Light notes on Hodgson’s seminal Work: The venture of Islam-- The rise and decline of the Sufi aura; the dawn of reform movements
The
reason for treating Sufism here is because of its centrality in the history of
Islam and also because of the controversy over its role in leading to the
backwardness--at least in the technical sense-- of Muslims. There is a
parallel, it would seem from Hodgson's account, between the role Sufi orders
played during the 18th century in the Ottoman Empire and the role
they are accused of playing in the discourse of the Arabic Renaissance, where
such effects are traced to a very early period, and where it is mostly
emphasized on the cultural—not on the political—front.
Sufi
movements still maintain today a strong presence in numerous pockets in the
Muslim world. But the influence of Sufi ideas has evidently been in decline for
some time. The decline of Sufi ideas is a relatively modern phenomenon.
Until late 19th century, the overwhelming majority of Muslim
societies espoused, more or less, a Sufi view of religion. The decline of
Sufi ideas in modern time in the lands of Islam is a complex phenomenon,
complex in the sense that it is the product of multiplicity of factors. The
dominance of scientific spirit even in limited classes within any given
society, the rise of political Islam with its emphasis often on a literalist
reading of scripture, both played a role in this metamorphosis. The retreat of
Sufi concepts was also the result of an aggressive onslaught from the movements
of religious reform that emerged in the second half of the 19th
century. This onslaught reached its peak in the second half of the 20th
century. But why did Sufi views become the target of such onslaught? And what
were the historical, social and political processes that led to the rise and
decline of Sufism in the lands of Islam? These questions will be considered
here briefly in light of the Hodgson's discussion in this week’s
reading.
But
first what is Sufism?
Sufism
could be defined as an approach to life, an outlook to life infused with
religious codes and symbols. A central point in this Sufi outlook of the universe is the distinction between what is ‘manifest’ and what is ‘real’. In
Sufi thought these two are tied in a zero-sum form of logic. The ‘real’ is
never ‘manifest’ and the ‘manifest’ is never ‘real’. As a matter of fact, the
‘manifest,’ often serves to disguise the ‘real’. Moreover, the ‘manifest’ has
an outward presence which is perceptible through senses. The ‘real’ on the
other hand has inward presence, one that is accessible only through
introspection. From this viewpoint stems another corollary: not
everyone—at least not every ordinary individual—is capable of recognizing the
‘real’. It is the ability of one to transcend the ‘manifest,’ to resist its
lure that determines his/her capacity to see reality in its pristine form.
To transcend and elude the visual and perceptible effects of the
‘manifest’ requires a detachment from everyday’s life—from the phenomena that
regulate the observable universe. Hence, a Sufi ultimate goal is to free his/her soul from all forms of gravity in hope of soaring beyond the veil of the
‘manifest’ and to be able to see with an unimpeded clairvoyance and sagacity.
When
did Sufism appear and how did it come to dominate?
As
a practice Sufism appeared toward the beginning of the 8th century
in a number of cities in the land that constitutes today the modern country of
Iraq. It would take Sufism at least another century or so to make inroads in
the Arab lands and other parts of the Muslim world. It would seems from
Hodgson’s account that by late 16 and early 17th century Sufi orders
became widespread enough to refer to them as “the great international
orders.”[1] He also notes that
Shari‘ia ‘ulama, who constituted the core of the Muslim elites and the most
authoritative religious establishment within Islam (and who provided legitimacy
to rulers on one hand and kept them in-check on the other), “were [during the
seventeenth century] mostly Sufis of some sort and defended their positions in
terms consistent with Sufism.[2] This Sufi tendency, with
its emphasis on a divorce between the observable and revealed and the
imperceptible and concealed was not without consequences. The ‘ulama, who were
by now mostly Sufis, became more rigid in their interpretation of what is
acceptable, impeding the ability of the Ottomans to acquire, Western made
innovation, including the most neutral elements such as “the use of printing.” [3]
Why
did Sufism become a target?
Hodgson
notes that “by the end of the eighteenth century, the number of earnest reform
movements being launched surely exceeded the average.” [4]Such movements directed
their criticism at various levels of society, but of all these two levels drew
reformers’ attention: disparity between form and practice within administrative
circles and the corrupting impact of such discrepancy on men of religious
standing, particularly Sufis. According to Hodgson, the latter is a direct
result of centuries of evolution during which “the Sufi turuq…had grown
more burdened with the weight of endowed property and popular superstition.
Many of the more established orders had notoriously compromised their
principles, either for wealth or for popularity; too many of those who took the
Sufi name were mere charlatans.” As a result, Sufi orders “became an important
target of reform movements.[5] Another reason why these orders came under direct assault from reform movements has to do with
the central place these orders occupied within Muslim societies. The fact that
the ‘ulama, who once stood as an ever watchful, ever present and engaged
religious entity that counterbalanced—even in theoretical sense—the power of
the secular leadership; had come to espouse, on one level, the appearance of
Sufi withdrawal, and on the other, the acquiescence and the sycophancy of the
courtiers; made such reform more urgent. It also made Sufism its main target
because of the association that had for some time now been made between ‘ulama
and Sufi saints.
It should be noted here that the clash with movements of reform
that swept the Muslim world in late 18th and during much of the 19th
century was not the first of such encounters between supporters and detractors of
Sufism. In Arabic lands, Sufism sustained a heavy onslaught during the 12th
and 13th centuries. This onslaught took both a military and
intellectual dimensions (where the latter being invoked more often in the
Mashriq and the former more so in the Maghreb). But Sufism outlasted this
onslaught, securing niches outside the Arabic zone and in remote areas within
it as well. By mid 14th century, Sufism was back, this time,
in full swing. The isolationist and non-political stance of Sufism made its
return and flourishing a relatively easy process, for it would not have alarmed
any governing entity. (The swell of their numbers and the expansive
geographical areas which they came to dominate are analogous to the prevalence
of the jama‘at al-Da‘wa wal Tabligh. This movement today is
present in almost all countries --both inside and outside the Muslim world-- and
has hitherto managed to avoid any clash with any regime anywhere in the world.
Yet, its activity is conducted in the open.) It would seem from Hodgson’s
account that unlike in the Arab lands, in the Ottoman Empire Sufi orders became
dominant only in the 16th century—and continued to thrive until late
18th century, wherefrom they came under attack from reformers.
Prevalence of Sufism: Conflicting assessments of the
impact
It seems from the account of Hodgson that the prevalence of
Sufism as a system of reference among the religious scholars of the Ottoman
Empire created a rigid conservative atmosphere that was directly or indirectly
responsible for the resistance to change within the Empire. Hodgson believed
that is why the religious reform was possible in independent Arabia and not in,
say, Anatolia, where the presence of Sufi schools made reform impossible at the
time. But beyond religious reform, there is also the hint that the dominance of
these orders made any attempt at opening (from an intellectual and scientific
sense) to the outside world and taking initiative forbidden or undesired act.
This process would have become visible and impactful in the context of the
Ottoman Empire only during the 18th and 19th century,
when it was finally clear that the Occident became demonstrably more superior
to the aging Empire. Accurate as this may be, the impact of the shift from a
more participatory religious system to a more withdrawn and more superstitious
one has long been present; even if it effects did not become visible because of
the absence of an assertive and rapidly advancing adversary. Such impact dates
at least to the early 13th century, if one is to believe the story
that came to dominate in the Arabic discourse of the Renaissance. In this
literature, the impact started sometime during the latter days of the Abbasid
reign, spreading a diseased spirit inclined toward metaphysical and
superstitious explanations of events, inculcating thereby the concept of
predisposition (in theological sense) and hence the futility of human actions.
[1] -[122]
[2] -[123]
[3] -[123]
[4] -[159]
[5] -[159]
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