Has Aljazeera been taken over by the Muslim Brothers?
Has Aljazeera been
taken over by the Muslim Brothers?
It has now become
a cliché to say that recent uprisings in the Arab World surprised the region’s
most revered experts not just in terms of the rapid procession with which they
spread but also because of the tangible results that some of them achieved:
toppling powerful dictators such Qadhafi and Mubarak. Overcoming the initial
shock, many of the region’s experts as well as ordinary Westerners turned to
the channel that has become the unrivaled news source on the region: Aljazeera.
But it was not only Westerners that tuned in to Aljazeera. TV viewers across
the region tuned in as well. For Arab viewers, Aljazeera has established itself
as truly “the most trusted name in news.” Its coverage of their various wars,
from Iraq to Palestine has placed it in an elevated status. Of course, this
time Aljazeera was there to report as usual.
But as the waves
of unrest swept the region and more fissures within Arab streets surfaced,
Aljazeera’s neutrality (once taken for granted) came to be questioned. For
some, its coverage seemed to favor certain players. Aljazeera, which was once
cherished for its policy of representing the opinion and the counter opinion,
appeared now, for a growing number of articulate Arabs, to stress certain
opinions and overlook others. It has been critiqued, particularly since the
early days of the Libyan uprising, of being a mouthpiece for the Qatari state,
which is thought to side with the Islamists. Many more accusations of this kind
continued to pour in as the Islamists in Egypt seemed poised to win the first
election in that country and as the Syrian uprising seemed to drift to a bloody
civil war. The central theme of these
accusations was that the channel has ceased to be a neutral source of news and
has become instead a propaganda tool at the disposal of the Muslim Brothers.
Some even go further to say that the channel has always been so. It simply
happened that this bias, which was carefully camouflaged, did not surface until
now.
This is no simple
proposition. It certainly deserves some inquiry. Thus I attempt to consider
these allegations below on the basis of the available information. I ask: To
what extent is Aljazeera serving the overall political goals of the Muslim
Brothers? And if so, how? Is the bias in favor of the Muslim Brothers, if such
bias exists, a by-product of intrinsic (a takeover of the channel’s editorial process)
or rather extrinsic (the brothers’ alignment with the state of Qatar) factors?
Of course, there are no simple answers. The
questions themselves were born out of the contentious and divisive nature of
the Arab Spring—or more properly the Arab Fall. For example, supporters of the
Syrian regime, even those amongst whom who are privy to the level of brutality
of the Assad cult, believe that Aljazeera stands completely on the side of the
“revolutionaries.” They contend that its coverage of the Syrian crisis is born
out of political and ideological stance, not out of earnest attempt to report
events. They further question the
argument— often made by supporters of Aljazeera— that such close reportage of
the Syrian (and before that the Libyan) uprising was motivated by a moral
commitment to side with the weak against the powerful. They maintain that had
such considerations been the guiding principles behind the channel’s reportage,
then the channel would not have toned down it coverage of the uprising in Bahrain.
I shall attempt
below to demonstrate that some bias is evident, although it is not as pervasive
or deliberate as some of Aljazeera’s distractors suggest. It certainly does not
amount to a takeover of Aljazeera by the Islamists, or Muslim Brothers in
particular. Evidently, the channel employs and hosts individuals who are not
Islamists, but also people with known hostility to the Islamists. Furthermore, Islamists
and pious Muslim alike have accused the channel of providing a platform for
Islamophobes to attack Islam on its airwaves. The appearance of Wafa Sultan on al-itijah al-mu‘akis debating a Muslim cleric
is frequently cited. It is helpful therefore to think not of how the Islamists
took over Aljazeera (since this is too big of a proposition to substantiate),
but rather to examine the socio-political and historical factors that make Aljazeera
more disposed to project the views of the Islamists. This includes the
channel’s perception of the preferences of its viewership, the clout of the
Islamists within the Qatari society (Aljazeera’s host) and the special
alignment between the Islamists and the foreign policy of the state of Qatar (Aljazeera’s
patron).
It should be
remembered that the name Aljazeera today stands for a collection of TV channels
in both Arabic and English (another channel in French will be launched soon).
Some of its channels are specialized in documentary programs and others in
sports. Moreover, Aljazeera has a special channel for children. Depending on which channel one examines, one’s
impression of Aljazeera could be different. Watching Aljazeera English is not
necessarily helpful in evaluating its Arabic sister. The programs of Aljazeera
English are not mere rendition of the programs on the Arabic channel. Both
channels are geared toward their respective audiences, and hence each reflects
the dominant values and cultural frames of its particular audience.
It is no that
surprising that Aram Bakshian, who served as an aid to three US presidents (Nixon,
Ford and Reagan), found Aljazeera (in this case English) to be “moderate,
Westernized,” and to find no evidence that it is “an "Islamist"
stalking horse.” To the contrary, Bakshian saw a channel that was “a not-for-Prophet
as well as a not-for-profit news operation,” a trait that he extolled.[1] However,
a viewer of the Arabic channel could come to a different conclusion. With this
aspect in mind, I should make clear that what follows is a discussion of the
orientation of the Arabic channel and has little to do with the nature or the
tone of the programs on Aljazeera English.
The Channel:
Since it shyly
invaded Arab skies in 1996, Aljazeera’s reputation as a trustworthy source of
news has been on the rise. The emancipatory
possibilities that Aljazeera represented as a free platform were all voices
inside the Arab world could engage in uncensored debate was new in its context,
and like all things new, it had its lure. Venturing to airwaves filled with media
busied with the solitary theme of glorifying the autocrats in power, Aljazeera rapidly
drew the viewers of local states-sponsored media outlets. It also drew, albeit
slowly, the viewers of Arabic media outlets broadcasted from outside the
region. These included both privately sponsored radios and TV channels and
those subsidized by foreign governments. Aljazeera’s attraction stemmed from
its ability to market itself as an all-Arab channel, reporting and analyzing
news of concern to the Arabic public, looking at them with Arabs’ eyes while,
of course, proclaiming objectivity.[2]
Accustomed to
listing to their news reported from the viewpoint of others (from media
platforms such as BBC, CNN, RFI) or to the propaganda machine of the state, consumers
of news in the Arab world found Aljazeera captivating. Aljazeera was seen as a revolution,
a channel capable of doing of what all Arab leaders preached but failed to do:
creating a unified free Arab public sphere. Only Arab autocrats and their
patrons abroad were unhappy, but their complaints seemed only to increase Aljazeera’s
popularity in the Arab World.[3]
Aljazeera’s
reputation, as the most credible source of news for the Arabic viewership, was
significantly boosted by its performance during certain critical moments in
Arab history. Aljazeera’s ability to provide a close and often live coverage of
the region’s most momentous events, such as the war in Afghanistan, the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the 2008-09 bloody onslaught on Gaza
(dubbed Cast Lead), did certainly take Aljazeera’s fame well beyond the borders
of the region. But its more profound effects were in the region itself.
Aljazeera which was once a trusted source of news and news analysis had become
by the end of the first decade of the 21st century—at least in the
eyes of its Arab viewers—a celebrated phenomenon, the last castle guarding
Arabic culture, at a time of a great defeat. Most, if not all Arabs, felt that
Aljazeera is truthful when it proclaims itself to be the voice of the
voiceless. Living under repressive
regimes and constant threats of foreign invasions, the Arab—in his collective
imaginary—was the persona most deserving of the descriptor, “the voiceless.” In
some ways, Aljazeera ceased to be a channel in the collective memory to
becoming something of a shadow government. It was to Aljazeera that people
turned, not just to passively listen to news but rather to create them as well.
Evidently not all
Arabs venerated Aljazeera to such extent, but outside the circles of governing
elites, those who did not venerate the channels held it in a great esteem. It
did not matter whether one was a leftist, Islamist of salafist or ikhwani bent,
or ideologically unaffiliated. Aljazeera was everyone’s channel. If the Arab
masses and many of their intellectuals agreed on any one subject, and they
seldom did, it was that Aljazeera was doing a good job.[4]
This was possible
in part because Aljazeera made it one of its unspoken priorities to scrutinize
the behavior of the Arab regimes, at a time when their own citizens held them
in extreme contempt. It was also in part because Aljazeera did not bow-down (at
least not completely[1])
to the enormous pressures from the Americans and others to tone down its
reportage on key topics such the war in Iraq, the occupation in Palestine and
the war on terror. But above all, Aljazeera was successful in unifying the Arab
masses in their trust in its programming because Aljazeera made a conscious
decision to cater to the diversity of the Arab world by speaking to all the ideological
trends present in the region. Whether through the selection of its staff or the
ideological background of its guest speakers, Aljazeera made sure that every
Arab viewer would feel that her viewpoint was made and heard, whether she was
of Arab nationalist persuasion, a secular individual, a traditional religion
scholar or an Islamist. This was a successful formula, one that did not veer
away from its claim to represent the opinion and the counter opinion. In fact,
it perfectly went with it.[5]
Aljazeera’s
reputation peaked at the onset of the Arab Spring as it expectedly made use of
the expertise it had amassed, the credibility it had gained and the connections
it had forged to provide extensive coverage of the Egyptian and Tunisian
revolts as they took place. But the intricacies of the ongoing unrest in the
region brought some reversal of fortune to Aljazeera. The cleavages within the
Arab street and among the intelligentsia as a result of the waves of agitation
sweeping the Arab world brought to the fore what Aljazeera had all along been
able to hide by sending its cameramen and correspondents elsewhere: the
Channel’s relationship with its host and sponsor, the state of Qatar. And
within that frame, the clout of a specific ideological group in the channel,
namely the Muslim Brothers, has been put to question. These two points were
brought up in the wake of perceived imbalance of Aljazeera’s coverage of the
bloody civil war in Libya, the current repression campaign in Syrian, and
demonstrations in Bahrain.
Challenges:
But before examining
these aspects, the following should be born in mind. There are many
difficulties that the researcher face in evaluating the extent to which the
range of opinion in regard to Aljazeera, especially the critical portrayal of it,
indicates a genuine consternation among a considerable segment of its viewers.
Part of this lies in the difficulty of separating the deliberate official campaigns
(undertaken by certain governments because of their dislike of how Aljazeera
reports on their conducts or by the managers and sponsors of other news
channels that compete with Aljazeera for Arab viewership) from the sentiments
on the streets.
It should also be
remembered that although some bias could be shown, a blatant bias couldn’t. The
very premise of Aljazeera as a channel for the opinion and counter opinion, the
sophistication that has only increased as the channel evolved, makes its
difficult for Aljazeera to be overwhelmingly and unashamedly biased toward one
player. Aljazeera’s support for a given party is not, and unlikely to be at the
same level of clarity as, for example, the Syrian TV’s support for the Syrian
president. Although state-sponsored, Aljazeera continues to maintain a level of
diversity in its staff and in its coverage of events as to keep it in the rank
of private or free channels. This diversity also gives Aljazeera a chance of
deniability.
Despite these
credible challenges, however, some of the accusations against Aljazeera seem to
come from different parts of the region and from known intellectuals with no
known links to the existing regimes. In fact, some of these sentiments are
expressed by many of those who have once defended or, as was often the case,
worked for Aljazeera. And some, not all, of these continue to oppose the dictatorial
regimes in the regions. Therefore, their words cannot be dismissed simply as a
part of a given regime’s propaganda.[6]
Evidence of the bias:
Aljazeera’s critics
cite numerous examples of cases where Aljazeera’s bias was very evident, even
and especially in areas where the uprisings have led to the fall of former
regimes. Internet chat rooms, debate forums, facebook groups, and even
newspapers’ columns are awash with examples of Aljazeera’s clear bias in favor
of the Muslim Brother across the region. The most frequently cited examples
are:
1-
Aljazeera employs many members with known links
to the Muslim Brothers. These include Aljazeera’s former director Wadah
Khanfar, Ahmad Mansur, and the director of Aljazeera’s Bureau in Cairo, ‘Abd
al-Fattah Fayid. Aljazeera also has
Skaykh Al-Qaradawi as a permanent guest-speaker for its weekly Shari‘a and Life
program.
2-
After the revolution in Egypt, Aljazeera’s
correspondent, Ahmad Mansur, made a series of interviews with members of the
Muslim Brothers as a part of his program Shahid
‘Ala al-Thawra—a Witness to the revolution. In short period, Ahmad Mansur
interviewed, Dr. Safwat Hijazi and Khirat al-Shatir. Even though Mansur later interviewed
non-Islamist activists, some critics contend that the disproportionately longer
time given to the Muslim Brothers indicates a clear bias, even as the Islamists
only joined the revolution in its latter stages.
3-
The channel’s report on the fall of Mubarak,
which was aired for several times in the same day bore an unmistakable Islamist
tone, with heavy allusions to Quranic references.
4-
In its coverage of the Syrian uprising,
Aljazeera sides completely with demonstrators, and especially with the
Islamists amongst them. It has supplanted its absence from the scene inside
Syria with a dubious use of eyewitnesses, many of whom turned to be liars,
located far away from where actions took place. Aljazeera’s critics say that
this unfiltered use of the testimonies of eyewitnesses is no random act.
Analysis:
The alignment
between the objectives of the channel and those of the Muslim Brothers can be
discussed at two levels. One is the close relationship between the Qatari state
and the movement, or at the least, key players in the local movement. The
second has to do with the orientation of the channel, its desire to be the
channel most viewed in the Arab world.
On the first level, one has to see not just the evident camaraderie
between key figures in the Muslim Brothers such as Qaradawi and the most
influential members in the government of the small emirate, especially with the
emir and his family. However, not all the influence of the Muslim Brothers in
Qatar stems from this important connection, the Muslim Brothers benefit, not
doubt, from it. In fact, it seems that this unique connection, between Qaradawi
and the state, is in part reinforced by the vast network of connections that
local Muslim Brothers have forged inside various state institutions. Although it is difficult, given the centrality
of Qaradawi and his long lasting ties to the emirate, to isolate the cause from
effect (i.e whether the movement’s connections are simply an extension of
Qaradawi’s clout or whether the latter is a by product of those connections),
the tactics of local Brothers are worth examining.
The movement:
Since its founding
in 1928 at the hands of a high school teacher (Hasan al-Banna) in the town of
al-Isma‘iliyya, the movement of the Muslim Brothers has sought to expand its
influence outside its country of origin, Egypt. This was often done in one of
two ways. One of these was to approach visiting students or scholars from other
Arab countries to convince them to be part of the movement. Once recruited, the
goal of these new converts was to establish cells inside their respective
countries. The second method (functions either as a substitute or reinforcement
to the first one) was to send delegations to certain countries to propagate the
mission of the movement and recruit followers. Once sufficient members are
converted, an organizational structure would be set up. The leaders as well as
the members would pledge allegiance to the General Guide in Egypt. The local
leader of the movement would have to carry a title suggesting allegiance but
also subordination to the General Guide. For example, the title of the local
leader in countries such as Syria, Jordan and Palestine (countries were the
Muslim Brothers created early branches) is known as al-Muraqib al-‘Am, the General Observer—a man who runs the local
branch on the behest of the General Guide in Egypt.
While this is the
general paradigm of the expansion of the Muslim Brothers in some parts of the
Arab World, the literature of the movement have led in other parts to the rise
of local movements inspired by the Egyptian model, without a direct involvement
of the main movement in Egypt. But even when a local movement grew
independently, an attempt would always be made, either by a local initiative or
by the main movement in Egypt, to integrate the newborn to the global network.
Whether the movement sprang naturally or through a prompt from Cairo, the main
vehicle of integrating a new movement is the oath of allegiance, bay‘a. The oath not only symbolizes a
commitment to the ideals of the movement but also acts as an acknowledgment of
the leadership of the General Guide.
The centrality of
the concept of bay‘a for the Muslim
Brothers made it also a litmus test for governments’ fearing the spread of the
organization in their countries. In the gulf where various manifestations of political
Islam appeared somewhat late on the scene and where most of its strands were
tolerated, the question of subservience of local branches to the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt became a contentious topic in 1990s when the influence of the
Muslim Brothers was perceived to pose a threat to local regime or social norms.
It was often the ability of the local branch of the Muslim Brothers in a given
country to convince the government under whose jurisdiction they operate of the
absence of ties with the mother organization that determined its ability to
continue to function unobstructed. The movements, which failed in this regard,
clashed with the local regimes and their activities were severely
circumscribed, if their structures were not completely dismantled.
The gulf, an area
of great interest to the Muslim Brothers because of its vitality as a funding
source, saw the rise of various braches of the Muslim Brothers between early
and late 1970s in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain
and Qatar. Early attempts (in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s) to create a branch in
Saudi Arabia received unequivocal opposition from the monarchy, even when the
relationship between the general movement and the kingdom was at its best. The
arrival of the Muslim Brothers in large numbers in 1970s as quest workers,
asylum seekers or guest scholars did not change this fact— although they were
able to disseminate their message and attract some sympathy. The Saudis held to the polite but firm
rejection of establishing a Muslim Brothers’ branch, insisting that the Saudis
are already ‘brothers’ and hence the creation of a new brotherhood is unnecessary
superfluity. [7]
Like other
branches in the region, the Muslim Brothers in Qatar trace their origins to the
waves of Egyptian migrants, mostly asylum seekers fleeing the persecution of
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt under Nasser. Many of these new migrants (some but
not all of whom were scholars) found societies that were mostly untouched by
modernity and countries that were in their infancy. These societies were also
both Muslim and conservative.[8]
These factors
placed the relatively well-trained, politically motivated and organizationally
savvy Brothers at a great advantage vis-à-vis both the state and the public. They
soon became the group that dominated vital professions in these countries. They
were the lawyers, the jurists, the teachers and the mosque leaders. Beyond this
qualitative imbalance, the Muslim Brothers found the conservative environment
receptive to their ideology, although it seemed at times too conservative for
their taste. All of this meant that the
brothers were able to shape the youths of these countries through the mold of
Islamic education.
But the Qatari
case was unique in at least three ways. First, Qatar was demographically
smaller than any other state in the region. At the time of the arrival of early
migrants of the Muslim Brothers, the country had a population of only 10,000
inhabitants. Second, the Muslim Brothers arrived a few years before Qatar
became an independent state. Last, and most important, it would seem now in
hindsight that no one person among the Brothers who migrated to the region
commandeered a level of respect among fellow brothers, dedication to the cause,
personal charisma, independence, erudition and an inexhaustible energy all at
once as did Qaradawi.
The centrality of Qaradawi,
which will receive further treatment below, cannot be overstated. But before
highlighting the role of Qaradawi and the trajectory of events that led to his
enormous influence inside and outside Qatar (all of which contributed to the intersection
between the Muslim Brothers’ rhetoric and Aljazeera’s editorial policy), it
would be useful to look at how the Muslim Brothers in Qatar managed to
circumvent the fate of other movements in the region.
As noted above,
the question of the level of ties to the mother organization in Egypt has
always been a bone of contention between the various regimes in the Gulf and
the different branches of the Muslim Brothers under their jurisdictions. In mid
1990s, when fears of political Islam reached considerable heights (fears that
were triggered in no small part by the bloody civil war in Algeria) and at a
time when ikhwani networks in
countries like Kuwait and the UAE have dominated such important sectors as education,
culture and religious affairs, many of these governments, which had hitherto tolerated
or supported the activities of the Brothers, sought to curb their power. Suspicions of the Muslim Brothers were also in
part exacerbated by the position of the mother organization in Egypt during the
Gulf war (II), which was interpreted as sympathetic to the regime in Bagdad.
Unlike in other
countries, where attempts to curb the Muslim Brothers often entailed a direct
assault on the organizational structure of the movement, in the Gulf (Kuwait
and UAE are good examples) the governments took a more measured approach. They
often sought to negotiate with the local members and leaders of the
movement. In the UAE, for example, the
state attempted to reach a resolution whereby the local branch could maintain
much of its structure and privileges if they were willing to severe all ties
with the mother organization in Egypt and officially abrogate the oath of
pledge to its General Guide. Long negotiations, interrupted by periods of
arrests and banning of publications, continued for most of the 1990s and early
2000s, with not apparent outcome. Although the movement proclaimed independence,
it was less forthcoming when it came to the issue of the oath. They refused to
renounce the oath publicly. Although no agreement
was reached, the campaigns of imprisonments (which targeted mostly foreign immigrants
and naturalized members of the Brothers), the censorship of the movement’s
publications, and the deliberate purging of known ikhwani affiliates from state
institutions have severely reduced the movement’s influence in the UAE. Some of
these campaigns of imprisonments have intensified in the past few months. [9]
In Kuwait the picture
was similar. Like their peers in the UAE, the Kuwaiti ikhwan consistently deflected the question of the bay‘a while claiming that they were completely
independent from the mother organization in Egypt. However, unlike the brothers in the UAE, the
Kuwaiti brothers were able, because of the democratic opening in that country
in post 1992, to protect their institutions from the regime. Banned
publications, such as al-Mujtama‘,
were replaced with new ones and the movement’s various organs were either
replaced by the political party (the Islamic Constitutional Movement) or
transformed into charitable organizations. In general, however, whether the
movement was severely restricted (such as the case in the UAE) or actively
participating in the political sphere (such as in Kuwait), the Muslim Brothers
in the Gulf chose to maintain their presence as a political entity distinct
from, if not in conflict with the state.
Qatar was the
exception. Although little has been written on the Muslim Brothers in Qatar and,
as a result, about their organizational tactics, we know now that many
known associates and leaders of the movement had opted to dissolve the
movement in1999 and some declared its dissolution in 2003.[10]
Although there are lingering questions as to whether these decisions reflect a
consensus within the movement or simply individual initiatives, the movement in
generally kept a low profile in Qatar, both before and after the period in
question. The movement has generally opted to sacrifice, not only its ties with
the mother organization but also any organized activism, in favor of
integration inside state and public institutions. The absence of a distinct
organization to which members belonged allowed Qatari Brothers to forge a web
of vertical and horizontal networks as individual professionals without
arousing suspicion. And it seems further that unlike its peers in the region
that the Qatari Muslim Brothers did not require their members to pledge
allegiance to the General Guide in Egypt. [11]
The apolitical and
amorphous nature of the movement helped it melt into the fabric of the Qatari
state and society. Unlike its peers elsewhere, the branch in Qatar was not
interested in either distinguishing itself from the state or rallying behind a
specific political or moral agenda which its hopes to impose on the state or
society. Instead, many members and sympathizers chose to disseminate their
message with whatever convenient way they found, be it during a lecture in a
classroom, a sermon at a mosque, or through radio or TV programs. But in
whatever form the teachings of the Muslim Brothers were presented, the
political dimension was always downplayed.
The Man
In pursuing this
unique stance, the Muslim Brothers in Qatar relied on the views of the
independent cleric and leading figure in the movement, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Qaradawi
is by far the most influential Muslim jurist today. The wide appeal across the
world has earned him the title of the Global Mufti. Much of that reputation
rests on Qaradawi’s weekly appearance on Aljazeera in its only religious
program, al-shari‘a wa al-Hayat,
Shari‘a and Life. The program was born with the channel itself, but Qaradawi’s
relationship with the small emirates precedes the channel.
Qaradawi arrived
in Qatar in 1961 with a delegation of Muslim scholars sent by al-Azhar as part
of a cultural exchange program with the small emirate. But Qaradawi, who was
jailed in 1954 as a part of the state crackdown on the Muslim Brothers, chose
to stay. He stayed in part because when
he left Egypt the signs of a new repression campaign were looming on the
horizon. By staying in Qatar Qaradawi spared himself a new round of jail time
and possibly torture. But in his decision, Qaradawi was in part swayed by the
warm welcome he received in Qatar, especially from high-ranking members of its
government. He quickly formed a special bond with then governor of Doha Shaykh
Khalifa b. Hamad Al Thani, who subsequently became the Emir of the emirate from
1972 until he was ousted in a coup in 1995.[12]
The special bond
between the emir and the Shaykh would give the latter the chance to not only to
travel extensively abroad (with the emirate providing a passport and generously
paying for the expenses) but also participate in shaping the educational and
cultural institutions of the newborn state. His role in building the
educational system in the country is undisputable. Soon after his arrival,
Qaradawi became the Principle of Qatar’s only religious institution (al-ma‘had al-dinni). In the next few
years, Qaradawi established the Shari‘a Faculty at the infant University of
Qatar. He also oversaw the organization of numerous exchange programs with
Egypt and other countries that allowed the young emirate to bring and recruit
scholars and professionals from various educational backgrounds. With
al-Qaradawi, in leading and organizing role, it was no surprise that many of
these were either sympathizers or members of the Muslim Brothers, mostly from
Egypt and Syria. [13]
These visiting ikhwan—whether from literary and
religious studies or from scientific specializations—were not only the group to
whom the training and education of the future generation of Qatari youth was entrusted. They also constituted the nucleus of networks
of Islamist professionals who would contribute to the normalization of the
Islamist discourse within the country and to the establishment of many Islamist
educational institutions. The special position that Qaradawi occupies as a part
of the establishment, a close adviser to the emir and main religious scholar of
the state, conferred on the activities of the Islamists an aura of officialdom
that protected them from questioning.
Important as the
shaping of educational field was, Qaradawi’s main influence was not on what
being taught in the classrooms, but rather on what was broadcasted on the
Qatari airwaves. Upon his arrival in
Qatar, Qaradawi—conscious of the importance of media— made sure that all his
lectures at the main mosque in Doha were broadcasted and tapped for later
usage. Since this was before the creation of the national radio, Qaradawi’s
associates created a small radio platform that broadcasted his lectures to
allow people within in a limited radius from the mosque to listen to them. (In
an interview, Qaradawi boasted about this experiment saying: we introduced the
radio in Qatar).[14]
As soon as the Qatari national radio was created, Qaradawi’s Friday sermons
from the main mosque were broadcasted on its airwaves. Qaradawi also had a
regular religious program on the radio.[15]
Similarly,
Qaradawi was keen on securing some regular airtime once the National TV of
Qatar was launched. This meant that for ordinary Qataris, Qaradawi was always
on the air. In addition, to his Friday sermons, which are broadcasted live,
Qaradawi had regular appearances on both the national TV and the national
radio. In certain Muslim occasions, such as in Ramadan, ordinary Qataris and
whoever was able to tune in to Qatari airwaves would see Qaradawi with greater
frequency and for hours at a time.
When Aljazeera
finally appeared on the scene in 1996, Qaradawi was already a well-respected
religious authority and a celebrity on the Qatari airwaves. His reputation has
somewhat spilled over the borders, in part because of the wide circulation that
his book on “The Permissible and Forbidden” enjoyed, but also in part because
of his trips abroad (subsidized by the Qatari state) to participate in
religious gatherings and scholarly seminars.[16]
Beside his close ties with the state, Qaradawi commandeered a great deal of
respect among thousands of Ikhwani
professionals (both Qatari and foreigners) who were strongly integrated in
horizontal and vertical networks inside Qatari institutions. Unlike their peers
elsewhere, these professionals gained strong footholds within civil and state
institutions, not by way of challenging them but by coopting them. The cooptation of Qatari institutions was
made easy by the fact that, unlike most of Arab states, Qatar has no official
ideology.
It was not that
surprising, given the influence that the Brothers, and especially their leader,
Qaradawi, enjoyed, that Aljazeera (essentially a Qatari institution) would
invite the latter to become the regular quest-speaker on its only religious
program. [17] Choosing
Qaradawi for the new program was not simply dictated by the influence he
enjoyed inside Qatar, although that played a major part. It was also driven by
shared interests. The media-savvy shaykh (with years of experience as a guest
on Egyptian and Qatari TV), whose publications and presence on the airwaves had
earned him some reputation across and beyond the Arab World, was an important
asset to the newborn Aljazeera, as it allowed it to attract new viewers. Aljazeera’s
owners were in particular aware of the popularity that the new Islamic media,
which started to invade the airwaves a few years earlier, had gained. On his
part, Qaradawi knew that his appearance on a channel with a wider reach, one
that was free from the defect that impeded other channels (namely being a state
mouthpiece), would carry his popularity to new spheres and further expand the
Islamist public sphere that he and many of his peers across the region have so
industriously sought to create and dominate.[18]
Out of these
converging interests was born the weekly program of Shari‘a wa al-Hayat, a program that permits Aljazeera to use the
rhetoric skills, erudition and popularity of the Shaykh to carve a space within
the rising Islamic public sphere. The format of the program, one where the
channels viewers have the chance to engage the quest-speaker, through phone,
facsimile or email, provides a democratizing experience consistent with the goals
of the channels. But the programs wide reach, being accessible to Arabic
viewers beyond the borders of the Arab world, was especially important for
Qaradawi who found in it a convenient way to consolidate the ties he forged
with thousands of admirers in the Western hemisphere. These admirers would have
only seen him in the far-in-between conferences or simply known him through his
publications. The program provided a platform through which he meets and
addresses them on a weekly basis. Of course, the program also permits the
Shaykh to make inroads among the rising youths of the Muslim community in
Europe.[19]
The outcome of
this cooperation was a success for both parties and further interdependence
between the Shaykh and the channel. Aljazeera ceased to be a small channel in a
remote Arab potentate that it was on the eve of its launch. It has turned into
a powerful international media giant with offices and correspondents in all corners
of the world. Even in areas where it does not have offices, it is capable of reaching
them in short time should the need arise. It has become a brand name the
governments across the region both loathe and dread. With the growth of the
channel also grew the influence of the Shaykh and the reach of the Islamist
public sphere that he, using Aljazeera own airwaves, earnestly propagated.[20]
Of course,
Qaradawi and other Islamists did not rely per se on Aljazeera. He continued to
appear on the national Qatari TV, publish his works, and interact with his
growing mass of admirers using a combination of modern and traditional media
tools. Examples of these include websites such as Qaradawi.net and
Islamonline.net— both launched shortly after the appearance of Aljazeera (and both
extensively publicized on Aljazeera). But none of these tools proved as useful
in disseminating the viewers of the Shaykh with their evident ikhwani bent as Aljazeera. If the
outcome at the professional level of fifteen years of Aljazeera was a powerful
media giant, the outcome on the sociopolitical spheres in the Arab World is one
where the Islamist views of Qaradawi held an enormous sway. Always sensitive to
the views of its viewers, Aljazeera finds itself disposed to echo this reality.
Conclusion:
It is clear from
the discussion above that Aljazeera Arabic still adheres, to a great extent, to
the editorial line, which reflects a commitment to neutral coverage of global
news and shows proclivity to cater to the tastes of its Arabic audience in its
coverage of local news. Catering to the
tastes of a diverse audience such as the Arab world is no easy matter, but by
diversifying its newscast Aljazeera was able to do so. It helped that, up until
recently, the stance of the Arab public was unified vis-à-vis most of the
conflicts that Aljazeera covered. The recent uprisings were divisive in some
areas and hence caused a split amongst Aljazeera’s viewers. Aljazeera, driven
by several factors (among which the channel’s proclivity to cater to the tastes
of the majority of its viewers and its need to respect the orientation of the
policies of its host and patron), found itself slightly leaning toward one
camp: the Islamists.
Rather than
viewing this stance as a sign of a takeover of the editorial operation in the
channel by the Islamists, the discussion above suggests that it is more useful to
examine the trajectory of events that makes Aljazeera today more disposed to
project a favorable coverage of the Islamists. Of these, the wide networks of
connections that the Muslim Brothers harnessed over the years inside Qatari
state institutions and society (some of which extend to Aljazeera itself) are
of paramount importance. No less important is the growth of the Islamic public
sphere, in whose expansion Aljazeera participated by providing a platform to
the most prominent Islamist jurist in the world today. The outcome of these two developments was a
growing local and regional public that is more receptive and accepting of the
Islamist discourse. It is to this audience that Aljazeera caters. Aljazeera’s
Islamist bias should be seen in this light.
Despite this
proclivity and the bias it generates, Aljazeera is still sensitive to
criticism. The accusations of bias in the coverage of different aspects of the
Arab uprising have often led to Aljazeera’s recalibration of this coverage. When critiqued for giving long interviews to
an Islamist in one of its program, Aljazeera would always hasten to interview a
non-Islamist. The reputation of neutrality that it once gained is still
important for the channel. Even though some of the accusations may seem too
harsh and occasionally unfounded, they provide a necessary check without which
the channel, given its proclivity and the factors discussed above might drift
even further. As the Arabs say, man amina
al-‘hisaba fasada (anyone who fears no reckoning will give in to corruption,
or in Aljazeera’s case given to further bias)!Read more on
Cited and consulted sources
Primary Sources:
'Abd al-Halim, Mahmud. al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimun: ah-Dathun Sana'at al-Tarikh. 1 & 2. Alexandria: Dar
al-Da'wa, 1979.
Al-Banna, Hasan . Min rasa'il al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimin. Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi bi-Misr, 1954.
Al-Banna, Hasan . Mudhakirat al-da‘wa
w-al-da‘i. Cairo: al-Maktab al-Islamiya li-al-tiba'a wal-nashir, 1948.
Al-Banna, Hasan. Qadiyatuna bayna yaday
al-Ra'y al-'amm al-Misri wal-'Arabi wal-Islami wa al-Dammir al-'Alami.
Unknown: Unknown, 1978.
Al-Mut'iny, 'Abd al-'Azim, I.. Tis'ata
'ashara (19) risalatan min Hasan al-Banna ila qiyyadat al-Da'wa.
Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1979.
SPr
Al
Mahmud, And al-'Aziz. "Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Qatar: Man hum?." Al-Arab,
Jan 8, 2012. http://www.alarab.qa/details.php?issueId=1485&artid=166996
(accessed May 12, 2012).
Almirazi,
Hafiz. "Hafiz al-Mirazi yad'u al-Jazeera wa al-Arabiya ila tanawil al-Wad'
fi Qatar wa al-Sa'udiya." Al-Quds al-Arabi, Feb 14, 2011.
http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?
Al-Shammari,
Sulayman. al-Bu'd al-Qawmi fi Qanat al-Jazeera: Dirasat halat al-itijah
al-mu'akis. Al-Dawha: Dar al-Shuruq, 1999.
Al-Zaydi,
Mufid. Qanat al-Jazeera: kasr al-Muharammat fi al-Fada' al-I'lamial-Arabi.
Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a l- al-tiba'a w al-Nashir, 2003.
Graf,
Bettina, and Jakob Petersen. Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf
al-Qaradawi. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
Husaini, Ishak M.. The Moslem Brethren: The
Greatest of Islamic Modern Movements. Beirut : Khayat's College Book
Cooperative , 1956.
Kenney, Jeffery . Muslim Rebels: Kharijites
and the Politics of Extremism In Egypt . Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006.
Khalaf,
Mujahid. Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa al-Sultan. Cairo: Dar
al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008.
Kramer, Gurdrun . Hasan al-Banna .
Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2010.
Krayshan,
Muhammad. Al-Jazeer wa Akhawatuha (silsilat bara'im). Paris: Orab,
al-Lajna al-'Arabiyya Li huquq al-Insan, 2006.
Marsot ,Agfaf, L. S.. A short
History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Mitchell, Richard P. . The Society of the
Muslim Brothers. . Oxford University Press, 1969.
Rubin, Barry (ed.). The Muslim Brotherhood:
The organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement. New York:
PalGrave Macmillan, 2010.
"The
Unlikely Rise of Al Jazeera." The Atlantic, JAN 10, 2012.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/the-unlikely-rise-of-al-jazeera/251112/
(accessed May 2, 2012).
Notes:
[1] ("Unlikely Rise of Al Jazeera" 2012)
[2] Sulayman Al-Shammari, al-Bu'd al-Qawmi fi Qanat al-Jazeera: Dirasat
halat al-itijah al-mu'akis, (Al-Dawha: Dar al-Shuruq, 1999).
[3] Muhammad Krayshan, Al-Jazeer wa Akhawatuha (silsilat bara'im),
(Paris: Orab, al-Lajna al-'Arabiyya Li huquq al-Insan, 2006).
[4] Muhammad Krayshan, Al-Jazeer wa Akhawatuha (silsilat bara'im),
(Paris: Orab, al-Lajna al-'Arabiyya Li huquq al-Insan, 2006).
[5] Mufid Al-Zaydi, Qanat al-Jazeera: kasr al-Muharammat fi al-Fada'
al-I'lamial-Arabi, (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a l- al-tiba'a w al-Nashir, 2003).
[6] See for example the call issued by the former manager of
the Aljazeera’s Washington Bureau, (Almirazi 2011).
[7]
Mahmud 'Abd al-Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun:
ah-Dathun Sana'at al-Tarikh. 1 & 2. (Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa,
1979).
[8] (Al Mahmud 2012)
[9] (Al Mahmud 2012).
[10] Ibid.
[11] (Al Mahmud 2012).
[12] Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa
al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi bayna al-Ikhwan wa
al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa, 2008).
[16] Bettina Graf, and Jakob Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
[17] There are unconfirmed reports that the
program itself was the idea of al-Qaradawi see, Mujahid Khalaf, Al-Qaradawi
bayna al-Ikhwan wa al-Sultan, (Cairo: Dar al-Jumhuriyya li al-Sahafa,
2008).
[18] Bettina Graf , and Jakob Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
[19] Ibid.
Read more on
http://abdelkafy.maktoobblog.com/
تعليقات
إرسال تعليق