Are we reliving the “Shi‘i Century”? Light notes on Hodgson’s seminal work: Venture of Islam

(This was written before the current events in the Arab world--maybe the Shi 'i century is finally drawing to close)

This section of Hodgson’s reading provides an extensive review of the historical developments in the Muslim world in what Hodgson term ‘Middle Period,’ which he in turn divides into an early and late period. This roughly corresponds to the period between 945 and 1500 C.E. In both periods, Hodgson surveys the political, social, economic and cultural changes in all the lands in which Islam held sway, an area that stretches all the way from southern Asia to al-Andalusia in Europe.  What makes this period unique in Hodgson’s judgment was that it witnessed the demise of the central Caliphal structure that prevailed for almost two centuries. On the other level, this demise—despite all the political turmoil that it engendered and the fragmentation on the political and economic level— did not translate to a direct decline of the idea of the Muslim community. Yet, the changes on the political and cultural fronts in some of these periods and in some of the areas are indeed fascinating. I found the rise of the Shi‘a to the corridors of power and their intellectual influence in large areas of the Muslim world the most fascinating aspect of these changes. This is interesting in light of the following three facts: 1) that the strength of the central caliphal state was build on the loyalty of what Hodgson termed the ‘Jami‘i-Sunni’ scholars to the exclusion of other minor trends; 2) that Shi‘is were and continued to be, even after the passing of what historians refer to as the ‘Shi‘i Century,’ a minority within the realm of Islam; 3) the religious literature that had gained wide acceptance and endorsement of the state was largely Sunni.  The Shi‘is were able, as Hodgson documents, to rise against their minority status and to provide both military leadership and financial patronage for a majority who considered their formulations of religious creeds and literature at best misguided and at worse heretical.

The surge of Shi‘i influence that culminated in the Fatimid’s control of Egypt, Syria, and al-Hijaz, created an arch of Shi‘i influence that stretches at one point of time from North Africa all the way to India.  These areas were then and continue to be today, except for Iran and part of Iraq, a Sunni stronghold. Evidently, this situation would not have happened if it was not for the decline of the authority of the Sunni religious and political leadership, a decline that translated in the absence of a specialized class (intellectual, military and otherwise) that could garner the support of the masses. As the ‘Abbasid Caliphs turn into mere figureheads and as their courts became invested with corruption and moral decadence, the masses (Sunnis included) who often held to the view that an ‘oppressive leader is better than chaos’ or fitan, became less interested in throwing their support behind a Caliphal system—which its own holders chose to bankrupt— and more willing to capitulate to any alternative form of governance. (The hope, of course, had always been to see that ideal caliphal system resurrected one day, even perhaps with the intervention of Devine providence). The disenchanted Shi‘i scholars and political leaders, who found an environment ripe for social and political change, marched from marginal lands in North African and also from the deep areas of Iran to bigger centers of Islamdom.

An interesting parallel with some differences that have to do with the nature of the political discourse and norms of the modern period, has been forming since the Islamic revolution in Iran propelled Shi‘i theocrats into the corridors of power in Tehran in 1979. Ever since, the echoes of this Shi‘i revolution kept reverberating across the Muslim world— interestingly enough in mostly Sunni areas where Shi‘ism was always held in contempt. The first manifestation of these echoes was expressed in the rise of Islamic movements to the fore of the political arena in countries like Egypt, Sudan and Syrian. These movements looked at the Iranian revolution as a model to emulate. Despite apparent ideological and doctrinal differences, most of these movements (such as the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and its various branches throughout the Arab and Muslim World) looked at Tehran for inspiration and guidance. The second manifestation of this was the Iranian attempt (which has been successful so far) to use its sympathetic stance vis-à-vis the plight of the Palestinians, which most Sunni Arab leaders were unable to solve, as a window to the hearts and minds of the masses in the important capitals of the region. Capitalizing on the struggle of small shi‘i minorities in the region, particularly the adept struggle of the Lebanese Shi‘i organization (Hezbollah) against Israel, Iran was able to portray itself—at least to many—as the spokesperson for Muslim causes in the region. Eight years of devastating warfare launched by the Iraqis (supported by oil-wealthy Gulf States and much of the ‘civilized world’) did little to curb this influence.

 By the end of the twentieth century it was apparent to many that Iran has emerged from this war as a regional power and that the Shi‘i influence has as a result increased. The Saudis were growing conscious of the rising opposition of the Shi‘i minority to their Sunni theocracy and were looking for measures—mostly economical— to attenuate the resultant tension. The Bahrainis and Kuwaitis, both with their own Shi‘i communities, were experimenting with different trends of political reform to achieve similar end.   In Lebanon the Shi‘i community, which capitalized on the perceived victory of Hezbollah on Israel to garner the support of the masses, was only a few steps short of running the state. With the rise of the prices of oil (much like the lucrative revenue of the Fatimid naval trade), Iran was able to finance large subsidies of Shi‘i endowments and schools in many countries including Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and other non-Arab countries in West Africa, such as Senegal.  Just two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the aftermath of the US-led invasion, strategists and political pundits alike started talking about the formation of a Shi‘i power arch. It was therefore no surprise that a year ago the biggest Sunni religious institution, al-Azzhar, issued a statement in which it condemned what it perceived to be increasing cases of Shi‘i attempt to convert Sunnis over to their camp. A few weeks later, Egyptian authorities claimed that they uncovered Shi‘i terrorist cells that was planning to carryout military acts in hope of destabilizing the country and in provoking a social revolt. Egyptian authorities blamed Hezbollah for training and sending members of these cells. And it was not long until Morocco announced its intention to sever ties with Iran on the charge of increasing Iranian meddling in the Moroccan internal affairs.

All of this happened because the current Sunni leaders, most of whom came to power through military coups or inheritance, and who have so far failed to fill any of their constituents’ aspirations, have lost all popular support in their own countries. While many Sunnis have far less favorable opinions of Iran and the Shi‘i sect, they look at Iran as a Muslim country that succeeded where their own leaders failed. Despite being in conflict with western powers and ardently opposing the occupation of Palestine, Iran was able to achieve a reasonable level of development while remaining a strong contender in the region.

Although the comparison between the Shi’i century of the ‘Middle Period’ and the current influence of Iran and the Shi‘ia in our time will remain incomplete, there is indeed some striking resemblance. Both instances of Shi‘i influence took place as a result of the absence of a powerful Sunni leadership, particularly in the central lands such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Hijaz.  Both also happened at a time of deepening division among the Sunni-leaders. As the current rift between local Sunni Arab leaders and the trouble that their countries face are reminiscent of the rift between the caliph in Baghdad and his representatives throughout the region, most of whom wanted to create their own independent states. The concerted effort of by Ikhshidid rulers to gain independence from the central government in Baghdad and constant revolts in al-Hijaz, and Yemen are but a few examples. The centrality of Iraq in both cases is also interesting. The rise of the Shi‘i influence in both cases seem to coincide with the decline of the Sunni power in Iraq in particular. It almost looks like that whoever maintains a strong presence in Iraq enjoys a favorable influence elsewhere in the region. Moreover, the Messianic belief that the Isma‘ilis held and which served as a strong impetus to spread their power not only in Islam but elsewhere in hope of making “Islam triumph in all the world” is shared by current Shi‘i leaders particularly in Iran. These leaders see the rise of their nation as a part of an inevitable Devine plan to rid earth from injustice and to bring about the ‘absent’ Imam.  

It remains to be seen whether the Iranians will be able to replicate the Fatimid experience in the Muslim world and whether this coming century is going to be a Shi‘i century as was much of the tenth century and part of the eleventh century. The rise of Turkey as an important player in the region brings to minds a possible and interesting turn of events should history chooses to replicate itself. Furthermore, the presence of the Israelis as a non-Muslim entity directly controlling the sacred religious sites in Palestine adds another dimension to this historical comparison as it brings to the fore the image of the crusade state in Jerusalem in the final days of the Fatimid in Egypt. Evidently, the nature of the theatre of modern geopolitics has its own effects in making a complete parallel an unlikely scenario. Nonetheless, the picture is not at all that different if someone approaches it with a flexible mind that ignores the discrepancy in the chronology of events at the micro level to see the striking similarities in the macro picture.