Light notes on Hodgson’s seminal Work: The venture of Islam (Egyptian Drama and Japanese high-tech: two models of Westernization!)

This week’s reading of Hodgson looks at how Western domination of non-Western cultures during the 19^th century finally came to an end as these cultures became conscious of their position as pawns in the hands of Western players. In this vein, Hodgson discusses the process through which these various ‘others’ sought to reverse the equation of the 19^th century: The West dictates, the rest follows. The process started with the desire for self-rule, but with the hope of ultimate independence and self-sufficiency. While the first goal was mostly realized, at least as a political formality, the other goal remained elusive for most of these ‘others.’ Part of that has to do with the nature of colonization itself, but significant parts have to do with the reaction to the culture of colonization. Almost all of these ‘others’ adopted some measure of Westernization, having rightly understood that the emergence of the West as a potent power was no coincidence. There was something about the West that made it distinctive. But what exactly was that distinctive element, and how to transplant it in one’s backyard were the points on which these ‘others’ diverged.  These were the questions to which the answers determined the degree of success in breaking with the state of dependency that the culture of colonization has sown.  

That the actors in nationalist movements were conscious of, and to some extent believed in the ‘distinctiveness’ of the West as they strongly sought to dispel it is evident in the background of these actors. Most of the leaders in such movements came from the segment of the population that had much contact with the West, with the most articulate members being fully immersed in this culture.  On the minds of those who strove to dislodge from the hegemony of the West and those who sought parity with it, the common belief was that Westernization, or some measure thereof, is inevitable, if not required. Expectedly, Westernization, or some aspects of it, did not guarantee independence. As a result, most of those who wanted to Westernize their societies were successful, at least at the superficial level, in modeling their society “in imitation of what was happening in the West: buses and typewriters, toothpaste ads, and aeroplanes, unveiled women harrying to their jobs and grey-suited businessmen consulting their watches, gradually appeared or even became routine in all these cities, though the squalid poverty of the ordinary people was not relieved.”[1] However most failed to achieve a meaningful independence, let alone technical parity.

Among the few who succeeded Hodgson brings the example of Japan. Japan is important for a number of reasons. First, Japan was among the early non-Western nations to make contact with the West and to embark on a modernization project. Second Japan “had [unlike most other non-Western nations] carefully forestalled most of the disruptive effect of the Western Transmutation and had kept its economy and institutions intact.”[2] Moreover, Hodgson cites Japan also because of its importance as the first non-Western power to defeat a Western power, thereby dispelling the belief in the invincibility of the West and its corollary of inherent racial superiority.  Last, Japan was ultimately able to reach a level of technical sophistication that rivals, if doesn’t surpass, that of most Western countries.  It is the latter aspect that often receives more attention, often to ponder why the Japanese succeeded whereas others failed?

In the Islamic World and especially in the Arab World, the successful model of Japan is often invoked by intellectuals when reflecting on what they see as the failure of the Arab World to achieve independence (as measured by technical self-sufficiency). Egypt is a country whose fate is often contrasted with Japan. This is not simply because Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab World, and hence the country that possesses the largest human capital to rely on in realizing its self-sufficiency.  It is because Egypt, like Japan, came to direct contact with the West at a relatively early time.  Like Japan, Egypt also embarked on a Westernization campaign hoping to be admitted to the Western club as a respected member. To prove its credential, Egypt espoused imperialist tendency, expanding its territory on the expense of its neighbors (hence came the annexation of Sudan and the War with Ethiopia and other ventures in the region). Egypt would later insist on holding to some of these possessions, namely, Sudan even as it lost control over its own territory, thus earning the oxymoron of ‘the colonized colonizer.’  

Egypt’s contact with the West, at least in regards to the question of modernity, dates back to the Napoleonic invasion (1798–1801).  Upon the French withdrawal, Egypt sought under the leadership of Muahmmad ‘Ali (an Ottoman military commander) to modernize itself. His reign saw a concerted effort to create an industrial base, which initially achieved some success. Muhammad ‘Ali also sent Egyptians to study in European schools hoping to ape Western development.  By introducing Western concepts and culture, Muhammad ‘Ali and subsequent leaders hoped— one would assume—to achieve parity with the West. But the ultimate outcome was anything but. Out of the campaign to modernize came first, dependency on Western financiers, then indebtedness and eventually capitulation to Western powers (mostly France and Britain, with the latter ultimately occupying the country 1882 ‘to restore order,’ a complicated process which lasted until 1954).  

Toward the end of the first half of the twentieth century, both Egypt and Japan had recently received humiliating defeats.  Although they shared in the anguish of defeat, it is the nature of the defeat that set them apart. Japan lost at the hands of the Allies, mostly the USA, after two of its cities were annihilated by nuclear bombs—a testimony no doubt to Japan’s technical competence and tenacity.  Egypt, on the other hand, was humiliated by a ‘band’ of irregular—albeit perhaps more organized and better armed.  The contrast between the two processes of Westernization was revealed, and the meaning of which was not certainly lost on Egyptian intellectuals. Part of the Egyptian failure has to do, as many articulate Egyptians have come to argue, with its inability to either create an industrial base that would supply its army with modern armaments, or to achieve a level of sophistication to select more dependable clients to supply them. But this inability is not a product Egypt’s lack of adopting Western methods. To be sure, Egypt had then, more perhaps than it is now, the appearance of a Western country. The educated community in Egypt at the time had an easy access to the most recent Western trends in literature, in arts and in cinema.  Egyptian had also their share of Western-like institutions and Western-oriented thinkers who aptly mimicked their Western colleagues and produced prolifically in their respective fields.

The same scenario would be repeated two decades later. Egypt received an even more humiliating defeat as a part of what the Arab came to call Naksa.   By then Japan was well on its way to becoming a world industrial power, although in civilian matters not in military technology as the consequences of WWII would have prevented such matter. There was still no indication that Egypt was going, at least not any time soon, to achieve self-sufficiency either in civilian or military matters.  Long gone are the days of Muhammad ‘Ali when building a great and glorious Egypt seemed within reach. 

The Neksa, was an earthquake whose repercussions are still visible today. But the most immediate aftershock and more relevant to our purposes here was the intellectual warfare that ensured between secular and Islamist thinkers. Even though such thinkers hated one another, they all came to the same conclusion: Egypt chose the wrong element(s) in Western cultures. This attitude was summed in a sarcastic, albeit not entirely untruthful statement attributed to the late Egyptian preacher ‘Abd al-Hamid Kishk.  Kishk, as he is mostly known, drew a comparison between Egypt’s response to Western influence and that of Japan.  He contended that Japan and Egypt made contact with the West at roughly the same time. They both decided to adopt Western methods. Egypt sent its students to study in the West and so did Japan. But Egypt chose to focus on theatre and cinema, whereas Japan concentrated on technology and sciences. The problem is not in the choice, Kishk sardonically asserts, but in the outcome. After a century of their initial contacts with the West, Japan was able to excel, if not to outperform the West, in technology. Egypt on the other hand failed to produce a good drama! --this is an old piece.