Were the shifts in Islamists' discourses a prelude to the Arab Spring?
Recent
events in the Arab World have brought the Islamists back to the fore after many
Western scholars had declared the dawn of a post-Islamists era.[1] This
premature declaration emerged in parallel with great shifts in Islamist
discourses in late 1990s. These shifts manifested in these movements’ rejection
of violence and in their desire to peacefully participate in the political
process in their respective countries. The softening of the Islamist discourse
was thoroughly debated and discussed in the Arab World, but received very
little attention in the West. Those who assessed the Islamists’ new overture
saw only signs of weakness or worse of chicanery.[2]
Beside this general impression, the substance of these discursive shifts was mostly
overlooked. These shifts, which emerged first in publications by leading
Islamist thinkers from certain groups and then became later a central aspects
of “moderate” Islamist discourse, are known in the Islamist’ parlance as muraja‘at, or revisions. They took place
over a span of, at least, a decade and appeared in different countries at
different times. It was first the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya who charted
the muraja‘at course, but a few other
movements followed in their footsteps. The
most important of these revisions both in terms of scope and timing was that of
the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG).
In
this paper I examine in some details the revisions of LIFG and argue that the
importance of these revisions lies not in what they tell us about the Islamists
but the changes in the society around them. The change of Islamist discourses,
their embrace of a non-violent approach, although seemed innovative in the eyes
of some of those who assessed them, seem now in hindsight simply an attempt to remain
relevant in a context, where the use of violence to resist oppression has
assumed a secondary position, if considered at all. The Islamists therefore were not introducing a
novel concept. They simply captured, projected and justified on Islamist
grounds the popular frustration with a situation in which a small minority of actors
(Jihadists on one hand and the regime and its apparatus on the other hand) was locked
in a destructive confrontation on their behalf while keeping them on the
sideline. The general public seems to
have been unhappy with the chaos that dominated at the time the religious
domain as a result of the lowering of the threshold as to allow anyone with
rudimentary knowledge of the faith and desire to preach, to propagate their
ideology. Much of this chaos was a direct result of the loss of the clout that
traditional scholars (which some Islamist activists tended to vilify) enjoyed. It was no wonder that respecting scholarship
and men of knowledge occupied an important space in these revisions.
In
general, the religious language, with which these revisions was written,
indicates both the prevalence of the Islamic discourse in these societies, and the
Islamists’ keen awareness of that. It shows that the Islamists, even the most
extremist of whom, are not tone-deaf to what transpires around them. To the
contrary, it shows show agile and extroversive these movements are. This fact was
lost on many of those who studied the Islamists and has led many to be
surprised by the continued popularity of the Islamists. The revisions continue
to provide a rich source, one that has not been tapped, to examine the
extroversive nature of these movements.
But
one should first ask what is unique about the revisions undertaken by Libya’s
Islamists? Three factors are key here. The first and the second have to do with
the scope and timing. The last has to do with the absence of adequate
discussion in Western literature on the revisions undertaken by the LIFG. In terms
of scope, the LIFG revisions are one of the most exhaustive. Earlier revisions
such as that of the Egyptian Jama‘a
tended to come in series of publication each dedicated to a specific subject.
The LIFG revisions were published in one document that touched on the most
contentious topics that were and continue to be divisive. The document in
question featured nine chapters that discuss the foundations of the creed,
Islamic knowledge between theory and practice, preaching, Jihad, diversity of
scholarly opinions, extremism, preserving public interests and promoting good
and preventing vice. The final chapter engages the question of authority in
Islam, asking who is authorized to pass judgments on others’ faith.
In
terms of timing, the Libyan case is by far the most instructive as it reflected
a shift in the attitude and behavior of the only movement that had posed a
credible threat to Qadafi’s regime. Unlike the al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya of
Egypt, which is a minority movement in its context, competing for recruits with
an established movement such as the Muslim Brother, LIFG was the sole actor
challenging the Libyan regime. This is in part because Libya did not witness
the liberalization and limited party system that Egypt saw. Therefore, the
revisions of LIFG were a seismic event in their context. At the apparent level,
the declaration of the only group confronting the regime of its willingness to
give up the only available means of challenging the regime (violence) meant
that the last venue for possible change was now closed.
In
terms of discussion in Western literature, the LIFG revisions went unnoticed. The
interest of Omar Ashour
is an exception that proves the rule. This stands in contrast with the Egyptian
Jama‘a, which received some discussion
in Western literature, although the assessments of their value were mostly
incorrect. This is not that surprising in a literature where the Islamists of
Libya are in general understudied. But it is also in part because there is a
dearth of discussion in Western literature on the topic of revisions, a
situation that might have bee responsible for the failure to see the Arab
Spring coming and the outcome of recent elections. But before examining these revisions,
it behooves to provide a general background on Islamic activism in Libya along
with a short review of the literature.
Historical
background:
The
presence of Islamist activism dates back to the rule of Sanusiyya. The early
manifestation of Islamist thought could be traced to the arrival of a few
members of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers who sought and were granted political
asylum in Libya in 1949. This group of Egyptian MB brothers started to preach
in local mosques in Benghazi and was able to attract a group of youth. These
youth will constitute the nucleus of the Libyan Muslim Brothers. The ranks and
effectiveness of the movement will grow as Libyan students, who had studied in
Egypt, returned bringing with them the ideology of the Muslim Brothers. These included some of the Libyan who
participated in 1948 war against Israel, fighting a long side the Muslim
Brothers. Although the Islamist numbers continued to grow, the movement lacked
cohesion and structural organization. This was in part due to the appeal of the
Nasserite ideology. It was not until after 1967 that the Islamists sought to
create a political movement.[3]
Given
the political situation in post 1969 coup, especially the repressive nature of
the regime, the Islamists opted to create independent local groups in each town
instead of a national movement with unified decision-making organs. But despite
these measures, the movement would become a target for a crack down by the
regime of Colonel Qadhafi in 1973. Many of their leadings members were
imprisoned and tortured. In 1974, a deal was struck whereby leading members of
the group were released, but were informed that their ideology was not welcome.
Subsequently, many of them left and, with their departure, the movement died inside
the country.
The
movement would reconstitute again in early 1980s. But it had presence only
outside Libya. In 1981, a group of Libyan immigrants in United States declared
the creation of al-Jama‘ a-Islamiyya. In the same year, this group and others
merged to create the Libyan National Front for Salvation. Over time, however,
many members of the Libyan Muslim Brothers were worried that their activism
outside the country was fruitless and started to send members into the country.
Once there, they started an underground organization to spread the movement’s
ideology through preaching and establishment of cultural clubs. These were the
only two viable choices at the time since political participation was severely
restricted. Between 1987 and 1991, series of meetings between various leaders
of the movement across Libya resulted in the creation of Harakat al-Tajamu‘ al-Islami. Al-Tajamu‘ al-Islami, which had an elected
board, continued to function in secrecy and avoided politics at all cost. Despite
their caution, the leaders of al-Tajamu‘
al-Islami became targets of two severe repression campaigns in 1995 and
2005. Although a few members were executed, the vast majority of the followers
were detained and later released at the behest of Sayf al-Islam’s Foundation in
2006. From that point until the recent uprising, the survival of the Muslim
Brothers of Libya depended largely on their members in exiles, especially in
the Gulf and Europe.[4]
In
addition to Muslim Brothers, there were also other Islamist factions that
emerged (some as early as 1953) in the post independence era. Many of these,
such as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, gained
some following during early 1970s, but soon clashed with the regime of Qadhafi
and were eventually banned. The Tablighi
group, who were also active during most of the post independence era faired
better than other movements because of their apolitical stance. Despite their
apolitical stance, the Tablighis had
eventually to cede their activities in Libya after their leader, Shaykh Mabruk Ghayth al-Madhuni, was
assassinated in Mecca during the pilgrimage season of 1985, presumably by the
Libyan mukhbarat.
However,
the most important and robust of all Islamist factions in Libya is al-Jama‘a al-Libiyya al-Muqatila. This
is the only movement that openly challenged the regime of colonel Qadhafi and
engaged in various battles between 1995 and 1999. The seeds of the violence
that would become the hallmark of this movement was sown in early 1980s with
the torture technics and targeted assassinations that al-Qadhafi’s infamous al-Lijan al-thawriya (revolutionary committees)
carried out against its opponents. In
addition to the retaliatory motives, which no doubt drove many of the foot
soldiers of the movement to fight the regime, the jihadist rhetoric coming from
Afghanistan, especially the lectures of the prominent ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, provided purpose and direction to many
of the disenchanted youth of the Islamic current. The writings of Sayyid Qutb
and the sermons of Muhammad al-Bishti (whose assassination by members of
Qadhafi’s revolutionary committees in 1983 enraged the Islamist youth) served
as an added fodder that sustained the military struggle. Although the movement carried out several
operations in Libya, it remained a clandestine movement until October of 1995
when it issued its first communiqué. But despite the bold step of making their
movement known, and of confronting the regime militarily, the regime was able to
deal the movement a crippling blow and arrest most of its leaders. By 1998, the
movement mobility inside Libya had become severely circumscribed. The
government also hunted the movement’s leaders abroad, exploiting the atmosphere
of the war on terror in post 9/11. With the help from Western intelligence,
especially that of the US and UK, Libya was able to bring in most of their
leaders. These included the emir of the movement, ‘Abd al-Hakim Bil Hajj, who
would become later instrumental in the fall of Qadhafi. The unit of Libyan revolutionaries,
which he commanded, led the assault on Tripoli and captured al-Qadhafi’s
compound in September of 2011.
During their sojourn in prison, the
leaders of the al-Jama‘a engaged in a
debate with the regime that eventually led to the release of many of members
and culminated in the publication of the movement’s major intellectual work,
which was budded muraja‘at
(revisions). These revisions marked a departure from the movement’s earlier
position of the obligatory nature of the war on the Libyan regime. They came as
a result of a lengthy negotiation sponsored by Sayf al-Islam’s Foundation, with
participation and endorsement from such figures as al-Qaradawi and ‘Ali
al-Silabi, who are both based in Qatar. From inside the prison, the role of Bil
Hajj, the movement’s emir, was pivotal as well.[5] Ironically,
the three would play prominent roles in the anti-Qadhafi movement just months
after the revisions came to light. Bil Hajj fought on the ground; Qaradawi and
Silabi fought on the air from Doha, capitalizing on their airtime on Aljazeera.
The rapid reversal of course from a movement that rejected violence to one that
led the fight against Qadhafi is one of the ironies of the war in Libya that
are outside the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that the
brutal response with which the regime faced the civilian unrest left very
little choice for the Libyans.
Libya’s
Islamists in the Literature:
The
Islamists of Libya have been a subject to` some inquiry from Western and Arabs
scholars, but often as a part of a general interest in the Islamists in the
region. As distinct local movement, the Islamists of Libya received relatively
little attention. Unlike its well-studied counterparts in the region (the
Islamists of Mauritania are the other exception), the dearth of scholarly work
on the Islamic movement of Libya is striking. There is, for instance, no
monograph in English that is entirely dedicated to the Islamic movement in
Libya. Nor there is any other systematic study of the movement in other genre,
articles for example. Instead, one has to sift through works written either on
the Islamists in the region in general (such as Burgat and Dowell, 1997; John
Ruedy, 1994; and Yahia H. Zoubir, 1999) or in works on the politics of Libya (such
as John Davis, 1987; Dirk Vandewalle,1995; Ahmida ,1994; and Ahmida 2005) to
find sections on, and references to Libya’s Islamists.
Works
on the Islamists of Libya in variably stress the effect of the policies adopted
by Qadhafi, particularly the series of measures he took after 1975 to limit the
power of the clerical establishment. Of these measures, Qadhafi’s position that
the prophetic tradition and Islamic legal rulings (fiqh) are human-made (and therefore should not enjoy the sanctity
awarded to Quran) is by far the most consequential.
Some
of the most recent works, such as Youssef Mohammad Sawani’s article “Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and
the political future” are particularly valuable. This article, which was
published in the journal of Contemporary Arab Affairs (vol. 5, issue 1),
provides an excellent discussion of the political environment in post-Qadhafi
era. Sawani’s brings an insider’s knowledge. He was until the beginning of the
uprising the director of the Gaddafi Foundation. He subsequently resigned and
joined the opposition.
Compared to the English literature, Arabic literature on Islamism
in Libya is richer. However, it pales in comparison (both in breadth and depth)
to literature in Arabic on other Islamic groups in the regions. Despite dozens
of articles and hundreds more of short newspapers’ articles, some of which
dates back to early 1980s, I found only one full work in Arabic on the
Islamists of Libya. This is Naku‘’s most recent book, al-Harakat al-Islamiyya
al-Haditha fi Libiyya. (I was not able
to find the book its self, but relied on several sections of it published
piecemeal on Libyan Websites). Naku‘ is a prolific Libyan authors with more
than 15 titles to his name. His book constitutes to date the most extensive
work on this rather understudied movement. It traces the evolution of all
Islamist ideas in Libya and provides a genealogy of the different factions of
Islamists that operated or are currently operating in Libya.
Naku‘’s work derives its importance, not just from its
timing (coming just a few month before the 2011’s uprising), but also from its
content. It was the first work on the Islamists in Libya to include detailed
biographical information on the leading figures in every Islamist faction in
Libya from 1970s to the time of its publication in 2010. It is therefore a great addition to the
literature, where the names as well as the biographies of key Libyan Islamists
remained until the publication of Naku‘’s work wanting. However, despite its
thorough nature, Naku‘’s work is marred by the evident bias of its author to
Islamists (Naku‘ was himself a founding member of the Muslim Brothers in Libya).
This led to the dominance of an apologetic tone in areas where rigorous
analysis was critically needed. This was particularly true when Naku‘ sought to
explain why these various factions failed in their war against the regime.
The interesting shift in the Islamists’ discourse, which is
the focus of this paper, was the topic of an article by Omar Ashour
entitled “Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamis
Movements.” Ashour’s article relies on a mixture of primary sources and some
ethnographic work. In addition to his reading of the Islamists’ revisions,
Ashour interviewed many leading Islamists including some of those who
participated in writing the above revisions as well as those who first fought
but later negotiated with colonel Gadhafi.
Ashour’s looks at these revisions as a part of a larger context of
de-radicalization that started to spread in the Arab world beginning from late
1990s. He sees those revisions as a continuation of a trend that started in
Algeria with the declaration of unilateral ceasefire by the Islamic Salvation in 1997.
This step was followed by a dismantling of ISA armed units and the attempt to
integrate the movement into the political fabric of the country. He also draws
a comparison between the negotiations that preceded these revisions in Libya
and the programs of munasaha that
have become a part of the Saudi approach to growing radical activism in early
2000s. But according to Ashour revisions are only the first of three steps.
The process, which Ashour termed de-readicalization, consists also of two
other subsequent steps, behavioral and organizational. Revisions constitute the
reversal on the ideological level, which must be followed by a change on the
behavioral level, as indicated by a complete rejection of violence, and later
by practical steps to dismantle the organizational structure of the movement in
question. It seems in Libya that there
was a reversal in the order as the organizational aspect was the first step to
materialize as a result of the state’s repression. Here Ashour highlights the
role the Libya state played in pushing for the ideological de-radicalization.
He specifically focuses on the role that Sayf al-Islam played, enlisting the
help of leading Islamist figures (both local and foreign members of the Muslim
Brothers) such as ‘Ali al-Silabi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
In general, Ashour’s interest in radicalization and de-radicalization as
a process was clear in his earlier book, the De-radicalization of the
Jihadists. This was an ambitious
attempt on the part of Ashour to scientifically describe and also theorize the
conditions in which de-radicalization efforts succeed. Although Ashour
attempted to analytically describe and theoretically account for major cases of
de-radicalization in the Arab World, the Islamists of Libya were not discussed.
This was in part because most of the revisions of Islamists’ discourse in Libya
have not been published at the time and, it is also in part, because of all the
cases, the trajectory of political Islam in Libya is the least documented.
Ashour’s recent article is perhaps an attempt to remedy this case.
Ashour’s interest in the Libyan case is evidently consistent with his
argument about the trend of de-radicalization that is spreading in the Muslim
world. It is also consistent with his other argument that de-radicalization is
not simply important for the Islamists perspective vis-à-vis the state but also
vis-à-vis the West. Ashour argues that the two are connected. Abandoning the
ideological foundation on which radical tendencies against local regimes were
based inescapably effect the same tendencies toward other players, particularly
non-Muslim actors. In light of recent events in Libya, Ashour’s argument of
de-radicalization may seem too optimistic.
The
revisions: context and content
As
the twentieth century drew to close many of the Islamists working in the Arab
World had experienced different phases in their relationship with the existing
regimes. In general, this relationship has vacillated between tolerance, if not
outright support, in the early days of these movements’ life to cooptation and
finally to an all-out war. The last decade of the century saw some of the
bloodiest battles between disenchanted Islamists and local regimes. This was
the time when the Algerian civil war took place pursuant to the cancellation of
1992 general election. This was also the time when the Egyptian Jama‘a was involved in a messy war with
the Egyptian regime—a war in which the Jama‘a
targeted both government personnel and foreign tourists. Moreover, the
spectacular operations of al-Qaeda (such as the attack on a US base in Khubar,
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Col in Yemen)
became the highlights of mid and late 1990s. In short, the 1990s were the prime
time of Jihadist activities across the region.
However,
despite the spectacular display of power and the losses that the Jihadists had
to endure, there was no sign that these acts were bringing the Jihadists
anywhere closer to achieving their goals of dismantling local regimes or
curbing foreign influence. To the contrary, the Jihadists’ acts served as
justifications for more repression on the part of the regimes and further
meddling of foreign powers in their countries. Beyond this failure to influence
events in a positive direction, the jihadists modus operandi was further
discredited on the popular level as their acts not only harmed the economy, led
to more state repression, but also caused civilian deaths and great harm to
civilian institutions.
Ultimately,
state security apparatuses across the region (in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and
elsewhere) gained the upper hands in the war with jihadists. Many of the latter
were either killed or captured, thus diminishing greatly their ability to
carryout any significant operations. Those who were spared were on the run
either inside or outside the borders of their countries and were in no mood to
pursue the struggle any further.
It
should be noted that the outcome of this episode of conflict did not mean a
discrediting of Islamism as an ideology, as some Western scholars saw it.[6] It
rather discredited the rationales for jihad against the near enemy (local
regimes). In other words, it was for the masses a proof of a failure of a
strategy, not of an ideology. Despite the losses, the trials and tribulations
that jihadists went through, the islamization of the street continued to rise unabated.
The growth of Islamist institutions, whether in the field of media or
education, was unmistakable for anyone walking the Arab Streets in late 1990s.
The same was true about the growth of the number of mosques and expansion of
the socio-economic and cultural activities associate them.
With
these two seemingly contradictory trends (defeat of jihadism and rise of
Islamism) in view, the portrait of the future ideology has already revealed
itself. Religion is still in demand and
religiosity continued to rise, at least as a visible aspect of Arab societies.
However, violence against local regimes—hated as they were—had lost popularity.
Therefore, political actors hoped to succeed had to show an ability to restrain
from responding in kind to state repression. They also had to provide an
alternative to the ineffective and extremely corrupt state institutions, especially
those in charge of providing social services to the masses. They had to do all
this within an ideological framework, demonstrably derived from or consistent
with the teachings of Islam.
The
Islamists outside jihadist trends had by mid 1990s grasped these facts and made
the necessary changes to cope. Although some continued to engage politics
within whatever limits a particular national framework allowed, they mostly
focused on providing charitable, educational and technical services to host of
groups across different social stratums, indirectly propagating their ideology.
This was the case of the Muslim Brothers in countries like Egypt, Jordan, and
with some difference, Kuwait and UAE. Other Islamists opted, in hope of gaining
more favors from local governments, to dissolve the organizational structures
of their movements. Such was the approach of the Muslim Brothers in Qatar.[7]
Jihadists
in prisons across the Arab World, such as the al-Jama‘a al-Libiyya
al-Muqatila, were conscious of these changes on the street as well. They were
looking for a way out of the impasse in which they found themselves. In order
to do so, they knew that they have to speak to two contradictory audiences: to
the regimes that imprison them and the general populations whose support they
need for their intellectual and organizational survival. To appease these
regimes, the jihadists have simply to give up their resistance both militant
and peaceful. But simple surrender would look weak and perhaps unpalatable to
the movement’s supporters and the population in general. Surrender has to have
a different flavor. It has to come from within—or at least it should look like
that. Hence born the need for the revisions.
The
struggle to come up with a given formula was often long and arduous, as there
was a need to reflect the well of most prominent members of any given group, if
not the consensus of its members. The conditions for such consensus were not
ripe in some environments when they seemed so elsewhere. Hence, the Egyptian revisions came much
earlier than that of the Libyan ones. The jihadists in Egypt, who were in
competition with a score of other political groups (most of which had at the
time some leeway, narrow as it were, to propagate their message), were prompt
in their reexamination of the religious foundations that inform their activism.
The
pressure on the Jihadists would only grow during the first decade of the 21th
century. The war on terror did not only result in more cooperation between
local regimes and foreign powers against the Islamists but it also led to gross
violations of human rights. Prisoners received the brunt of these
violations. As the extent of torture in
Abu Ghrib and Guantanamo became a public information, the jailors in the Arab
World, who were not known for their clemency, knew that human rights were
nothing but a polite fiction and were now confident that they can act with
impunity. After all, torture, euphemistically referred to as “enhanced
interrogation techniques,” had become a de facto policy in the prisons of those
with mightiest arms and loudest rhetoric on human rights.
But
the jihadists were not the only party interested in some resolution. In the
period that followed the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many governments
were afraid that local adversaries might seek backing from the US to try to
topple them. This fear became more acute when US rhetoric of democratization
after the invasion of Iraq seemed to suggest that all countries in the region
had to democratize. In the meanwhile, these governments were aware, despite
their claims to the contrary on state media, that they enjoyed very little
support amongst their population, and a few of the leaders looked favorably at
the prospect of his own citizens desecrating his own statutes. Hence many of
them turned their attention inside to court some of the population to support
them or at least find a truce with those with whom they were at war.[8]
Other
players in the field, especially the Islamists, have also been mulling the
possibility of adopting a more reconciliatory tone toward the existing regimes,
judging that such reconciliation would in the long run change the nature of
these regimes and set them on a road to reform. Of course, this was all driven
by the sentiment of a populace that has grown tired of the pettiness and
fruitlessness of the struggle between these local regimes and the various
Islamists factions. Many Islamists wrote to advocate this approach and have set
channels to communicate with the traditional scholars working with or connected
to the regime.
Out
of this communication grew the desire of all parties to reexamine the
foundations according to which they have managed the conflict. Traditional
scholars and some prominent Islamists personalities would now initiate the
conversation between the jailors (governments) and jailed (jihadists). The
Islamists, whether current or former members of the Muslim Brothers, served as a
liaison to the Jihadists in prison with whom they had once shared the umbrella
of political Islam. The state clerics represented the state. With parties to the negotiation mostly
speaking or claiming to speak on behalf of the faith, it was not surprising
that the outcome was treatises in Islamic jurisprudence, ones in which the
tendencies of all three parties were accommodated. The Jihadists who had the
least leverage, being in prison, made most concessions (acknowledging the error
of their methods). But by participating, the Jihadists also gained the
recognition as a credible force within society, and above all established,
albeit implicitly, the sincerity of their intentions.
The
religious scholars representing the state had something to gain and something
to lose as well. They won the recognition as true representatives of the faith,
as an indispensable reference to anyone desiring to learn Islam. But they also
had to tacitly acknowledge that their patrons, the regimes on whose behalf they
negotiated, are oppressors. Although the revisions invariably forbade the excommunication
of these regimes and considered illegal any military attempt to challenge them,
they affirmed the illegitimate nature of their rule.
The
personalities affiliated with the Muslim Brother, which participated in or
endorsed these debates, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, had nothing to loose and
almost everything to gain. Not only did their participation enhance their clout
amongst the participants and the general public and opened a window for them to
those in power. The result of these debates seemed also to consolidate the
ikhwanization of political Islam in the Arab World, as they promoted a gradual,
non-confrontational, long term goal of societal change, and as they promoted a
non-literalist reading of religious text, thereby precluding, limiting or transforming
in the way the salafist inclination. But overall, the outcome, the substance of
these revisions went hand in hand with the popular trend, which showed a proclivity
to reject violence and excommunication, while demonstrating the preponderance of
Islamist motifs.
The
revisions of the Libya’s jihadists were the latest in these series of revisions
and as a consequence the most extensive. (They are also the most ironic since
they came just months before their authors engaged in bloody war to topple the
very regime on his behest these revisions were written.) Unlike the revisions
of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt,
which were published in a series of smaller books each tackling a specific
issue, the jihadist of Libya published all their revisions at once in a document
that is so far the most comprehensive in its topic. Evidently, some of the
views expressed in the Egyptian muraja‘at
were recycled, but many more opinions and views were introduced. They, for
example, share with the Egyptian revisions their realistic approach to Islamic
jurisprudence. The impact of social, political, economic and military
environment on which approach one adopts is particularly striking. The need to take into consideration not just
the legitimacy of the goal, the appropriateness of the means but also the
consequences of the action was strongly emphasized. This stands at a contrast
with the traditional stance of many jihadists that the outcomes should be left
to God, and that one is responsible only for possessing a good intention and
making all the efforts he could master to implement God’s commandments. The
consequences of one’s action, the reactions and counter-reactions that they
would generate were never to be considered a priori, if at all.
In
contrast to that view, the new revisions were all written with the end goal and
results in mind. This was achieved through out these revisions in two different
ways. On one hand there is an emphasis on the enormous responsibility that
those embark on Jihad shoulder to ensure that abiding by Islamic regulations
takes precedence over expediency. In other words, the end does not justify the
means. But even when the means and goals are legitimate there is an emphasis on
contemplating the consequences. It should be noted here that consequences do
not have to be material, perception and popular sentiment are as important. In
the Libyan revisions, there are several variables that are introduced as means
to assess consequences. These include the cohesiveness of a Muslim society, the
image of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of others, the stability of a Muslim
society and the deterrence that Muslim could establish or loose vis-à-vis their
adversaries as a result of a given action. These variables are emphasized to be
central goals of Islam and therefore should not be sacrificed for minor ones,
such as seeking political power. If the cohesiveness of the Muslim society
would be negatively impacted by certain acts, these acts may become, for that
very reason, impermissible. Adverse consequences de-justify (invalidate) both
the means and the end. The importance of this aspect justifies quoting from the
text at length here:
A
person can argue that a Muslim should only work to establish the religion using
whatever means he deems legitimate. This should suffice. He should not look at
the consequences of this, whether the outcome is harmful or useful to the
society. That is, the Muslim should work with legitimate means as they explained
literally in the text. Orders will ultimately brings the desired outcome. … We
have responded to this kind of argument. We have pointed out that this is a
defective way of thinking. It should suffice to mention that Jihad, promoting
good and prohibiting vices are not goals in themselves but means to establish
religion. If they stand in the way of achieving that goal, for whatever reason,
then they become forbidden.[9]
The
solution to this conundrum is the re-delegation of the responsibility of
declaring proper jihad to religious scholars, who are able to interpret
religious commandments from a holistic perspective and hence addressing events
within their own socio-political, cultural and military contexts. This aspect
was particularly striking in the case of Libyan revisions. In fact, most of
these revisions are based on this point. The scholars are the ones who should
make pronouncements regarding important matters such as jihad. Their absence,
these revisions asserted, was the root of all the errors the movement
committed:
Since
their ijtihadat and efforts were
those of human being, it was inevitable that they would suffer from defects,
shortcomings, and mistakes for many reasons, especially the absence of scholars
from the field of orientation. This was also due to the novel nature of the
experiments and lack of experience among other things.[10]
Because
of the central role that religious scholars play in interpreting religious texts,
the authors of the revisions were eager to clarify that this document is a
synthesis of scholarly opinions and not simply those of the authors:
We
could have made this study only about the lessons we learned from the
experiences we have had so far…and how these revisions make sense given those
experiences, but we opted here instead to focus on the Islamic grounds on the
basis of which we are making these revisions… We know that would be better… We
did not just want to publish opinions.[11]
But
beyond emphasizing the role of religious scholars as the final arbiters in
matters pertaining to faith and especially to major commitments such as Jihad,
and in addition to acknowledging that errors were made during their activism,
the authors admit that the essence of the revisions is nothing new as this line
of thought was already widespread “among other brothers.”[12] Moreover,
the authors devoted a whole section to the rejection of harm and the promotion
of public good as an overriding Islamic goal and hence the true source of
happiness. This is consistent with the general tendency among the population to
reject violence, militancy and to prefer a more realistic and forward looking
stance based on promoting public interests and providing serves to those
needing them.
In
general, the revisions that the Islamists published in late 1990s and early
2000s reflect the desire of these movements, especially the jihadists to remain
relevant in a context where religious activism has taken on a new meaning. This
is evident in the LIFG revisions where the popular frustration with dead-end
strategy of confrontation was expressed in religious frames. In these revisions
Jihad is not a goal that has to be realized. It is, instead, a means to an end.
If it seems that this end is not achievable through the use of Jihad as it has
been defined in Islamist discourses, then Jihad as such is not necessary. But
Jihad as a way to promote public interest through peaceful means (a conception
that has gained popularity as Jihadists themselves acknowledged) is welcome.
Initiating jihad, justifying an act as a jihad, is not something that could be
left to anyone. Such decision has to be delegated to known authority. The
alternative is the nihilism and chaos that typified local ventures of jihad.
Once
this power of declaring jihad is handed over to the religious scholars, then
they and whatever patrons they have shoulder that responsibility. This was the
first necessary step toward putting both regimes and the religious
establishment before their own task. The absence of confrontation with the
Islamists takes away the last fig leaf behind which the regimes hide their
inefficacy and corruption. Empowering religious scholars also means putting
more pressure on them to disassociate themselves from the corruption of the
regime under whose tutelage they function. More importantly, the withdrawal of
the Islamists, the jihadists that is, from the fore of the social struggle
against injustice meant that the field of resistance was left open to all
participants. With the withdrawal of the Jihadists, with the end of any claim
to exclusivity, with the absence of one group claiming to represent the
vanguards, the society has no one to speak on its behalf except its collective;
that is, everyone. This was the background of the Arab Spring. The violence
that stained its march was in part a by product of the violence of the regimes,
but also because the revisions above, especially in Libya, were not only fresh but
also have mostly been written for extrinsic, not intrinsic reasons. This is not
to say that the Jihadists were dishonest. It is rather to say that they were
and continue to be extroversive. They made and will likely make mistakes but
they also assess the results. The Islamists in general, and the jihadist in
particular, are not lunatics.
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