrogate the oath of pledge to its General Guide. Long negotiations, interrupted by periods of arrests and banning of publications, continued for most of the 1990s and early 2000s, with not apparent outcome. Although the movement proclaimed independence, it was less forthcoming when it came to the issue of the oath. They refused to renounce the oath publicly.  Although no agreement was reached, the campaigns of imprisonments (which targeted mostly foreign immigrants and naturalized members of the Brothers), the censorship of the movement’s publications, and the deliberate purging of known ikhwani affiliates from state institutions have severely reduced the movement’s influence in the UAE. Some of these campaigns of imprisonments have intensified in the past few months. [9]
In Kuwait the picture was similar. Like their peers in the UAE, the Kuwaiti ikhwan consistently deflected the question of the bay‘a while claiming that they were completely independent from the mother organization in Egypt.  However, unlike the brothers in the UAE, the Kuwaiti brothers were able, because of the democratic opening in that country in post 1992, to protect their institutions from the regime. Banned publications, such as al-Mujtama‘, were replaced with new ones and the movement’s various organs were either replaced by the political party (the Islamic Constitutional Movement) or transformed into charitable organizations. In general, however, whether the movement was severely restricted (such as the case in the UAE) or actively participating in the political sphere (such as in Kuwait), the Muslim Brothers in the Gulf chose to maintain their presence as a political entity distinct from, if not in conflict with the state.  
Qatar was the exception. Although little has been written on the Muslim Brothers in Qatar and, as a result, about their organizational tactics, we know now that many known associates and leaders of the movement had opted to dissolve the movement in1999 and some declared its dissolution in 2003.[10] Although there are lingering questions as to whether these decisions reflect a consensus within the movement or simply individual initiatives, the movement in generally kept a low profile in Qatar, both before and after the period in question. The movement has generally opted to sacrifice, not only its ties with the mother organization but also any organized activism, in favor of integration inside state and public institutions. The absence of a distinct organization to which members belonged allowed Qatari Brothers to forge a web of vertical and horizontal networks as individual professionals without arousing suspicion. And it seems further that unlike its peers in the region that the Qatari Muslim Brothers did not require their members to pledge allegiance to the General Guide in Egypt. [11]
The apolitical and amorphous nature of the movement helped it melt into the fabric of the Qatari state and society. Unlike its peers elsewhere, the branch in Qatar was not interested in either distinguishing itself from the state or rallying behind a specific political or moral agenda which its hopes to impose on the state or society. Instead, many members and sympathizers chose to disseminate their message with whatever convenient way they found, be it during a lecture in a classroom, a sermon at a mosque, or through radio or TV programs. But in whatever form the teachings of the Muslim Brothers were presented, the political dimension was always downplayed.
The Man
In pursuing this unique stance, the Muslim Brothers in Qatar relied on the views of the independent cleric and leading figure in the movement, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Qaradawi is by far the most influential Muslim jurist today. The wide appeal across the world has earned him the title of the Global Mufti. Much of that reputation rests on Qaradawi’s weekly appearance on Aljazeera in its only religious program, al-shari‘a wa al-Hayat, Shari‘a and Life. The program was born with the channel itself, but Qaradawi’s relationship with the small emirates precedes the channel.
Qaradawi arrived in Qatar in 1961 with a delegation of Muslim scholars sent by al-Azhar as part of a cultural exchange program with the small emirate. But Qaradawi, who was jailed in 1954 as a part of the state crackdown on the Muslim Brothers, chose to stay.  He stayed in part because when he left Egypt the signs of a new repression campaign were looming on the horizon. By staying in Qatar Qaradawi spared himself a new round of jail time and possibly torture. But in his decision, Qaradawi was in part swayed by the warm welcome he received in Qatar, especially from high-ranking members of its government. He quickly formed a special bond with then governor of Doha Shaykh Khalifa b. Hamad Al Thani, who subsequently became the Emir of the emirate from 1972 until he was ousted in a coup in 1995.[12] 
The special bond between the emir and the Shaykh would give the latter the chance to not only to travel extensively abroad (with the emirate providing a passport and generously paying for the expenses) but also participate in shaping the educational and cultural institutions of the newborn state. His role in building the educational system in the country is undisputable. Soon after his arrival, Qaradawi became the Principle of Qatar’s only religious institution (al-ma‘had al-dinni). In the next few years, Qaradawi established the Shari‘a Faculty at the infant University of Qatar. He also oversaw the organization of numerous exchange programs with Egypt and other countries that allowed the young emirate to bring and recruit scholars and professionals from various educational backgrounds. With al-Qaradawi, in leading and organizing role, it was no surprise that many of these were either sympathizers or members of the Muslim Brothers, mostly from Egypt and Syria. [13]
These visiting ikhwan—whether from literary and religious studies or from scientific specializations—were not only the group to whom the training and education of the future generation of Qatari youth was entrusted.  They also constituted the nucleus of networks of Islamist professionals who would contribute to the normalization of the Islamist discourse within the country and to the establishment of many Islamist educational institutions. The special position that Qaradawi occupies as a part of the establishment, a close adviser to the emir and main religious scholar of the state, conferred on the activities of the Islamists an aura of officialdom that protected them from questioning.
Important as the shaping of educational field was, Qaradawi’s main influence was not on what being taught in the classrooms, but rather on what was broadcasted on the Qatari airwaves.  Upon his arrival in Qatar, Qaradawi—conscious of the importance of media— made sure that all his lectures at the main mosque in Doha were broadcasted and tapped for later usage. Since this was before the creation of the national radio, Qaradawi’s associates created a small radio platform that broadcasted his lectures to allow people within in a limited radius from the mosque to listen to them. (In an interview, Qaradawi boasted about this experiment saying: we introduced the radio in Qatar).[14] As soon as the Qatari national radio was created, Qaradawi’s Friday sermons from the main mosque were broadcasted on its airwaves. Qaradawi also had a regular religious program on the radio.[15]
Similarly, Qaradawi was keen on securing some regular airtime once the National TV of Qatar was launched. This meant that for ordinary Qataris, Qaradawi was always on the air. In addition, to his Friday sermons, which are broadcasted live, Qaradawi had regular appearances on both the national TV and the national radio. In certain Muslim occasions, such as in Ramadan, ordinary Qataris and whoever was able to tune in to Qatari airwaves would see Qaradawi with greater frequency and for hours at a time.
When Aljazeera finally appeared on the scene in 1996, Qaradawi was already a well-respected religious authority and a celebrity on the Qatari airwaves. His reputation has somewhat spilled over the borders, in part because of the wide circulation that his book on “The Permissible and Forbidden” enjoyed, but also in part because of his trips abroad (subsidized by the Qatari state) to participate in religious gatherings and scholarly seminars.[16] Beside his close ties with the state, Qaradawi commandeered a great deal of respect among thousands of Ikhwani professionals (both Qatari and foreigners) who were strongly integrated in horizontal and vertical networks inside Qatari institutions. Unlike their peers elsewhere, these professionals gained strong footholds within civil and state institutions, not by way of challenging them but by coopting them.  The cooptation of Qatari institutions was made easy by the fact that, unlike most of Arab states, Qatar has no official ideology.
It was not that surprising, given the influence that the Brothers, and especially their leader, Qaradawi, enjoyed, that Aljazeera (essentially a Qatari institution) would invite the latter to become the regular quest-speaker on its only religious program. [17] Choosing Qaradawi for the new program was not simply dictated by the influence he enjoyed inside Qatar, although that played a major part. It was also driven by shared interests. The media-savvy shaykh (with years of experience as a guest on Egyptian and Qatari TV), whose publications and presence on the airwaves had earned him some reputation across and beyond the Arab World, was an important asset to the newborn Aljazeera, as it allowed it to attract new viewers. Aljazeera’s owners were in particular aware of the popularity that the new Islamic media, which started to invade the airwaves a few years earlier, had gained. On his part, Qaradawi knew that his appearance on a channel with a wider reach, one that was free from the defect that impeded other channels (namely being a state mouthpiece), would carry his popularity to new spheres and further expand the Islamist public sphere that he and many of his peers across the region have so industriously sought to create and dominate.[18]
Out of these converging interests was born the weekly program of Shari‘a wa al-Hayat, a program that permits Aljazeera to use the rhetoric skills, erudition and popularity of the Shaykh to carve a space within the rising Islamic public sphere. The format of the program, one where the channels viewers have the chance to engage the quest-speaker, through phone, facsimile or email, provides a democratizing experience consistent with the goals of the channels. But the programs wide reach, being accessible to Arabic viewers beyond the borders of the Arab world, was especially important for Qaradawi who found in it a convenient way to consolidate the ties he forged with thousands of admirers in the Western hemisphere. These admirers would have only seen him in the far-in-between conferences or simply known him through his publications. The program provided a platform through which he meets and addresses them on a weekly basis. Of course, the program also permits the Shaykh to make inroads among the rising youths of the Muslim community in Europe.[19]  
The outcome of this cooperation was a success for both parties and further interdependence between the Shaykh and the channel. Aljazeera ceased to be a small channel in a remote Arab potentate that it was on the eve of its launch. It has turned into a powerful international media giant with offices and correspondents in all corners of the world. Even in areas where it does not have offices, it is capable of reaching them in short time should the need arise. It has become a brand name the governments across the region both loathe and dread. With the growth of the channel also grew the influence of the Shaykh and the reach of the Islamist public sphere that he, using Aljazeera own airwaves, earnestly propagated.[20]  
Of course, Qaradawi and other Islamists did not rely per se on Aljazeera. He continued to appear on the national Qatari TV, publish his works, and interact with his growing mass of admirers using a combination of modern and traditional media tools. Examples of these include websites such as Qaradawi.net and Islamonline.net— both launched shortly after the appearance of Aljazeera (and both extensively publicized on Aljazeera). But none of these tools proved as useful in disseminating the viewers of the Shaykh with their evident ikhwani bent as Aljazeera. If the outcome at the professional level of fifteen years of Aljazeera was a powerful media giant, the outcome on the sociopolitical spheres in the Arab World is one where the Islamist views of Qaradawi held an enormous sway. Always sensitive to the views of its viewers, Aljazeera finds itself disposed to echo this reality.
Conclusion:
It is clear from the discussion above that Aljazeera Arabic still adheres, to a great extent, to the editorial line, which reflects a commitment to neutral coverage of global news and shows proclivity to cater to the tastes of its Arabic audience in its coverage of local news.  Catering to the tastes of a diverse audience such as the Arab world is no easy matter, but by diversifying its newscast Aljazeera was able to do so. It helped that, up until recently, the stance of the Arab public was unified vis-à-vis most of the conflicts that Aljazeera covered. The recent uprisings were divisive in some areas and hence caused a split amongst Aljazeera’s viewers. Aljazeera, driven by several factors (among which the channel’s proclivity to cater to the tastes of the majority of its viewers and its need to respect the orientation of the policies of its host and patron), found itself slightly leaning toward one camp: the Islamists.
Rather than viewing this stance as a sign of a takeover of the editorial operation in the channel by the Islamists, the discussion above suggests that it is more useful to examine the trajectory of events that makes Aljazeera today more disposed to project a favorable coverage of the Islamists. Of these, the wide networks of connections that the Muslim Brothers harnessed over the years inside Qatari state institutions and society (some of which extend to Aljazeera itself) are of paramount importance. No less important is the growth of the Islamic public sphere, in whose expansion Aljazeera participated by providing a platform to the most prominent Islamist jurist in the world today.  The outcome of these two developments was a growing local and regional public that is more receptive and accepting of the Islamist discourse. It is to this audience that Aljazeera caters. Aljazeera’s Islamist bias should be seen in this light.
Despite this proclivity and the bias it generates, Aljazeera is still sensitive to criticism. The accusations of bias in the coverage of different aspects of the Arab uprising have often led to Aljazeera’s recalibration of this coverage.  When critiqued for giving long interviews to an Islamist in one of its program, Aljazeera would always hasten to interview a non-Islamist. The reputation of neutrality that it once gained is still important for the channel. Even though some of the accusations may seem too harsh and occasionally unfounded, they provide a necessary check without which the channel, given its proclivity and the factors discussed above might drift even further. As the Arabs say, man amina al-‘hisaba fasada (anyone who fears no reckoning will give in to corruption, or in Aljazeera’s case given to further bias)!Read more on


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Notes:


[1] Some of the wikileakes spoke of some level of dialogue between Aljazeera and the US military.


[1] ("Unlikely Rise of Al Jazeera" 2012)
[2] Sulayman Al-Shammari, al-Bu'd al-Qawmi fi Qanat al-Jazeera: Dirasat halat al-itijah al-mu'akis, (Al-Dawha: Dar al-Shuruq, 1999).
[3] Muhammad Krayshan, Al-Jazeer wa Akhawatuha (silsilat bara'im), (Paris: Orab, al-Lajna al-'Arabiyya Li huquq al-Insan, 2006).
[4] Muhammad Krayshan, Al-Jazeer wa Akhawatuha (silsilat bara'im), (Paris: Orab, al-Lajna al-'Arabiyya Li huquq al-Insan, 2006).
[5] Mufid Al-Zaydi, Qanat al-Jazeera: kasr al-Muharammat fi al-Fada' al-I'lamial-Arabi, (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a l- al-tiba'a w al-Nashir, 2003).
[6] See for example the call issued by the former manager of the Aljazeera’s Washington Bureau, (Almirazi 2011).
[7] Mahmud 'Abd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: ah-Dathun Sana'at al-Tarikh. 1 & 2. (Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa, 1979).
[8] (Al Mahmud 2012)
[9] (Al Mahmud 2012).
[10] Ibid.
[11] (Al Mahmud 2012).
[12] Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008).

[13] Ibid.
[14] Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008).
[15]Ibid.
[16] Bettina Graf, and Jakob Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
[17] There are unconfirmed reports that the program itself was the idea of al-Qaradawi see, Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008).
[18] Bettina Graf , and Jakob Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.








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